



Quaid-i-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah

A Visionary Leader, Great Statesman & Founder of Pakistan

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--- PUBLISHER ---

Hilal Publications, Hilal Road, Rawalpindi Cantt

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First paperback edition printed September 2021 in Pakistan

ISBN: 978-969-7632-12-1

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Published by
Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)
Hilal Road, Rawalpindi, Pakistan
September 2021
www.ispr.gov.pk

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Printed by
Khursheed Printers (Pvt) Ltd.

Price: Rs 200

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Foreword

Character builds a man and thus goes a long way in building a nation, too. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the true embodiment of one such strong character that built not just his own 'self' but Pakistan and the Pakistani nation as well. Even the staunch critics of subcontinent's politics who typically come down hard on what they call the 'political machinations' are unanimous in praise when it comes to the Founder of Pakistan. They call him "great", "extraordinarily brilliant", and "a man born in centuries"; such was his strong character, visionary leadership, political acumen and astounding statesmanship. Above all was his personal integrity that was unshakable, unbreakable and beyond reproach. It was Quaid's power of truthfulness, highest degree of fairness, fearlessness, honesty and impeccable character that conquered both the friend and foe alike. Quaid-i-Azam exhibited a rare display of political prudence that won him a nation and a separate country while strictly adhering to constitutionalism, rule of law and democratic means. Such was his power of knowledge and argument that made both the British Government and Hindu Congress bow to his demand of an independent country for his nation.

It was Quaid-i-Azam's great foresightedness which had concluded much before others as he vociferously declared in his speech on eve of passing Pakistan Resolution - 23rd March 1940: "*The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature[s]. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life, and of life, are different.*" Times have proved how correct was Quaid's political vision basing on Indo-Pak history, religions, cultures and civilizations. Today, the whole world is witnessing the rise of a new and most dangerous form of 'Hindutva' that has always existed in some form for centuries. Two Nation

Theory, finding traces in the genius of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Dr. Mohammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah stands vindicated.

For us, the people of Pakistan, there is so much to learn from the character and politics of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah — both in theory and in practice — to serve the nation and country he created. This book in your hands will provide glimpses of Quaid’s great leadership to serve as a role model. Through brief description of challenging events, this book amply highlights Quaid’s leadership qualities and statesmanship.

We, at the Inter Services Public Relations, have made a few endeavors in the past also to publish books and magazines that keep alive the spirit of great struggle that once won us independence, and is always earnestly needed to preserve the sovereignty, solidarity and territorial integrity of our beloved country, Pakistan. We also express our gratitude to Prof. Dr. Riaz Ahmad, a scholar of repute in History and Pakistan Studies, whose well-researched articles, earlier carried by the *Hilal* (English) magazine, are now published in a book form. We are confident that this book will greatly benefit its readers particularly the youth of Pakistan.

The purpose of publishing this book is to instill in our hearts and minds the values and sacrifices that are always needed for great nations to emerge and rise. We earnestly desire that our youth and future generations carry the similar charisma of personal persona, leadership, wisdom, statesmanship and foresightedness, to make Pakistan more strong, secure, and prosperous, In Sha Allah.

Major General Babar Iftikhar
Director General
Inter Services Public Relations
General Headquarters, Rawalpindi
September, 2021

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

A Visionary Leader, Great Statesman & Founder of Pakistan

Leader and Statesman Defined

A leader is that person who understands all categories of the people whom he is leading, works for making them united around himself or the party or organization with a certain specified vision. He also knows how things can be improved and people could be led towards a better vision. He also plans the strategy, methods and the ways towards attaining that goal. A statesman is a skilled, widely experienced and highly respected political leader. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah rightly fits into these definitions. Quaid-i-Azam's political career is very long and spread over two divergent phases. The first phase relates to the period from 1897 to 1920 when he was an important political leader of the Indian National Congress (INC), and second phase relates to the period from 1921 to 1948 when he was mostly the President of All India Muslim League (AIML). It was because of his farsightedness, skillful handling of the political situation that he was able to galvanize the Muslim nation and create Pakistan on August 14, 1947 as the largest Islamic State in the world. Also, it is quite interesting that during 1913-1920 Jinnah was member and leader of both the AIML and the INC. The specialty of this period is that his dual leadership pushed both these organizations into a common goal of Lucknow Pact in December 1916 and made these parties put pressure on the British to grant self-government. Though the self-government could not be attained, yet this unity in political ranks forced the British to accept most of their demands in the shape of Government of India Act 1919. The situation started changing after Amritsar sessions of the Muslim League and the Congress held in December 1919, in which Jinnah cooperated with Gandhi on a number of issues. Since the dawn of 1920 M. K. Gandhi started showing his real designs when

