A tribute to the extraordinary leadership, courage, and sacrifices of Captain Muhammad Hayat Khan (later Brigadier) during the 1971 War, as witnessed by his comrade Brigadier Muhammad Saleem. From fearless frontline actions in Chhamb to the enduring bond of brotherhood shared during and after the war, this tribute honors the legacy of a hero whose dedication and valor continue to inspire generations.

14 Punjab was engaged in winter collective training in the general area of Kasur when, on November 29, 1968, I traveled to Lahore to receive the newly commissioned Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) Muhammad Hayat Khan (39^th Pakistan Military Academy [PMA] Long Course) upon his posting to 14 Punjab from PMA. I had joined the battalion a year and a half earlier, on July 11, 1967, after completing a Short Course (10^th War Course). However, Hayat, having joined PMA before me, held one day’s ante-date seniority. The next three years passed swiftly with intense field exercises, regimental duties, basic courses, and the unit's relocation from Lahore to Bhimber.
It was in the last quarter of 1970 that I received a major shock upon receiving my posting order, permanently transferring me to 9 East Bengal Regiment (EBR), which was under raising at Chittagong, with a reporting date of March 31, 1971. The fast-deteriorating situation in former East Pakistan gave rise to war clouds building on the horizon. Like any other regimental officer, I had a strong desire to fight in any future war with my parent unit. However, despite my best efforts, including applying for Aviation (as advised by Captain Hayat), I was dined out in the third week of March 1971 with the usual “He’s a jolly good fellow” played by the unit band, with officers dancing around. While spending my joining time at my native village en route to Karachi for a flight to Dacca on March 30, 1971, a special messenger arrived at my village on March 27, informing me to return to 14 Punjab, as the entire EBR had revolted on the night of March 25-26, 1971. Chittagong witnessed the worst genocide of West Pakistani troops and their families by Mukti Bahini and some revolting EBR elements. After a few months, 14 Punjab moved to its operational location in the Chhamb Sector, with Captain Hayat as Adjutant and me as Quartermaster.
Whatever little news was coming in from former East Pakistan made us restless. The unit was deployed defensively, while its D Company, under Captain Mumtaz Bashir, was detached to Jalil Force for a preemptive attack. In the last week of November 1971, we were pleasantly surprised to see Major Saeed Akhtar Malik, a Platoon Commander from PMA, walk into our field mess with a small handbag, declaring that he had left PMA without permission to fight the war alongside the unit. Such was the fighting spirit prevailing across the Army, in the days leading up to the war.

Finally, the moment to launch the offensive in the Chhamb Sector arrived. On the night of December 2, 1971, ‘D’ Company of the unit, under Captain Mumtaz Bashir, as part of Jalil Force, executed a daring preemptive attack and captured Takho Chak, a strategic location opposite Marala. They repulsed repeated Indian counterattacks until the war's end. While the main effort of the 23 Division offensive struggled toward Chhamb, a platoon-sized force, personally led by Company Commander Captain Tanveer Hussain, captured a company-sized Indian strongpoint at Burejal, a position renowned from the 1965 War for holding back the advance of two Baloch Battalions and inflicting heavy losses. This audacious surprise daytime assault, carried out by troops gathered from C Company’s defensive position on December 4, 1971, earned Captain Tanveer the Sitara-i-Jurat (SJ) for his valor. Additionally, three other ranks received the Tamgha-i-Jurat (TJ) posthumously for their exemplary courage and bravery.
Captain Hayat and I witnessed the attack from our Forward Defended Locality (FDL) bunker, accompanied by our Artillery Observer, Captain Humayun, who skillfully coordinated artillery fire on the objective. Upon seeing the success signal over Burejal, Captain Hayat and I were the first to join Captain Tanveer at the objective, where our troops were still clearing its bunkers and tunnels.
As the three of us sat on the objective, movement was noticed in our immediate rear. Looking back, we saw a group of Indian soldiers with raised hands emerging from a bunker. Captain Tanveer shouted, "Oa, kya kar rahe ho?" (Hey, what are you doing?), to which they replied, "Sir, surrender kar rahe hain" (Sir, we are surrendering). In his typical style, Captain Tanveer responded, "Te phir karo" (Then go ahead). He called his Havildar Major and instructed him to disarm the Indian soldiers and escort them to the Prisoner of War (POW) area. The Indian soldiers could have easily attacked the three of us from the rear, but their defeat was already etched in their minds—a fortunate outcome that spared us from harm.
