In the midst of chaos, Jinnah's political genius reshaped the future of South Asia. Armed with legal precision and unmatched strategy, he transformed the demand for Muslim rights into the birth of Pakistan, outmaneuvering both British rule and Indian nationalism to carve out a new national identity.

The purpose of this article is to explore and examine Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s role as a negotiator—indeed, a successful negotiator—in pursuing the goal of Pakistan after the passage of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940. This includes his negotiations with both the Indian National Congress (INC) and the British, with a particular focus on the British, as they were the ultimate power and authority in India. Jinnah's role was neither easy nor simple. He had to contend with two parties stronger than his Muslim League, both of which shared a common interest in the unity of India, despite being at odds with each other.

Jinnah’s long experience as an able and successful lawyer had helped him with the masterful grasp of law and constitution-making processes. 

The Congress leadership rejected the Pakistan demand outright, insisting that the partition of India amounted to ‘vivisection’, indeed ‘cutting the baby into two halves’. Its main leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, in his characteristic manner of speech, however, went on to comfort the Muslims by saying that he had nothing against their demand as long as they remained within the bounds of the country. As he put it: ‘The Muslims have the same right of self-determination as that the rest of India has [sic]. We are at present a joint family. Any member can claim a division.’ But then, he did not hesitate to chide the Muslims that ‘religion did not change nationality.’ Jawaharlal Nehru added that, ‘Religious barriers are obviously not permanent, as conversions take place from one religion to another, and a person changing his religion does not thereby lose his social background or his cultural and linguistic heritage.’ Obviously, the Hindu leaders of Congress failed to appreciate the force of Islam as it affected political behavior of the Muslims in India. As Allama Muhammad Iqbal explained, Islam ‘did not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter,’ and thus the demand for Pakistan, a separate state for the Muslims, was indeed ‘an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization.’ The Indian Muslims wanted to realize that spirit in the separate state of Pakistan. 
The British, of course, had their own reasons to oppose the Pakistan demand. To begin with, they did not approve the idea of Pakistan for their own historical and cultural reasons. They did not want ‘Ulsters in India’. And secondly, and more importantly, as Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India (1937-40) observed, the partition of India would mean ‘the wrecking of all that we have been working for a number of years past…’ In fact, he maintained, the ‘acceptance’ of Pakistan as a separate state ‘would be equivalent to admitting the failure of the devoted efforts of Englishmen and Indians alike over a long period of concentrated striving… to enable India as a whole to take its place as an integral unit in British Commonwealth of Nations.’ Lord Amery, the next Secretary of State (1940-45), even went further in proclaiming that, ‘if some sort of Indian unity had not existed it would have to be invented.’ Besides, the British needed a united India for their defense and strategic purposes. Indeed, as one British historian emphasized, Britain’s whole defense strategy snice the early twentieth century (with the rise of the Soviet Union), was ‘oriented towards India.’ 
Thus, Jinnah’s task of negotiating the Pakistan demand with the Congress and the British could not have been more demanding and difficult. But then, Jinnah was a constitutionalist and endowed with an exceptionally sharp legal mind and, thus, in many ways, ideally suited to negotiations with both parties. Unlike Gandhi, for instance, who, in spite of being a barrister, had no penchant for constitutional issues, and indeed confessed to a bewildered Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in 1942 that he had not read the 1935 Act, and who was never a member of any legislative assembly, Jinnah was a constitutional craftsman.  He had been part of all constitutional deliberations both inside the assembly and outside, whether between the League and the Congress or between the League, Congress, and the British together. 
Jinnah’s long experience as an able and successful lawyer had helped him with the masterful grasp of law and constitution-making processes. In fact, as one of the delegates to the Round Table Conference in London in the early 1930s noted that he, in a constitutional document prepared by some eminent Muslim lawyers, was able to point out ‘the flaw where none seemed to exist–a flaw that would have meant the annulment of most of what had been conceded’. This knack for legal-constitutional details made him ‘a hard and shrewd negotiator’ with the Congress and British leaders. Indeed, as a leading British historian, Ian Talbot, observed: ‘His lengthy and successful legal career suited him for this task, as did his dogged determination which so exasperated British officials from Lord Mountbatten downwards’. He was demanding and fastidious in all his negotiations, ‘never to give in, never to retreat, always to attack the opponent at his weakest point, and constantly repeat his own position’. This was indeed the hallmark of his negotiations with the Congress and the British throughout. Let us examine some of them here.  