he was able to sympathize with the Muslim sentiments at the meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee held on May 28, 1920 in which Gandhi's idea of starting *Satyagraha* for attaining the Muslim demands of Khilafat and preservation of Holy Lands of Arabia was adopted. This was followed by his becoming President of All India Home Rule League in October 1920 when he changed the Constitution of Home Rule and decided on making decisions by simple majority, this was against what Jinnah had made bound the Congress in Surat in 1907 that no decision affecting Muslims or any minority will be forced by the majority until two-third members of the concerned community consent to it. Despite Jinnah and his colleagues' protest, Gandhi continued his solo flight and changed the Congress constitution in December 1920 in the same way and started his *Satyagraha* movement against the wishes of Jinnah forcing Jinnah to leave the Home Rule League as well as the Congress in December 1920 and Jinnah finally devoted his whole life to the All India Muslim League until the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. The most important aspect in both these phases was that Jinnah worked for securing the political rights of the Muslims. The only difference was that in the first phase Jinnah worked for bringing unity between the Muslims and Hindus as equal partners in the politics of British India as is witnessed by the Lucknow Pact of 1916. In the second phase, he worked more vigorously for galvanizing the Muslim nation and securing for them a homeland in the shape of majority Muslim areas of the Subcontinent. In this phase as well he succeeded with a thumping victory for providing homeland in the shape of Pakistan to at least Muslim majority living in the provinces of Sindh, NWFP (now KP), Punjab, Balochistan, Bengal, and Assam of the British India. This booklet is focused on the whole personality of Quaid-i-Azam covering both phases of his political phase.

Leader of the Congress and Muslim League (1906-1920)

Jinnah rose to the top hierarchy of the Congress leadership since 1906 when he attended the 22nd Session of the Indian National Congress held in Calcutta in December 1906 as a delegate from the Provincial Congress of Bombay. Moreover, Jinnah acted as Secretary of Dadabhai Naoroji, President of the Session, and read *Naoroji's* presidential address. The other important factor was that Jinnah spoke on two resolutions in this session. Speaking on Maulvi Mahomed Yusuf (Bihar)'s resolution on "Validity of *Wakf-alal-Aulad*", a Muslim issue, Jinnah said that moving of this resolution "shows one thing, gentlemen, that we *Mahomedans* can equally stand on this platform of the National Congress".¹ The other resolution was on "Self-Government". Speaking on this resolution, Jinnah was bold enough to say that "the *Mahomedan community* should be treated in the same way as the Hindu community".² In this way Jinnah could not tolerate that the Muslims in the Congress as well as the country should be looked down upon by the Hindus.

All India Muslim League was founded at Dhaka in December 1906 but Jinnah joined it on October 10, 1913. Why Jinnah joined late? Some writers did try to give some reasons but they do not sound well. The fact remains that he was sympathetic towards the goals and objectives of the Muslim League, i.e., to promote the political rights of the Muslims, grant of separate electorates to the Muslims under the new reforms, and grant of one-third representation to the Muslims in the federal council and legislature because of political importance of the Muslim community. Before formally joining the Muslim League, Jinnah had already worked for the attainment of

¹ Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years 1892-1920*, Islamabad, NIHCR, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1986, p. 77.

² Ibid.

these rights for the Muslims from his own angle, the records of which are not much known to the biographers. However, there are signs which show that Jinnah was favorable to the grant of separate electorates to the Muslims, one-third representation of the Muslims in the Federal Cabinet and Federal Parliament because of the political importance of the Muslim community. When Minto-Morley Reforms were announced in early 1908, Jinnah was attending the Congress Committee meeting at Allahabad on April 18-19, 1908. The Committee suggested certain changes in the Congress Constitution in the light of new reforms for which Jinnah was the chief legal adviser. In his address to this Committee, Jinnah thanked Lord Morley for the efforts he made for grant of new reforms to the Muslims. The point of approval of a resolution or motion in any meeting of the Congress relating to Muslims or any other community was that unless and until two-third majority of members attending the concerned meeting approve the resolution or motion, it will not be considered as having passed by the Congress. On the basis of these recommendations of this Committee, the Madras session of the Indian National Congress held in December 1908 approved changes in the Congress constitution. Further in a letter to the Editor, *Times of India*, Bombay, Jinnah sympathized with the Muslim demand of separate representation. In a meeting of the Anjuman-i-Islam, Bombay, held on August 1, 1909 presided over by Sir Aga Khan III also Jinnah expressed for acceptance of the Muslim demands as mentioned before. Unofficially, he was being invited to the meetings of the Muslim League since December 1910. It was at the Bankipur session of the AIML Council held in December 1912 presided over by Sir Aga Khan III that Jinnah's amendment in the League constitution to work for "grant of Self-Government suitable to India" was adopted by the AIML Session held in March 1913. On this basis, Jinnah was also elected Member of the Imperial Legislative Council from Bombay as a representative of the Muslims of the Bombay Province on January 4, 1910.

