In an era marked by shifting global dynamics, the military cooperation between Pakistan and China stands as a cornerstone in maintaining regional stability, with strategic alliances and advanced defense collaborations shaping the evolving balance of power in South Asia.

In August 2022, Pakistan's then Chief of the Army Staff described the Pakistan-China militaries as “brothers in arms,” working together to safeguard their collective interests. The volume and quality of military-to-military interactions validate this description and further highlight the growing military relationship.
The geopolitical landscape of South Asia is shaped by a complex interplay of historical grievances, national aspirations, and strategic alliances. At the heart of this intricate web lies the military cooperation between Pakistan and China, which has become a vital factor in maintaining the regional strategic balance and countering Indian military ambitions. As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, Pakistan-China military cooperation will remain crucial in shaping the future stability of South Asia.
The relationships among China, India, and Pakistan serve as key drivers of Asian security. Forming a "strategic triangle," these three countries are entangled in a complex dynamic often described as a "four-sided saga," where India and the U.S. align strategically against China and Pakistan.    
The strategic balance in South Asia is primarily influenced by India’s hegemonistic regional designs and its desire to become the net security provider in South Asia. India's military modernization poses significant challenges for Pakistan and other South Asian countries. The concept of strategic balance is further complicated by the involvement of external powers, particularly the strategic support to India by the U.S. and the European Union (EU). Historically, the U.S. has supported India as a counterbalance to China, a strategic partner of Pakistan, thereby altering the dynamics of South Asia. However, Pakistan's deepening ties with China have allowed it to navigate this complex geopolitical environment more effectively.

The strategic balance in South Asia is primarily influenced by India’s hegemonistic regional designs and its desire to become the net security provider in South Asia.

In contemporary international politics, Sino-Pak relations stand out as one of the few enduring friendships that have withstood the test of time and shifting geostrategic conditions. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1951 and have never looked back. The foundation of Pakistan-China relations was solidified in the early 1960s, driven by mutual interests against common adversaries and a shared vision of regional stability. The Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963 laid the groundwork for military collaboration, which has since evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership.

The Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963 laid the groundwork for military collaboration, which has since evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership.

The early 21st century saw an intensification of this cooperation, particularly with China’s rise as a global power and Pakistan’s increasing partnership with China for military hardware and economic growth. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has not only facilitated economic development but also strengthened military ties, enhancing Pakistan’s strategic capabilities to counterbalance India. This historical context is crucial for understanding the contemporary dynamics of the all-weather military cooperation between the two nations.
The military partnership encompasses various dimensions, including arms sales, joint military exercises, and technology transfers. China has been a significant supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, providing advanced weaponry, including fighter jets, and submarines. Notably, the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, co-produced by the two countries, exemplifies the depth of this military collaboration. This military cooperation enhances Pakistan’s defensive capabilities, thereby deterring potential aggression from India. Therefore, the delicate equilibrium in South Asia is contingent upon the evolving military dynamics between Pakistan and China.
India's unresolved strategic and military issues with Pakistan and China have been a central tenet in India's national security policy. Over the years, the tension between India and China has intensified over China's support for Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, the increasing presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, and border disputes such as the ones leading to the Doklam standoff. China’s military posture and cooperation with Islamabad contribute to maintaining a strategic balance in the region while reinforcing China’s regional influence.
Pakistan-China's strong convergence in security interests has led to a multifaceted strategic relationship, reflected in a strong show of support for each other's positions across a wide spectrum of bilateral, regional, and international issues.
China-Pakistan military cooperation can be examined through arms transfers and co-development, military diplomacy and exercises, as well as military basing preparations and contingencies. China has been a steadfast supporter of Pakistan's conventional arsenal since the 1960s and has remained the country’s most important defense partner since the end of the Cold War. Over the past decade, China has emerged as Pakistan's leading and most significant arms supplier, while Pakistan has become China’s largest and most important arms recipient. China is the primary supplier of the Pakistan Army’s combat power, especially as Western-supplied equipment has shifted from combat platforms to supporting elements like intelligence, transport, and logistics.

Pakistan is seeking to modernize its armored fleet with China’s VT4 (MBT-3000), a 52-ton main battle tank designed and manufactured by the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).