The first and foremost task of Jinnah after the passage of Lahore Resolution in 1940 was to press the British to concede that ‘no interim or final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Government without the previous approval and consent of Muslim India’. This was to ensure that British would not take a position ‘which would in any way militate against, or prejudice’, the ‘two nations’ theory at the base of Pakistan demand. Indeed, Jinnah made it absolutely clear that unless this was agreed, the League could not fully support the war effort. 
The British needed the League’s support badly. The Congress, by non-cooperation, indeed defiance, and eventually, ‘rebellion’ during the war years, had made this support inevitable and necessary. Upsetting Jinnah and ignoring his Pakistan demand would not only have led to the League’s opposition to the war effort but to a possible alliance between the League and the Congress making things all the more difficult for the British. They knew this, for, as late as May 1941, two leaders, Rajagopalachari and Tej Bahadur Sapru were in touch with Jinnah to seek ‘rapprochement’ with the Congress. 
Thus, with no option but to conciliate Jinnah, the British made their ‘August Offer,’ on August 18, 1940, assuring the Muslims that the British Government will not impose its system of government upon unwilling ‘minorities’. This was a major concession to them in the sense that ‘no future constitution, interim or final, should be adopted by the British government without their approval and consent’. But then, as the Muslim League Working Committee noted, notwithstanding this pledge, the British insisted upon the ‘unity of national life’ in India. The League, therefore, in the end, spurned the offer, reiterating that ‘Muslims of India are a nation by themselves and will exercise their right of self-determination and that they alone are the final judges and arbiters of their own destiny.’ 

The failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks not only raised Jinnah’s standing and stature in Indian politics but also, significantly, brought into sharp focus the Pakistan demand and its realization as the main demand of the Muslims. 

The August Offer, however, committed the British government to some understanding of the Muslim position with regard to the future constitution of India, that their aspirations for a separate homeland, Pakistan, could not be dismissed off hand, regardless of what Lord Zetland and Lord Amery had said earlier, as mentioned above. The war conditions had begun to affect their policy perspectives. Jinnah, of course, given his ‘practical sense’, was convinced that this shift was just the beginning, and more concessions will be made in their favor as the war progressed, with the Congress on the warpath and the British needing more and more support from the League along the way. 
Jinnah’s next chance to negotiate Pakistan demand came with Stafford Cripps’ visit to India in March 1942, as the British War Cabinet’s representative to persuade the Congress to cooperate with them during the war years. While focused on the Congress leadership, particularly to appease Gandhi and Nehru, Cripps found it expedient to assure Jinnah that if any province of British India refused to accept the future constitution or even the present constitution, the British Government would have no choice but to grant such ‘non-acceding provinces’ the same status as that of the ‘Indian Union’. But then, ‘only if Congress failed to come to an agreement with the Muslims in the constitution-making body…’ But also, more importantly, to the chagrin of Jinnah, the proposal ‘did not provide for the right of option to be exercised by vote of Muslim population alone’. The British knew that the ‘situation proposed in the Cripps proposal practically amounts to rejecting the Pakistan claim, since the League could not secure necessary majorities in Bengal and Punjab’. 
Obviously, the British were not interested in the Muslim case for Pakistan as such. They apparently wanted to threaten the Congress into acquiescence by suggesting a kind of ‘secession’ to the Muslims. Jinnah, of course, saw this proposition as ‘illusory’ and did not hesitate to reject it. But then, the Congress, too, in the hope of a Japanese advance, hastened to reject it, describing the Cripps proposals, all of them, ‘a post-dated cheque,’ indeed advising Cripps to take the ‘first plane home’. 