The Congress agreed to all these Muslim demands under the Lucknow Pact in December 1916 which was a Pact between the AIML and INC concluded at Lucknow. The way Jinnah planned to bring these two largest political parties of the country on one platform was marvellous. The first challenge was because of Turkey's involvement in the First World War (1914-1918), the British Rulers manipulated through certain Muslim leaders of Bombay – whom Jinnah termed as “wire-pullers” – that session of the Muslim League due to be held in December 1914 should not be held because they feared that a resolution against the British may not be passed. By holding certain meetings with such leaders and with the officials of the Bombay Governor's House, Jinnah was able to arrange meeting of the Muslim League in Bombay in December 1915. Moreover, he also planned to hold the Congress session at Bombay about the same time in December 1915. In order to chalk out some common formula for understanding between the Congress and the Muslim League, committees of the respective parties were appointed. These committees of both the parties arranged a number of meetings between themselves and came to a final common formula, which was put at annual sessions of Congress and Muslim League arranged at one place of Lucknow about the same time in December 1916. Thus, the formula of commonality between these two parties was approved which is known as Lucknow Pact. Accordingly, Jinnah emerged as the “Architect” of Lucknow Pact and earned the title “Ambassador of Unity”.

Congress Leaders Turned against Lucknow Pact

It was because of the Lucknow Pact that separate electorates for the Muslims and the other minorities continued to be maintained under the Government of India Act 1919 as was earlier granted under the Government of India Act 1909. The Congress leaders turned against the separate electorates to the Muslims and other minorities after 1920 when Jinnah had left the Congress. The Nehru

Report of August 1928 is a clear manifestation of this. A public meeting in Bombay on October 24, 1928 attended by about 5000 Muslims was convened to consider the Nehru Report. Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub presided over this meeting. Leaders from all sections of Muslim opinion participated. All unanimously rejected the Nehru Report, terming it "Hindus' Magna Carta". Maulana Shaukat Ali, Secretary of the Central Khilafat Committee warned the Muslims that "Islam is in Danger".

When Jinnah and other Muslim leaders rose against the Nehru Report, it created a great turmoil in the country despite the fact that Simon Commission was appointed whose deliberations were largely boycotted by the Congress and Jinnah Group of Muslim League. In order to resolve the Hindu-Muslim settlement, three Round Table Conferences were held in London during 1930-1932 but the issue could not be resolved. The whole of Muslim India had risen against the Nehru Report. Quaid-i-Azam attended meetings of the first two RTCs in London, for the third he was not invited. Gandhi was also invited to the second RTC but no settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims could be reached. However, because of the Muslim pressure and pressure from all the minorities of British India, separate electorates were granted to the Muslims and other minorities under the Government of India Act 1935.

Jinnah left the Congress in December 1920 because of two reasons. First, Jinnah argued that India was not yet ready for Non-Cooperation of the type on "peaceful" lines as Gandhi was suggesting as it will destroy India. Jinnah's words were: "This step that you are taking is not the right step to take at this moment".³ The other reason was that the Congress' creed which was approved in 1907, had been changed which now authorised that the Congress would decide only by majority vote without caring for the Muslims

³ Ibid., p.195.

and the minorities.⁴ Therefore, Jinnah rightly thought that when all the decisions of the Congress are to be taken by majority, the Muslims shall have no faith in such a Congress. Consequently, Jinnah was right in his decision to leave the Congress in December 1920, a realization which came to Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar and Maulana Shaukat Ali after eight years when Hindu objective was clearly manifested in the Nehru Report of 1928.

Leader of the Muslim League (1921-1929)

By March 1929, Jinnah's leadership had been established above board. The way Jinnah planned and devised his Fourteen Points Formula as a settlement between four different schools of Muslim political thought – Jinnah Group of AIML, Shafi Group of AIML, All-Parties Muslim Conference, and Central Khilafat Committee – is marvellous. After presenting his Fourteen Points Formula, Jinnah rightly spoke in the tone of a great leader: “We have met here on an occasion which to my mind really involves an issue affecting the life and death of 70 million of *Mussalmans*”. He also emphasized: “I want to appeal to everyone to leave aside personal quarrels and leave aside differences. There is no intelligent body without differences, and the fact of differences shows we are intelligent people. These differences exist everywhere but here comes wisdom, statesmanship and discipline that while differences do arise we should be in a position to smooth them and march forward with a united decision. That is the test of all organized, well disciplined, well trained and experienced body. Are you going to show the world that we are a body who can come to one conclusion, one decision which we consider in the best interests of our country?”⁵

Finally, the unity between the Jinnah and Shafi groups of the AIML was brought about early next year in February 1930 as a result of

⁴ Ibid., pp- 195-196.

⁵ Statesman, Calcutta, 31 March 1929.

consistent endeavors of Jinnah. By this time almost all the Indian Muslim politicians had realized the importance of Jinnah's Fourteen Points making them the final charter of Muslim freedom. As a result of Jinnah's hectic efforts, an important meeting of the Council of the AIML was held on February 28, 1930 in Delhi with Jinnah in the chair in which over fifty Muslim leaders belonging to both the factions of the League participated. It was announced amidst cheers that both the sections of the League had been reunited. The two leaders reached an agreement to travail for Muslim constitutional settlement in the light of Jinnah's Fourteen Points.

