The article discusses the differing perspectives on the demand for Pakistan, highlighting the British policies and initiatives as a vital factor according to Pakistani-American and British historians. Indian historians, on the other hand, attribute the demand to the will of the British rulers. The author argues that the demand for Pakistan emerged due to the failure of the representative government system to provide constitutional space and fair representation to Muslims, leading to the invocation of Muslim ideology and the need for a separate state.

The demand for Pakistan and its ultimate creation following the Partition of India in 1947 has been explained in several ways by historians, depending upon the narrator's perspective, origins, values, and interests. The main parties involved, i.e., Indian and Pakistani historians, have, in general, offered two differing and mutually exclusive explanations. Indian historians have insisted upon the British 'Divide and Rule' policy. Pakistani historians generally made it an 'ideological' struggle for Muslims to live according to their ideology, beliefs, and norms. British/American historians, the third party took a nuanced and varied position. Francis Robinson, for instance, observed that there was 'no deliberate attempt' on the part of the British to divide and 'foster communal hostility' for the purpose. However, he maintained that the British 'had to formulate policies and hand out patronage.' Inevitably, the effect of Imperial rule was to exacerbate some divisions and to break down others.' A Pakistani-American historian, Ayesha Jalal, argued in a similar vein, suggesting that the 'British policies and initiatives were a vital factor in Indian political calculations and responses…'
But then, Indian historians made the demand for Pakistan, the end product of all such policies, their only explanation. Tara Chand, the pioneering historian of the 'freedom movement' in India, claimed, 'Whatever other factors might have contributed to the emergence of the demand for Pakistan, the substantive cause which made it effective was the will of the British rulers.' Ramji Lal followed suit, holding the British 'responsible for the Pakistan demand by promoting the policy of the division of India by encouraging disruptive forces, especially the Muslim League and Jinnah.' Likewise, Anita Inder Singh insisted that the British pursued the 'gulf' between the two communities, Muslims and Hindus, to ensure that there were few prospects of them 'getting together' for the independence of India. Uma Kaura charged that the British were 'jubilant' at the demand for the separate state of Pakistan for they thought they could 'use it as a handy tool against the Congress demand for independence.' More recently, Jaswant Singh, an Indian politician turned writer, in his book on the partition of India (2009), could not help but assert, like Indian academics before him, that Pakistan came into being 'with the British acting as an ever helpful midwife.'
The trouble with these Indian historians and others has been that they, wittingly or unwittingly, have become victims of their rhetoric, rationalizing, indeed justifying their failure to keep India united, and without acknowledging the force of 'ideology' at the other end. That is the 'Muslim ideology,' formulated and fermented into a 'Muslim separatist political movement,' initiated by Syed Ahmed Khan, idealized by Allama Muhammad Iqbal, and ably led by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.
But these Muslim leaders professed and promoted the separatist movement only after the system of representative government introduced by the British rulers in India, based on numbers and, hence, the 'majority' principle, failed to provide the Muslims a constitutional space to their satisfaction and needs. The system doomed them to a 'minority' status and for good. There was no way they could turn the system around in their favor fairly and equitably. It was only after this fundamental, irreparable constitutional problem could not be resolved, despite all their efforts, that the Muslims invoked their 'ideology,' finally and irrevocably, with Jinnah declaring that, 'Pakistan not only meant freedom and independence but the Muslim ideology which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure...'
Jinnah, more than any other Muslim leader, tried to resolve the constitutional problem. He tried very hard, as 'Ambassador of Unity,' to work out the system of government despite its inherent bias towards the Hindu majority community, till he realized, by early 1940, that the Muslims had to 'revise our notions' in the light of 'experiences and lessons we have learned during the past 25 years'. The lessons were learned soon after the landmark Hindu-Muslim accord of 1916 (Lucknow Pact) was ruined through the Nehru Report 1928 and the Congress rule of provinces in 1937-39 years. It was now that Jinnah declared in clear, categorical terms that the Muslims 'could not accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj. Democracy of the kind with which the Congress’ High Command is enamored would mean the destruction of what is most precious in Islam,' that is, the 'spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life… in consonance with our ideals and according to the genius of our people.'