But all said and done, there was no denying that the Cripps proposals represented considerable advance over the August Offer in spite of the fact that they did not concede the Pakistan demand ‘unequivocally’ and did not clearly recognize the Muslims ‘right of self-determination.’ But, then, things could not remain the same henceforth. The British had tacitly recognized the demand for Pakistan. Indeed, as one writer put it, the Cripps proposals offered Jinnah ‘a hole in the dyke’ which he was determined to widen with his future negotiations with the Congress and the British leaders. 
This did not take long, as Jinnah-Gandhi talks, held in September 1944 in Bombay (Mumbai) provided him an opportunity to further the case of Pakistan. In fact, as one Indian historian described the talks: ‘Viewed in the long-term strategy of the campaign for Pakistan, the… talks were another milestone marking further progress from the offer of Lord Linlithgow in August 1940 (August Offer) and the Cripps Mission in 1942’. Interestingly, the talks were called by Gandhi suggesting that the two ‘life servants of the nation’ should meet and resolve this ‘communal tangle’, as he put it, ‘which had hitherto defied solution.’ Though talks and accompanying correspondence went on for three weeks (September 9-27), the result, as Jinnah found out was that Gandhi was not prepared to accept ‘the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution’. He was afraid of its ‘concrete consequences’, the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a separate, sovereign state. As he expressed it: ‘But if it means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is to be nothing in common between the two, I hold it as an impossible proposition. That means war to the knife.’  
Jinnah, on his part, remained steady and steadfast throughout the negotiations with Gandhi, asking him again and again to ‘accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and proceed to settle the details.’ But, then, Gandhi having failed to find a ‘ground for mutual agreement’ was now, as a shocked Jinnah exclaimed, ‘threatening us with a fight to the knife’. The so-called ‘apostle and a devote of non-violence’ had lost his cool and, in the process, lost a rare opportunity to help work out the Pakistan demand in the best interest of major communities, Hindus, Muslims, and for that matter, the Sikhs. This, in turn, might have helped avoid the later violence and killings during the partition in August 1947.  
     The failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks not only raised Jinnah’s standing and stature in Indian politics but also, significantly, brought into sharp focus the Pakistan demand and its realization as the main demand of the Muslims. Unless this demand was conceded, nothing would move. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, learnt it the hard way. He organized Simla Conference in June 1945 and invited all leading political parties to break the ‘political deadlock’ over the future of India. But he was primarily interested in the expansion of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, an interim, short-term proposal, to help run the government with support of the Indian leaders. He wanted to leave the issue of Pakistan out as a long term issue. But Jinnah refused to budge. He insisted that the long-term and short-term issues were interrelated, indeed intertwined. He was afraid ‘the proposed Executive plus the known policy of the British Government and Lord Wavell’s strong inclination for a united India, would completely jeopardize’ our demand. He wanted the British Government to deal with the ‘inevitable issues of Pakistan’, first and foremost. In the process, he did not hesitate to ‘wreck’ the conference. Wavell, subsequently, acknowledged that Jinnah ‘spoke for 99 percent of the Muslim population of India in their apprehension of Hindu domination’, and, thus, ‘we cannot evade the issue’. Indeed, the Simla Conference brought the Pakistan issue to the fore like never before. The League’s overwhelming victory in the 1945-46 elections, fought on this very issue of Pakistan, cemented it further, forcing the British Government to deal with it as a ‘reality’, whether they liked it or not.    
The British, of course, did not like it, at least the way Jinnah wanted it, as was evident in the Cabinet Mission Plan, offered by three senior cabinet ministers, Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander in March-April 1946. On April 16, they pointedly asked Jinnah ‘whether he would prefer the matter to be considered on the basis of sovereignty and the smaller area or a Union and a larger area’. They made it clear to him that if ‘full sovereignty is desired, then the claims to the [non-] Muslims territories could not be conceded.’ This was in spite of the fact that, they admitted, he had ‘made a fairly good case for Pakistan on cultural and religious grounds.’ Eventually, their two statements of May 16 and June 16, 1946, together, offered their plan for the future constitution of India, popularly known as the Cabinet Mission Plan, dismissing Jinnah’s demand of a sovereign Pakistan, with all Muslims-majority provinces intact. 