After a few minutes, the Havildar Major returned. Despite clear orders not to touch unexploded ammunition, he picked up a dead hand grenade lying near the three of us. As it began producing a smoldering sound, Captain Tanveer shouted, “Phaja, soot oh!” (Phaja, throw it!), but instead of throwing it into the nearby trench, he flung it into the air. The grenade exploded midair, scattering shrapnel all around us, with its cap striking Hayat’s steel helmet, producing a distinct “ton” sound. By the grace of Allah, the Most Merciful, a second tragedy was averted. Havildar Fazl later became famous in the unit as Sub Phaja. 

On the morning of December 15, after we had beaten back a major counterattack by the Indian 16 Punjab, with more than 30 dead and wounded Indians lying in front of our position, Brigadier Hayat (then Captain Adjutant), along with Brigade Signal Officer Major Nawaz, came to visit us. 

That evening, Hayat and I brought 13 Prisoners of War (POWs) to the Battalion Headquarters (HQ). After initial interrogation, they were sent to the Brigade HQ. 
Building on the success at Burejal, another Indian company position at Dallah was captured in the afternoon by our ‘B’ Company, under the command of Major Saeed Akhtar Malik. The position fell without much resistance.
On December 6, 1971, Jhanda, which was a part of the Indian main position and defended by a Battalion supported by tanks/Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) in fortified positions along with a defensive minefield in front, proved very costly for the attack by two of our companies (B and C Companies commanded by Major Saeed Akhtar Malik and Captain Tanveer Hussain, respectively), supported by a squadron of tanks from 26 Cavalry. The attack was initially planned to commence at 0430 hours. However, due to the delayed arrival of the supporting tank squadron, which had only four operational tanks, the attacking troops were delayed by three hours. They finally left the Forming Up Place (F.U.P) at Burejal at 0730 hours, with the tanks leading the charge. The Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Aman Ullah Khan Niazi, the Second-in-Command (2IC), Major Qamar Zaman, Captain Hayat, and I observed the attack from Burejal.
After covering about 800 meters, the leading tanks halted on encountering the enemy defensive minefield and started exchanging fire with the Indian main position at Jhanda. The assaulting troops came up and resorted to a fire-and-move technique through the minefield in order to reach the objective. The area had scattered bushes and elephant grass, which helped the assaulting troops in moving steadily forward in the face of fierce enemy fire. The left-forward platoon of B Company, commanded by Naib Subedar Afzal, and the right-forward platoon of C Company, led by Second Lieutenant Amjad Khurshid Khan, advanced to within grenade-throwing range of the enemy’s bunkers. Around 1100 hours, two Indian SU-7 aircraft appeared in the sky. After performing a dry run over our attacking troops, they dived down to engage them. In response, our troops opened fire on the attacking aircraft with all available weapons.
It was probably Captain Syed Zaheer, Squadron 2IC/Troop Commander (39 PMA L/C), who displayed great courage by emerging from his tank to fire his 12.7 mm AA Machine Gun. He succeeded in shooting down the leading SU-7, causing its pilot to bail out and land near Burejal. The aircraft was engulfed in smoke and fire before crashing near our Mortar Platoon. The enemy’s second attacking aircraft fled the scene without firing, after witnessing the horrific end of the leading SU-7. Captain Zaheer (Captain Hayat’s coursemate) was soon struck, likely by an enemy tank shell or ATGM, which blew away his upper body as he was exposed through the tank cupola. He was posthumously awarded the  SJ for his valor during the attack on Jhanda.
Captain Hayat rushed to the location of our Mortar Platoon to assess any damage caused by the falling debris of the Indian SU-7. Fortunately, no damage occurred, as the body of the Indian aircraft landed some distance away from our Mortar Platoon. Major Qamar and I then took the CO’s jeep to search for the Indian pilot, who had landed in the nearby area. We found his parachute on the ground, covered by thick elephant grass, confirming his presence in the area. While we were still searching for him, we received a message from the CO, instructing us to immediately return to assist with the evacuation of our own casualties, who were being brought back in increasing numbers. The Indian pilot was fortunate to make his way back to his base during the night.