To understand and appreciate fully the constitutional problem in India leading up to the demand for Pakistan on March 23, 1940, it will be useful to start with its origins and proceed with its development over time. The origins will help us realize the intent and purpose of British rulers in introducing this system of representative government in India in the first place.
The British initiated the system of representative government with the Charter Act of 1833, stipulating that the Government of India would be 'a purely official government,' with the executive authority vested in the office of the Governor-General and his Council of officials and the governors of the presidencies and their Councils. The only thing 'representative' about the system was a clause that suggested that someday Indians would be ready to hold a high office in the government. There was no clear-cut reference or commitment to 'anything approaching representation' in India. Thomas Macaulay acknowledged that 'we are walking in the darkness… we do not distinctly see whither we are going. It is man's wisdom, so situated, to feel his way and not to plant his foot till he is well assured that ground before him is firm.'
Indeed, many British leaders were 'alarmed' at introducing a representative government system in India. John Malcolm, for instance, saw no need for it 'as far as [it] relates to the good rule of our Indian possession.' Some even believed it was 'impossible without creating the greatest jealousy among the numerous sects [religions?] which would necessarily remain unrepresented.'
Only after the 1857 War of Independence did the British realize 'the gap of ignorance and misunderstanding' with their Indian subjects. They felt it was 'necessary' to know 'what natives think of our measures [policies] and how the native community will be affected by them.' But this still did not mean the British felt the need for 'an Indian Parliament.' Even after coming up with the Indian Councils Bill of 1892, Lord Curzon charged: 'The people of India were voiceless millions, who could neither read nor write their native tongue, who did not know any English... The people of India were the ryots and the peasants... the time had not come when representative institutions, as we understand the term, could be extended to India.' He claimed, ' The idea of representation was alien to the Indian mind…'
But then the British were confronted with another problem too, the sharp communal divide between the Muslims and Hindus, adherents of Islam and Hinduism, respectively. The British realized the difference between the two communities was 'not a mere difference of articles of religious faith. It is a difference in life, tradition, history, and all the social things and articles of belief that constitute a community.'
But the British could not stand still with their given, restricted, and stifling councils for long. They had to open them up to make some room for Indians, whether they liked or wanted the representative system of government in India or not. They had no choice. Indeed, legislative councils stimulated an 'appetite' for more over a period, forcing the British to introduce some kind of representative system in India. They could not halt or reverse, for that matter, 'the progressive realization of responsible government in India.' The Act of 1919, and indeed constitutional advance in that direction eventually, using Edwin Montagu's declaration of 1917 for its preamble, admitted: 'The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view of the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'
Earlier, the 1909 Act granted separate representation to the Muslims and other minority communities of India, such as the Depressed Classes, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Sikhs, and Europeans, to help them vote for their representatives in their separate constituencies through a mechanism called 'separate electorates.' This mode of separate representation represented the Indian 'conditions' than the British concept of representation back home. But then the British were convinced that this was the 'only kind of representation' under the circumstances 'which undoubtedly, as a minority, they are entitled to demand.'
While the 1909 Act conceded them separate electorates, the Muslims still failed to get 'adequate' representation in various councils in the country. This was quite apparent in the elections of 1912. In Bengal Legislative Council, for instance, they managed to elect only five Muslims out of twenty-eight elected. In Punjab, they secured only one seat out of the eight elected members of the Legislative Council. Due to electoral qualifications, stipulating ownership of land, payment of income tax, and graduation from university, Muslims could not truly benefit from the system of separate electorates.

This realization became even more intense with the knowledge that the British were on their way out in the wake of the Second World War, and things would soon be left to the will of the Hindu majority community. They will be the new masters of India. This left the Muslims no option, but to demand a separate state of their own.

While the separate electorates for the Muslims were validated in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and revalidated in the 1919 Act, the Muslims did not gain much. Instead of gaining significant representation in the Muslim-minority provinces such as the UP (United Provinces, presently Uttar Pradesh), they lost their proportionate share in the Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. In Punjab, for instance, with its 55.2 percent (1921 census) Muslim majority, their representation was fixed at 49.0 percent. In Bengal, with its 54.6 percent Muslim population, they were forced into minority status. They could not secure more than 45.0 percent electorate due to their economic and educational backwardness. As one writer aptly summed up their predicament, the Muslims were a political minority both in those areas where they were in a population minority and those where they were in a population majority'.