All these developments were closely watched by the British officials, particularly the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India. Before this patch up between the two groups of AIML, but after the approval of Fourteen Points of Jinnah by the AIML in its Council in March 1929, Jinnah had shown to the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha leaders that now the AIML would not be ready for settlement on the previous lines. The new course of Jinnah was from now on the settlement with the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders on nothing less than his Fourteen Points; otherwise he was going for the “parting of the ways” with the Hindu leaders. The Muslims were to now resort to a new course of action and that would be independence of Muslim majority provinces from the British and the Congress yoke. It was on these lines that Jinnah met Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru on January 31, 1930 and conveyed to him his new line of action. Jinnah had started his endeavors with the Hindu leaders such as the one on January 31, 1930 with Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru, to impress upon him to be ready for settlement with the Muslims on nothing short of the Fourteen Points. Not only this, but the provincial Muslim meetings and conferences like those of Maulana Shaukat Ali in Bombay on August 11, 1929 had shown how the Muslims rallied to Jinnah's Fourteen Points and thinking of different lines. This meeting was attended by about 10,000 Muslims. At another meeting in Delhi, speaking from the platform

of All-India Muslim Conference on April 5, 1931, in his presidential address Maulana Shaukat Ali made it further clear that the All India Muslim Conference and other Muslim leaders "stood" by these Fourteen Points of Quaid-i-Azam.

These Fourteen Points of Jinnah attained historical importance. No future constitution could be evolved outside the framework provided by these points. Even Allama Iqbal seems to have drawn his concept of a separate Muslim state in South Asia from these points of Jinnah who, as President of AIML, allowed Iqbal to preside over Allahabad session of AIML held in December 1930. Chaudhry Rahmat Ali claimed that in framing his scheme of Pakistan he was in turn influenced by Allama Iqbal's address. But as a matter of fact, the Fourteen Points served the purpose of being mother of all the Muslim schemes to come forth in future. The concept of Muslim nationhood, though not mentioned, ripens in the shape of these points. The British constitutional experts also thought it difficult to deviate from the framework set out by these points. It is characteristic of the genius of the Quaid-i-Azam that he alone, from among so many intellectual giants among Muslim leaders of his time, could conceive the Fourteen Points plan which not only set the course of history on different lines, but signalled Muslims' parting of their way with those of the Congress and Hindu political parties.

Jinnah's Encounter with the British Viceroys

Despite the fact that the British never liked Jinnah's importance in the Indian leadership, yet they could not ignore him right from the beginning till the end of the British Raj and creation of Pakistan. The first encounter of Jinnah was with Lord Minto, the Viceroy, who was presiding over the Imperial Legislative Council meeting on February 25, 1910. When G. K. Gokhale moved his Resolution about the Indentured Labour for Natal Colony in South Africa where Indians were cruelly treated by the British Rulers, Jinnah, speaking

on this Resolution, was bold enough to say: “My Lord.... It is a most painful question – a question which has roused the feelings of all classes in this country to the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa”.⁶ Lord Minto, who was presiding over the Council meeting, warned Jinnah: “I must call the Hon’ble gentleman to order. I think that is rather too-strong a word ‘cruelty’. The Hon’ble Member must remember that he is talking of a friendly part of the Empire, and he must really adapt his language to the circumstances”.⁷ Jinnah was not the leader to be cowed down by the Viceroy. He was bold and courageous enough to rebut: “Well, My Lord, I should feel inclined to use much stronger language, but I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council; but I do say this, that the treatment that is meted out to Indians is the harshest which can possibly be imagined, and, as I said before, the feeling in this country is unanimous”.⁸ Jinnah was invited to the Bombay War Conference held on June 10, 1918 and presided over by Lord Willingdon, Governor of Bombay. In his speech to this Conference, Jinnah boldly said: “What we want Government clearly to understand is this. If you want us to raise an army to stand this menace [World War I]⁹, then make the people feel that they are citizens of this Empire. Do this by your deeds, not words”.¹⁰ For this, Willingdon charged him as a leader who was “irreconcilable”. Addressing a public meeting five days later, Jinnah was bold

⁶ Riaz Ahmad, *The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1893-1912)*, Vol. I, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Chair (NIPS), Quaid-i-Azam University, 1996, p. 261.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Author’s italics.

¹⁰ Bombay Judicial Dept (Confidential) Proceedings, IOR P/23, British Library, London. For full text of Jinnah’s dialogue with the Governor see Appendix C of Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years, 1892-1920*, pp. 215-217.

enough to charge the Government: “You are playing with the people, and you are not in earnest. Your methods and policy are all wrong”.¹¹ These ideas of Jinnah were widely acclaimed by the people.