I have analyzed Cabinet Mission Plan and Jinnah’s response in several publications, including in the Hilal English (January 2023), and thus, for paucity of space, will not go into details here. I will confine myself to its acceptance, ultimate rejection, and its impact on the realization of Pakistan goal. Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan for a number of reasons. First, he did not want the division of Punjab and Bengal, two Muslim-majority provinces. Secondly, he was convinced that the ‘foundation and the basis of Pakistan’ in the form of B and C Sections of the plan, comprising Muslim-majority province, were there to help him ‘reach our goal and establish Pakistan’. Indeed, he saw it as ‘the first step towards Pakistan’. Thirdly, Jinnah was sure that the given plan was too cumbersome, too unwieldy, and, in fact, unworkable in the end. As one writer remarked, ‘Conventional wisdom… ordains the scheme to be unworkable’. Finally, Jinnah reckoned that the Congress leadership, particularly Gandhi (based on his earlier pronouncements), will not accept the ‘grouping clause’ which formed the Sections, and which indeed was the integral part of the plan. They would object to the inclusion of Assam in Section C and that of the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), into  Section B, both being pro-Congress provinces.  
That it was not a forlorn hope, was proved soon after the plan was announced. Writing in Harijan on May 17, Gandhi insisted that: ‘The provinces were free to reject the very idea of grouping. No province could be forced against its will to belong to a group even if the idea of grouping was accepted’. Nehru reinforced this stands by announcing in a ‘bombshell’ press conference on July 10 that ‘there will be no grouping’. Thus, the plan was dead upon arrival and remained so in spite of some desperate efforts made by the Mission to resurrect it.  
Jinnah’s path to attainment of Pakistan was clear now. On July 29, the League formally rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan, and called upon ‘the Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan’. Jinnah particularly asked the Muslims to ‘conduct themselves in a peaceful manner.’ But, unfortunately, bloody communal riots in Calcutta (Kolkata) and spread soon all over Eastern and Northern India and even affecting the princely states forced the British Government to act and indeed negotiate with Jinnah to enter the Interim Government formed by the Congress on August 24, 1946. This was in spite of the fact that the Congress had not really accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, especially the long-term part of it. Insisting upon the demand for parity with the Congress, Jinnah, eventually, nominated five Muslim League representatives, led by Liaquat Ali Khan and including a Schedule Caste member, Jogendra Nath Mandal. Thus, the League formally joined the Interim Government on October 15, 1946.  
The Interim Government, of course, did not work on the principle of ‘cabinet,’ with the League and Congress ministers at loggerheads, as this became fully evident during the course of presentation of the annual budget by Liaquat Ali Khan, Minister of Finance, on February 28, 1947. In fact, as Viceroy Wavell lamented, there were ‘two blocks in the Cabinet.’ To add to the woes of the government, Jinnah (and the League members) refused to attend the Constituent Assembly sessions, having rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan already. The result was a complete deadlock, forcing the British Prime Minister Clement Atlee to announce in the Parliament that the ‘present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged.’ The British Government went on to declare ‘that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948.’ Of course, the actual transfer of power took place on August 14, 1947 at the behest of and at the hands of new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. How, in fact, Mountbatten transferred power to the leaders of Pakistan and India, and how fairly and justly this was done—especially in the case of Pakistan—falls beyond the scope of this essay and requires a detailed discussion on its own.
Suffice it to say here that Jinnah achieved his Pakistan in the end, through successful negotiations, keeping ‘a keen eye for the weaknesses of his opponent,’ such as the Congress and the British, while strengthening ‘his defenses,’ and being organized and focused on his goal. The mistakes of the Congress helped him ‘to convince the vast majority of the Muslims that Congress rule meant Hindu domination…’ The mistakes of the British rulers, who underrated him and his cause by insisting that his Pakistan demand was ‘a deliberate overbid’ left them no option but to concede Pakistan in spite of their fierce opposition and resistance. Indeed, in his negotiations with both parties, Jinnah took ‘advantage of every situation, however unpromising’. No wonder, in the end, he was able to see his political life and career ‘capped by a lasting achievement, namely the creation of Pakistan’.

The author is a Distinguished Professor of History and Public Policy, at FC College University Lahore, with the most recent work being A Leadership Odyssey (OUP).