The 1919 Act set the stage for a Muslim campaign to demand statutory majorities in Muslim provinces (of the Punjab and Bengal) and, of course, a genuine federation of self-governing provinces with weak centers and strong provinces. This was the only way the Muslims could improve their position in India's evolving system of representative government, based on numbers and inevitably biased in favor of the Hindu majority community.
But the Congress, representing the Hindu majority community for the most part, was not interested in what it termed the 'imposition' of the statutory majorities. It was not interested in a federal system either with strong provinces. This was abundantly clear in the Nehru Report and the stand taken by the Congress leadership at the Round Table Conference. As M. K. Gandhi, the supreme leader of the Congress and its sole representative in the (Second) Round Table Conference, divulged: 'The residuary powers should vest in the federating units unless [sic] on further examination, it is found to be against the best interest of India.' But then, the British were no help either. Its Communal Award of 1932 reduced the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal. It also reduced the Muslim demand for a genuine federation with residuary powers vested in the provinces. Worst, the 1935 Act, India's most ambitious constitutional advance, promoted a strong unitary structure. It empowered the center to legislate the 'Federal' list of subjects and the 'Concurrent' list if desired. In addition, the Act made no room for provincial autonomy. Ministerial responsibility and, indeed, ministerial functions were subject to 'safeguards' placed in the hands of governors. To further restrict the scope of these functions, the governors were placed under the 'superintendence' and 'general control' of the Governor-General, reinforcing British Government in London's authority over the Indian legislatures. No wonder Jinnah criticized the Act severely, indeed called it 'unacceptable... devoid of all the basic and essential elements and fundamental requirements which are necessary to form any federation’.
The Act failed to culminate the representative and responsible government process in India. It could not ensure that 'the will of the legislature, which is responsible to the electorate, must prevail over the Executive' authority, be that a Governor or Governor-General. The Governor-General, of course, was bound to be under the control of the Secretary of State for India, responsible to the British Parliament.
If the 1935 Act proposed, in theory, a system of government with a unitary bias (strong center, weak provinces), heightening the Muslim concerns and fear of the Hindu 'majority rule,' the Congress governments in the provinces in 1937-39 left no doubt about it in practice. Insisting on forming one-party (Congress) governments and taking upon itself, the mantle of national authority 'to prove its claim to be the successor to the British Raj,' it spurned Muslim League's offer (especially in the UP) at power-sharing and coalition building in provinces. For the Muslims, the writing on the wall was 'Congress rule exerted from a center dominated by the Hindu majority through an organization which brooked no opposition and refused to share its power.'
The Muslims were not prepared to submit to a central government dominated by the Hindu majority, as it were. The more they saw powers vested in the center, the more they feared that it would favor the Hindus, led by Congress or any other party in the future. Separate electorates somewhat protected them, but the working of the 1935 Act, as reflected in the Congress rule of provinces in 1937-39, showed them that this electoral device was obsolete in the face of the Hindu majority determined to impose its will. The Congress rule, in fact, 'demonstrated the unworkability of parliamentary rule, the constitutional safeguards for minorities proving fragile.'
This realization became even more intense with the knowledge that the British were on their way out in the wake of the Second World War, and things would soon be left to the will of the Hindu majority community. They will be the new masters of India. This left the Muslims no option, but to demand a separate state of their own.
This was the only way out from them, to make the Muslims safe and secure and, above all, as Jinnah proclaimed, 'have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men which we could develop according to our lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play.' In the opinion of a contemporary observer, this was the making of a 'positive doctrine,' indeed an ideology with its own intrinsic value, meaning, and purpose. The subsequent struggle to create the state of Pakistan is a separate subject and has been followed in many accounts, including in my books, the latest being, A Leadership Odyssey: Muslim Separatism and the Achievement of the Separate State of Pakistan (OUP, 2021).

The author is a Distinguished Professor of History and Public Policy and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences at FC College University, Lahore. More recently, Dr. Hayat has edited Pakistan Studies: A Book of Readings (Sang-e-Meel 2023) for undergraduate students taking Pakistan Studies courses in colleges and universities in Pakistan.
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