Jinnah challenged Willingdon openly. When Willingdon was retiring as the Governor of Bombay, the Government thought to arrange a farewell in the name of the people of Bombay on December 11, 1918 by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Mr. and Mrs. Jinnah led a huge mob and occupied the Municipal Hall in early hours of the morning. In this way this grand reception was foiled by Jinnah with the support of the people of Bombay. In the history of British India, this was the first anti-Government demonstration against the British for which “Jinnah’s People’s Memorial Hall” was later built by public donations which stands in the memory of Jinnah.¹²

Jinnah also agitated against Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer’s cruel killing of 400 persons and injury to more than 1200 persons at a public meeting at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar on April 13, 1919. This protest was held against the passage of Rowlatt Act in February 1919 which was termed by Jinnah as “Black Act” meant to curb the will of the Indian people. For these reasons the Government was advised by the secret agencies to arrest Jinnah, but the Government was wise enough not to arrest him because of the fear that Jinnah was very popular at that time. However, the Government felt relieved when Jinnah resigned from his membership of the Indian Legislative Assembly by his letter dated March 28, 1919 addressed to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy.

¹¹ *The Bombay Chronicle*, 17 June 1918.

¹² Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years, 1892-1920*, pp. 167-168.

Situation After 1922 When Gandhi Called Off His *Satyagraha*

The political situation changed in British India when as a result of Gandhi's calling off the *Satyagraha* on February 12, 1922 because of the Chauri Chaura (Gorakhpur, India) where some policemen were burnt alive by the furious mob on February 4, 1922. The political unity between the Hindus and Muslims which Jinnah had built through his hard labors as a result of the Lucknow Pact 1916 was shattered to pieces. The Congress and Gandhi backed away from their promises under the Lucknow Pact. The Muslims also became divided amongst themselves. The division further increased because of Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 1927. The Muslim League was divided into Jinnah Group and Shafi Group. Encouraged by this disunity amongst the Muslim ranks the Congress leaders became bold enough to shun the Muslim rights under the Nehru Report of August 1928. The Congress leaders forgot that the Muslim rights given under the Government of India Acts of 1909 and 1919 were granted with the consent of the Congress. In this critical situation as well, Jinnah's leadership played a pivotal role and united all the Muslim political groups around his 14-Point Formula given in March 1929 as mentioned earlier. When the Muslim unity was revived, the Congress leaders planned to crush the Muslims and tried to force the British Government to grant *Purna Swaraj*, or Complete Independence, to India by announcing the Non-Cooperation Movement again in December 1929, and hand over power to the Congress leadership by ignoring the Muslims. On December 31, 1929 Jawaharlal Nehru hoisted the Congress flag on the banks of Ravi River in Lahore. The Declaration of Independence of India was announced by the Congress leaders. Jinnah, who sensed all this, after March 1929 wrote to Ramsay MacDonald, British Prime Minister, on June 19, 1929, who had assumed office as a result of his Labour Party's success in the UK elections held in May 1929, that a "very serious

deadlock” in India has been created. Jinnah also suggested that a round table conference should be convened so that the political and constitutional settlement amongst them was created. As a result of this, the British Government decided to hold Round Table Conference in London in November 1930. The Congress leaders advised the British that majority of the Indian leaders who belong to the “Congress mentality” should be invited.¹³ The British did not agree to this proposal of Gandhi. Despite the Congress’ boycott, the three Round Table Conferences were held during 1930-1932 which was a great success on the part of Jinnah. Otherwise, the Congress design was that the British would align with them to crush the Muslims from the political scene in India. Jinnah always took a wise step which led to the announcement of Communal Award in 1932 by the British Government and the finalization of Government of India Act 1935 by the British Parliament. As a result of Irwin-Gandhi Pact of 1931, Gandhi attended the second RTC in London but without a result because Gandhi was not ready to give any rights to the Muslims and other minorities in India. To Jinnah, the Muslim interests were always supreme for which even though he was not invited to the third RTC, yet he decided to stay on in London just to impress upon the British parliamentarians and the RTC participants the safety of Muslim’s political and constitutional rights. When Jinnah decided to return to India in December 1934, he was fully confident that due constitutional rights would be granted under the new Act of 1935.