Throughout the day-long attack, our unit suffered heavy casualties, including 2/Lt Amjad Khurshid Khan, who had joined the unit only five weeks earlier. He was struck by a burst of machine gun fire to his chest while storming an enemy bunker. We had six other Shuhada (martyrs) and 30 wounded, including our Burejal war hero, Captain Tanveer Hussain. 2/Lt Amjad Khurshid Khan was awarded the TJ posthumously. The assaulting troops were finally extricated after last light under heavy artillery covering fire and smoke. On the night of December 6-7, 1971, the Indians vacated Jhanda, which was later occupied by our 'A' Company, with Mongotian located further north.
It was at this point in time, on my repeated insistence, that the CO, a fatherly figure to us, allowed me to change the hat of Quarter Master and take command of my parent ‘B’ Company (although for a few days towards the end of the war). Captain Hayat performed the duties of both Adjutant and Quarter Master. It was during these few days that our unit was shifted to the main axis south of Chhamb, which the Indians had started vacating in the face of our offensive. We reached our concentration area south of Chhamb late at night on December 11, 1971.
In the morning, I discovered that the wooden butt of my .38 Revolver, which I was wearing even while sleeping in my bivouac, was damaged by shrapnel from enemy artillery shelling in our concentration area. It saved me from any injury by the special blessings of Allah. While carrying out reconnaissance of the area, I discovered a huge depot with underground bunkers full of weapons, ammunition, equipment, a squadron of T-55 Tanks, and a battalion-sized transport in the area south of Chhamb, which retreating Indian forces had left behind. Brigade HQ was informed of this huge cache of Bait-ul-Mal for collection by our own armor regiment and ASC/Ordinance.  I also changed my Gaz jeep for Indian-captured Dodge, which I was honored to drive on the battlefield of Chhamb until the end of the war. Later in life, I also drove a BMW 7.35 during my over 4-year tenure as Defense Attaché to Iran, but it was no match for driving the Indian-captured Dodge on the battlefield of Chhamb. 
On December 13, 1971, the unit occupied Chhamb with defensive positions along the Tavi River. Captain Hayat finally succeeded in convincing the CO to revert me to Quarter Master duties, as he found it hard to continue performing the dual functions of both staff appointments.
On December 15, 1971, Captain Hayat, accompanied by Brigade Signal Officer Major Nawaz, went for a day’s visit to Takho Chak, where our ‘D’ Company, under Captain Mumtaz Bashir, had fought gallantly. The visit, as described by Captain Mumtaz Bashir, was: “Throughout the war, our position in Takho Chak was not very active except for aggressive patrolling by both sides, as in the North, just a few kilometers away, heavy fighting was in progress by 23 Divison for the capture of Pallawala across the River Tavi. The Indians brought in additional troops with armor and did not allow 23 Division to establish any foothold across the River Tavi. Once the ceasefire became imminent, the Indians tried to counterattack and clear our position in Takho Chak, as it was our only position which remained across River Tavi. To reach Takho Chak was difficult, as one had to cross many channels of the River Tavi. So, throughout the war, no one visited our position. On the morning of December 15, after we had beaten back a major counterattack by the Indian 16 Punjab, with more than 30 dead and wounded Indians lying in front of our position, Brigadier Hayat (then Captain Adjutant), along with Brigade Signal Officer Major Nawaz, came to visit us. 
We, six officers (Captain Hayat, Major Nawaz, Armor Troop Commander Captain Naeem, FOO Artillery, and myself), were sitting under the cover of a sugarcane field, discussing whether to allow the Indians, who were under a white flag, to lift their casualties. Captain Hayat strongly recommended, on humanitarian grounds, that we allow the enemy to evacuate their dead and wounded stuck in the minefield in front of our FDLs. The Indians had, since morning, continued increasing artillery fire. Suddenly, an artillery shell landed near where we were sitting. We all dropped down to avoid flying shrapnel. As we raised our heads, we found that Major Nawaz had been hit by shrapnel on the side of his head. Captain Hayat, with the help of stretcher bearers, tried to evacuate him, but he died during evacuation. Following Captain Hayat's recommendation, I allowed the Indians to extricate their dead and wounded soldiers under the supervision of a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO). Later, our Brigade HQ raised some objections, which were resolved by our CO and Adjutant without my knowledge. I believe late Brigadier Hayat must have taken the responsibility, displaying his moral courage and adherence to principles. May Allah bless him and grant him a higher place in Jannah.