China’s contribution to Pakistan’s combat capability becomes even more apparent when each service’s equipment is disaggregated by source. Chinese-origin equipment constitutes a significant portion of the army's offensive armor and fire-support units, such as artillery and rocket launchers, while its contribution to infantry vehicles and aviation units is comparatively lower. Similarly, while Pakistan's navy appears diverse, an assessment based on combatant ships, displacement tonnage, or missile cells highlights the substantial role of Chinese-sourced naval combat capabilities.
Understanding China's imprint on the Pakistan military requires a close examination of each service. Despite the historical attention paid to Pakistan's three F-16 fighter squadrons, each comprising 18-24 of its most advanced combat aircraft, Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 multirole combat aircraft make up the largest share of Pakistan's modern fighter fleet. In contrast, the China-supplied F-7, designed for short-range air-to-air combat, forms the backbone of the legacy attack aircraft fleet.
Since the early 1970s, China has been the largest Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aviation assets provider by total volume. By 1990, it had become the source of more than half the fighter and support aircraft. The number of Chinese-origin aircraft is more than double that of the next leading provider, the U.S., and is poised to rise in the coming decade. While the PAF has historically been one of the most prominent operators of the U.S. F-16 fighter, the service’s future is undoubtedly intertwined with China’s. This trajectory with the new production of the fourth-generation JF-17 block III and the recent sale and transfer of the 4.5-generation fighter J-10CE is considered at par with the modern U.S. F-16/17.
The PAF currently fields six squadrons of JF-17s and J-10s compared to three squadrons of F-16s. Continued induction of this fourth-generation and later frontline fighter aircraft, comprehensive, integrated air defense and electronic warfare networks, geospatial data acquisition abilities, and satellite navigation will make Pakistan's air power a seamlessly integrated system with China’s military.
Pakistan began procuring the JF-17 in 2007 as a lightweight combat aircraft similar in design to the U.S. F-20 Tiger shark. Though billed as a joint project of Pakistan and China, the JF-17's design and development were principally conducted in China, with modest design inputs from Pakistan. Pakistan has acquired approximately 125 JF-17s, expecting to acquire between 170 and 250 total, likely replacing legacy fighter aircraft by 2025. 
Future JF-17 variants will likely be equipped with standoff weapons capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles or heavier air-launched cruise missiles, as well as electronic countermeasures to defend against advanced electronic warfare. Pakistan can also export the JF-17 to developing states like Azerbaijan, Myanmar, and Nigeria as a replacement for older-generation.
Pakistan reportedly agreed to purchase 36 of China’s 4.5-generation J-10 medium multirole fighter aircraft in 2009; however, it was not until June 2021 that Pakistan signed a contract to acquire the J-10CE. Recent reports indicate that Pakistan has agreed to purchase 20-25 J-10s, and some analysts expect it to procure at least 90 J-10s throughout the 2020s and 2030s.
The J-10 is a formidable platform designed for aerial combat with an active electronically scanned array radar and a PL-15E air-to-air missile that can outrange the U.S. AMRAAM (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile). This is particularly important because while the United States supplies what is considered Pakistan's most combat-capable fighter aircraft, the F-16, without U.S. contracts for maintenance and upgrades, these jets could fall into an inoperable state due to technology restrictions and the necessity of U.S. servicing for major components. Pakistan will likely try to keep its F-16 squadrons in service over the next decade as it phases out most of its Mirage III and Mirage 5 fleet. The J-10 may also replace the Mirage as the platform designated for nuclear delivery missions.
For supporting elements, the PAF is inducting into the fleet China’s medium-altitude long-endurance Wing Loong 2, an uncrewed combat aerial vehicle designed both for carrying out precision strikes and as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform. The Wing Loong 2 will complement the PAF’s other indigenous and Turkish-origin drone fleet. The PAF will also be relying on China in efforts to contest the electromagnetic spectrum with the planned acquisition of dozens of ground-based mobile electronic warfare systems for long-range radar jamming.
During the 1965 War with India, Pakistan Army equipment was mostly of U.S. origin. Since 1970, however, China's contributions to the Pakistan Army have climbed steadily, outstripping U.S. equipment transfers in raw number of platforms by the 1990s. Today, the Pakistan Army’s most potent offensive and combat capabilities increasingly come from China. Looking forward, Pakistan is seeking to modernize its armored fleet with China’s VT4 (MBT-3000), a 52-ton main battle tank designed and manufactured by the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Even the domestic production of the Al-Khalid 2 tank, for which China is a critical design partner, will rely on China’s VT-4 tank technology and subsystems.