Jinnah’s Grasp Over the British Political, Judicial and Administrative System

Jinnah well understood the British political, judicial and administrative system. As a brilliant student at the Lincoln’s Inn, Jinnah was enrolled as a law student in April 1893. The Bar-at-Law examination which required three years’ course work was passed by

¹³ Ibid., p. 127.

him within two years. It was in April 1895 that he passed the Bar-at-Law examination. He had to wait for another year so that his dinners' attendance could be completed. It was after receiving his degree of Bar-at-Law from the Lincoln's Inn that he decided to return to India in August 1896. During these 15 months stay after passing the Bar-at-Law examination, Jinnah spent his time observing the functioning of the British judicial system, British parliamentary system by attending the debates of the parliament and visiting British Museum for reading books. Thus, he learnt a lot. In this background when he came to India, he also enrolled himself as an Advocate at Bombay High Court. Soon, he started appearing before the Bombay High Court judges. He also had a six months' tenure as Presidency Magistrate in 1900 and became famous for his good judgment. He was also elected as a member of the Bombay Municipal Corporation for two years. It was because of his expertise and judiciousness that he was invited to appear before the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India on March 11, 1913 headed by Lord Islington. This was a 16-member Commission which also included Gokhale and prominent judges of the High Courts in India. First, a long questionnaire was sent to him following his interview on March 11, 1913 at Bombay. This Commission was appointed to reform and improve the efficiency of the Public Services in British India. Regarding the Indian Civil Service examination system, Jinnah replied that "it is the best test of a man's abilities or character and least blamable system one can imagine to elect men for service".¹⁴ Jinnah also gave a number of suggestions for its improvement. The judicial and executive services were functioning jointly at that time. When he was asked about this, Jinnah advised that judicial branch should be separated from the executive branch. He also advised that examination for judicial service should be based on efficiency in the knowledge of law and experience at the Bar. When he was asked whether he remained

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 87.

only in Bombay city, his answer was that this wasn't the case and that he had visited the whole of India apart from Bombay, like Madras, Calcutta, and Northern India. When he was asked whether he read in any prominent chambers of Bombay, Jinnah replied that he had read in the Chambers of John Macpherson who was the Acting Advocate-General of Bombay and the other was Love, who was the Advocate-General of Bombay. When he was asked whether he went to the British Courts in London, Jinnah's reply was that he had attended the Courts in London for eight months. With regard to Provincial Civil Service, Jinnah recommended that persons having 5 years' experience as High Court Pleaders should be included in the Provincial Civil Service. When he was asked whether he could speak Urdu, Jinnah's answer was "I can speak Urdu". Jinnah also revealed that usually he spoke English at public places, but when there were gatherings like meetings of Anjuman-i-Islamia, Bombay he spoke Urdu because majority of people there could speak the language. Similarly, he expressed his views regarding the appointments of District and Sessions Judges, High Court Judges and other matters.

Jinnah's Association with the Muslim League Before His Joining in 1913

Despite the fact that Jinnah had not yet joined the Muslim League, he did accomplish another achievement of getting passed the Mussalman Wakf Validating Bill by the Imperial Legislative Council in March 1913. This issue was lingering since the times of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. No Muslim League leader was daring enough to get this work accomplished. The way Jinnah chalked out to initiate this issue from the Congress platform in December 1906, as mentioned earlier, and the way Jinnah asked questions in the Imperial Legislative Council from the British Minister of the Viceroy's Cabinet is marvellous. When the government became ready to accept any proposal in this connection, Jinnah moved his Bill on this issue in the Imperial Legislative Council in March 1911.

Opinions on this bill were received in hundreds and thousands which were sifted in the Select Committee of the Legislature headed by Jinnah. The Muslim *ulema* of the whole of British India headed by Maulana Shibli Nomani were also heard. When Jinnah came to know that consensus of the *ulema* was on 6 clauses of the Bill, he agreed to reduce the Bill from 12 to 6 clauses just to maintain unity of *ulema* behind his Bill. When the Government saw this, the Bill consisting of agreed 6 clauses was passed in March 1913. This was the first Bill passed on the motion of a Private Member of the Imperial Legislative Council. Through this accomplishment Jinnah earned congratulations from Muslims all over British India.¹⁵

Jinnah's Long Parliamentary Career 1910-1947

Jinnah had a long career as a Parliamentarian because he remained Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly from 1910 till the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The greatest point was that he was all the time being elected from the same constituency of Bombay after the end of every three years' tenure or as the rules provided. He was never defeated. Sometimes he was elected unopposed. However, it was at his own that either he did not contest the elections, or he resigned from his Membership of the Assembly as mentioned earlier. The way he conducted the elections was exemplary. He was the most cherished leader of the voters of his constituency. He also took keen interest in solving their problems. His doors were never shut for his voters. During the election campaigns a number of charges were leveled against him. For instance, during the elections of 1926, the Swarajists and the Congress leveled charge against him that Jinnah was against the Holy Quran and Islam. Refuting this,

¹⁵ For details see *ibid.*, pp. 89-93. For the text of Select Committee Report on this Bill along with Précis of Different Opinions, dt. 24 Feb 1913 see Riaz Ahmad *Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1913-1916*, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Chair (NIPS), Quaid-i-Azam University, 1996, Vol. II, pp. 13-47.