No major activity took place till the ceasefire was announced on December 17.
War is a serious business, but not without its lighter moments. However, generally, the humorous side of an event is enjoyed later when the participants get time to reflect. The incidents narrated below occurred in our unit, with OC A Company seen at the center stage of these humorous moments in uniform during the Battle of Chhamb in 1971:
• On November 30, 1971, one late afternoon, Captain Hayat and I were sitting with our CO in the Field Mess when the OC of A Company made a frantic call, declaring that an Indian tank had broken through his FDLs towards the rear. The CO asked me to go in the indicated direction to deal with the reported threat. I quickly grabbed a few Energa grenades (the only anti-tank ammunition available at the Battalion HQ), jumped into a standby jeep, and drove off in the given direction. Upon reaching the area, we observed a moving object obscured by thick dust clouds. The area was scattered with bushes and elephant grass. I asked the driver to halt the jeep, then took a G3 rifle and two Energa grenades, approaching the target using my best fieldcraft. Upon reaching point-blank range, the intended target, instead of an Indian tank, turned out to be our own engineers' dozer returning after closing a minefield gap on the FDLs of our 'A' Company.
• After last light on December 1, 1971, the OC of ‘A’ Company called for Save Our Souls (SOS) fire from our own Mortar Platoon, reporting that enemy paratroopers had landed in his company area. When the Mortar Platoon Commander refused to engage our own position, the Company Commander became furious and immediately reported the matter to Adjutant Captain Hayat. Captain Hayat then contacted the adjoining Company Commander to verify the situation on the ground. It was determined that the light observed was actually mortar flares being fired by the Indians, which descended slowly with small parachutes. The OC of A Company had mistaken these flares for a para drop by the enemy on his FDLs. The Adjutant’s timely intervention prevented a major catastrophe.
• The third incident relates to the lighter side of our otherwise very stressful day. While reviewing our costly, day-long attack on Jhanda in an FDL bunker at night, Major Saeed Akhtar Malik, the Company Commander during the attack, remarked that “Defense was the preferable form.” Unable to hold back, I responded, “Sir, just after one attack, you’ve started advocating Clausewitz’s strategy that defense is the superior form of warfare.” The comment succeeded in bringing a smile to everyone’s face.
• On the night of December 6-7, 1971, the Indians vacated Jhanda, which was then occupied by ‘A’ Company of 14 Punjab, with Mongotian located further north. Late at night, the Company Commander began making frantic calls on the wireless, asking for Imam (CO). Captain Hayat (Adjutant) tried to reply, informing him that the CO, after a very tiring day, had just gone to his bunker to rest. However, the Company Commander was adamant about speaking directly to the CO. The Adjutant finally informed the CO, who came to the wireless station and answered the Company Commander’s call:
CO: “Imam listening, send over.”
Company Commander: “My position is under heavy enemy artillery shelling, advise further action, over.”
CO retorted: “Muhammad Khan, we are at war. Do not expect the enemy to throw flowers at you. Defend your position at all costs. Out.”
In January 1972, the unit was shifted and deployed on high mountains along the Line of Control (LOC). Captain Hayat and I got married one after the other and left the unit for our Grade-3 appointments in 1973-74. It was at Sialkot that newlywed Hayat visited us and stayed with us for two nights, refreshing our war memories and carrying our better halves with us on a future journey. This journey turned out to be one of two brothers and friends, as we crisscrossed each other’s professional paths but never served together in the same unit again. During his last five years of service, he transitioned to the Foreign Office on deputation. As DG Disarmament, his primary area of responsibility was the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the regime. He represented Pakistan internationally in numerous seminars, conferences, and negotiations, continuously safeguarding Pakistan’s national interest.
A brother-like friend, Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan SI (M), ex-14 Punjab/38 Punjab, and a former diplomat, departed for his eternal abode by Allah’s will on April 17, 2024. May his soul rest in peace. Ameen! Together, we spent some of the most nostalgic years of our lives and fought the 1971 War in 14 Punjab, with no fear of death.

The writer is a graduate of the Staff College Quetta and the War College, NDU Islamabad. He has extensive command, staff, and instructional experience and served as the Defense Attaché in Iran for over four years. Upon retiring at the end of 1999, he joined the NRB as a consultant for governance reforms.
E-mail: [email protected]