Western suppliers currently dominate Pakistan Army aviation assets, but this will also change dramatically over the next decade. Pakistan's inability to procure U.S. or Turkish systems to replace its aging Cobra attack helicopters means it is likely to seek Z-10MEs, the Chinese alternative.
Consistent with the direction of Air Force asset sourcing, advanced integrated air defenses are almost all supplied by China. For example, the Army and Air Force's Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defense, formerly composed of a diverse mix of French, Italian, and Chinese systems, is now primarily composed of systems sourced from China over the past decade. Within this "system of systems," the HQ-7/FM-90 provides low-altitude defense (and possibly defense for forward-deployed armored and artillery units), the HQ-16/LY-80 and the European MBDA Spada 2000 provide low- to medium-altitude defense, and the HQ-9P provides medium- to high-altitude defense. China even fast-tracked the most recently acquired layer, the HQ-9 system, comparable to Russia’s S-300, after the Balakot incident. Four units (presumably batteries) of China’s HQ-9/P were inducted in October 2021, and four more were expected in 2022.
Increasingly compatible supply chains for armor, artillery, and rocket launchers (support units for fire systems); networked communications and information systems; and interoperable air defenses and electronic warfare systems have moved Pakistan and China closer to being able to aggregate their military capabilities should they make the strategic decision to do so.
The Pakistan Navy has maintained a relatively balanced set of suppliers for decades, including China. Alongside its growing fleet of Chinese ships, it has retained vessels from various countries, including Turkiye and the UK. The navy has primarily relied on France for its undersea capabilities and on the U.S. and Europe for much of its naval aviation assets. The navy’s collaboration with China is expected to deepen as its modernization progresses, with the goal of a 50-ship surface fleet—40 percent of which will be major surface combatants—heavily reliant on Chinese imports. Pakistan has already inducted Chinese Type 054A/P frigates into its fleet, complementing its deployed F-22 frigates for enhanced sea control.
For anti-access/area denial (A2AD) missions, the navy plans to use Chinese Type 039A attack submarines with air-independent propulsion carrying torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. Pakistan was initially scheduled to receive four of these submarines by 2023 and to build four more by 2028. This timeline was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic and unexpected export control decisions, such as Germany's decision not to sell diesel engines to China because of their use for military purposes. However, the matter has since been resolved. 
The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, built in the 1970s and 1980s principally to overhaul Pakistan's fleet of Chinese F-6 fighter aircraft, constitutes the most important component of the technology partnership. Today, the complex in Kamra serves as a hub for military aircraft production and maintenance, repair, and overhaul, including for the JF-17. Pakistan has increased its share of indigenous production at the complex from 16 percent of the K-8 airframe in the 1990s to 58 percent of the JF-17 airframe, including the wings, horizontal stabilizer, vertical tail, and radar assembly.
Kamra’s “Aviation City” initiative was announced in 2017. It complements the aviation complex and is intended to build the academic, research and development, and engineering foundations that will allow Pakistan to pursue self-reliance and develop the capacity to produce navigation, radar, and onboard weapons systems for a next-generation fighter program.
The China-Pakistan military relationship is often regarded as formidable and consequential as Beijing's relationship with Moscow. Many Western analysts have advanced the concept of a "threshold alliance" to capture a state of military relations short of a formal treaty alliance but much more advanced than the increasingly ubiquitous "defense cooperation agreements."  The material and technical conditions and military interoperability of a threshold alliance move the defense relationship to the edge of wartime coordination, short of written-down, specific mutual defense commitments. 
The West believes that the prospects for China projecting military power over the Indian Ocean from Pakistan’s Western coast are growing. In this context, the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. and its Western allies are efforts to contain Pakistan's ability to develop its indigenous military capabilities further. The second Trump presidency will have significant implications for U.S.-China relations and will raise pressure on Pakistan to curtail its strategic and economic engagement with China. 
Overall, Pakistan's multifaceted response highlights the complex interplay between sovereignty and security within international relations, with implications that could reverberate throughout South Asia, influencing geopolitical stability and alliances.

The writer has served as an Ambassador to China, the European Union, Belgium, Luxembourg. and Ireland. She has also authored and edited several books, including Magnificent Pakistan, Pakistan-China All Weather Friendship, and Lost Cities of Indus. 
E-mail: [email protected]