Jinnah said that he had never been opposed to Islam and the Holy Quran rather he dedicated his whole life to the service of Islam and the Holy Quran.¹⁶ In the next elections in 1930 Jinnah was elected Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly unopposed. Soon after this, Jinnah proceeded to London to attend the Round Table Conference due to be opened in November 1930. After the end of first RTC in January 1931, Jinnah realized that this Conference would continue for some years to come. Before going to England, he had no intention to settle in London, but after the end of first RTC he realized that his Nation required him to stay on further. Being very loyal to his electorate, Jinnah came back to Bombay for a short period in July 1931 and resigned from his membership of the Indian Legislative Assembly so that his voters may not be deprived of his absence and they could elect a new member in his place for representation of their aspirations in the Legislature. So, he resigned and went back to London in August 1931 for a long stay there. This also proved that he was fair, bold and a fearless parliamentarian who very much believed in the welfare of his people. He was so popular that during the elections of 1934 when he was not even present, he was elected Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly.

British Benefit from Jinnah's Vast Experience

It was because of Jinnah's vast knowledge and experience that he was appointed member of the Reforms Enquiry Committee on June 20, 1924. This was a 10-member Committee appointed by the Indian Legislative Assembly on the initiative of the Government and headed by Sir Alexander Muddiman, Home Minister of the Viceroy's Cabinet as Chairman of the Committee. The purpose of this Committee was to find out how to improve upon the Government of India Act 1919 and to give more representation and rights to the Indians. The Committee heard various persons and

¹⁶ *Times of India*, 15 November 1926.

institutions for the purpose for some months. It was in October 1924 that the Committee came to finalize its report. Certain differences arose between Jinnah and the Chairman of the Committee. Therefore, two reports were prepared – one came to be known as the Majority Report and the other the Minority Report written by Jinnah and his associates. The Majority Report consisted of 130 pages, while the Minority Report consisted of 74 pages. The Minority Report was basically written by Jinnah along with other three members: Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru, P. S. Sivaswami Iyer, and R. P. Paranjpye. Both these reports were submitted to the Government on December 3, 1924. The Minority report became famous as “Jinnah Committee” Report. The Government studied these reports for some months and published them in March 1925. Both these reports came to be termed as “rival” reports. *The Times* (London) commented on the Minority Report: “The Minority Report lays emphasis on the fact that almost every non-official witness stressed the need for provincial autonomy and the introduction of the principle of the responsibility at the Central Government. This report approves the statement that nothing but the disappearance of Dyarchy and the Constitution for it of provincial autonomy will pacify the Government’s circles”.¹⁷ The interesting point in this connection was that initially he was not ready to become a member of this Committee because the terms of reference were not liked by Jinnah. It was on Jinnah’s insistence that the terms of reference were changed and then Jinnah became ready to become a member of this Committee.¹⁸

Jinnah was working for strengthening all major institutions of the State. So was with the case of Armed Forces. Jinnah had a deep

¹⁷ *The Times* (London), 11 March 1925.

¹⁸ *The Times*, 5 & 20 June 1924. Also see Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Second Phase of His Freedom Struggle, 1924-1934*, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Chair (NIPS), Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997, pp. 24-25.

concern for this and was interested to make the Indians become Army Officers so that the control of the Army would go in the hands of the Indians. A number of statements were made by Jinnah in the Imperial Legislative Council during World War I (1914-1918). In March 1925, on the initiative of the Government, the Indian Legislative Assembly appointed a Committee which is usually known as Indian Sandhurst Committee headed by Lt Gen Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of General Staff (Chairman). It was a 13-member Committee. Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal Nehru, was also appointed as a member of this Committee but he dissociated himself from it. The purpose of this Committee was to find ways and means as to how Indians could be recruited and trained to become Army Officers. This Committee heard various persons related to educational institutions, retired army personnel and other prominent persons. Then this Committee appointed a Sub-Committee headed by Quaid-i-Azam. Sir Pheroze Sethna and Zorawar Singh were its members. Major Lumby acted as the Secretary of this Committee. This Sub-Committee toured the military training institutions of England, France, U.S. and Canada during April-July 1926 and report of this Sub-Committee was separately submitted in August 1926 which suggested drastic changes to provide for making Indians' military training in India on the pattern of Sandhurst in England which the British Government disliked.¹⁹ Wherever Jinnah went, he gave interviews to the press in which he said such things that were against the British Government. Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, was totally annoyed with Jinnah for making statements in England and America. Quaid-i-Azam, even in those days of British power and military might showed a higher degree of independent opinions basing on his

¹⁹ For text of the proceedings of evidences of persons appearing before this Committee see Riaz Ahmad, *Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1925-1926*, Vol. VII, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Chair (NIPS), Quaid-i-Azam University, 2016. For Report of the Sub-Committee see *ibid.*, pp. 457-708.

observation and judgement. He annoyed the British high command to the extent that in their frustration they even used harsh words for him, but nothing deterred M. A. Jinnah from holding and giving his independent opinions. Birkenhead reported to Lord Irwin, the Viceroy that M.A Jinnah's attitude was not cooperative, and observed that "The other two members of the Committee showed little sign of dissociating themselves from him. I believe that their behavior in Canada was little better, and that they devoted themselves mainly to gathering opinions as in the probability of Canada seceding from the Empire. The Sub-Committee has done much harm, and I am sure it was a grave effort to let them loose without Skeen to control them. I had originally intended to get them to meet Worthington Evans and the CIGS at my house, but Jinnah had made it impossible for me to show them hospitality. I shall not see him unless he requests an interview. If he does, I shall talk to him very plainly."²⁰

In his reply, Irwin explained the reasons as to why he could not ignore Jinnah because of his political importance in the country.

When as a result of Partition Plan of June 3, 1947 details of division of assets between Hindustan and Pakistan were being discussed, Jinnah made it clear to Lord Mountbatten that in his meeting on June 23, 1947 what he wanted was to "have a Pakistan Army ready by August 15th and that there must be an operational Commander-in-Chief in Pakistan by that date who would take orders from the Pakistan Government."²¹ This was expressed by Quaid-i-Azam because he was well aware of the defense requirements of the newly born State of Pakistan.

To purchase a house in London and stay for four years (1930-1934) was a very expensive matter which no other leader except Jinnah

²⁰ Birkenhead to Irwin, 15 July 1926, *Halifax Papers*, MSS. Eur. C. 152/2, British Library, London.

²¹ Transfer of Power, Vol. XI, pp.269-270.

could afford for the cause of the Muslims. In one of his letters to Jinnah, Sir Aga Khan III also appreciated that to live in London was very expensive. That is why Sir Aga Khan III was staying in France. He used to go to London as and when required for the purpose of meetings. All this Jinnah did for the good future of the Muslims. Jinnah's concern had increased after the Congress threat in December 1929 that the Muslims should be eliminated politically, and they should not be given separate electorates in any future constitutional document. Jinnah and other Muslim leaders' efforts bore fruit and despite disagreement on many issues, the Muslim delegates unanimously proposed the continuance of separate electorates for the Muslims and other minorities, a demand which was accepted by the British in the form of issuance of the Communal Award 1932 and the White Paper 1933. On this basis, the Joint Parliamentary Committee formulated the draft of what was going to be the Government of India Act 1935. When Jinnah felt assured of the separate electorates for the Muslims and other minorities, and creation of Sindh as a new Muslim majority province, he decided to sail back to Bombay in December 1934.

Jinnah's Belief in the British Parliamentary System and Islamic State

Jinnah wanted to have a constitutional democracy based on the British Parliamentary system where there should be rule of law, supremacy of parliament, and effective role of Prime Minister as the supreme leader in the country who should work for promoting the interests of the Islamic State. Though he was champion of Western democracy, but when the Muslim interests at the hands of Congress Ministries in 6 Hindu majority provinces were violated, Jinnah wanted safeguards in this democracy. At the Patna Session of the All-India Muslim League held on 26-29 December 1938, Jinnah explained with sound arguments that Congress only represents the Hindus, and not others. Even the Christians, the Scheduled Caste Hindus, non-Brahman Hindus are

also not represented by the Congress. Thus, it was not only the Muslims who had developed grievances against the Congress Raj, but all the minorities had the same grievances against it. Therefore, Jinnah proved that the Congress was “mainly a Hindu body.”²² The Congress motto of ‘Swaraj’ in actual practice was an intention “to establish Hindu Raj.” Giving the example of ‘*Bande Mataram*’, Jinnah said that it was “not the national song”, but a Hindu song. Referring to the Congress flag being projected as a national flag, Jinnah also termed it as a “Hindu flag.” According to him, only that flag and anthem could be termed as the national anthem or national flag which is respected by everybody. He blamed Gandhi for all this and turning the Congress into a Hindu body. He said:

“I have no hesitation in saying that it is Mr. Gandhi who is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. He is the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism. His ideal is to revive the Hindu religion and establish Hindu Raj in this Country, and he is utilizing the Congress to further his objects.”²³

Therefore, what Jinnah wanted was that in democracy there should not only be the majority rule, but it should protect the rights of all the minorities as is required under an Islamic State.

Jinnah’s View for Maximum Provincial Autonomy

He also believed in the maximum provincial autonomy for the provinces in a federal setup. But the Central or Federal Government should also be strong enough to act in the best interest of its citizens. If any provincial government fails to protect the basic rights of the citizens including those of the minorities, the Federal Government should be empowered to act in the interest of its

²² S.S. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. II, Quaid-i-Azam University, NIHCR, 2007, p. 276.

²³ *Ibid.*

citizens and the minorities. This also includes the basic rights of health, education, and economic welfare. The cartels of *jagirdari* system or any power mongering group acting in the interest of evil forces should be controlled by the provinces. If the provinces fail to do so, the Central or Federal Government should be empowered in the Constitution to act in the interest of the common man. This was necessary because freedom of every citizen was an essential ingredient of the Islamic State of Pakistan. The judiciary was required to function without fear or favor in the best interest of law and constitution. The judges were also required to act in the interest of all segments of the society and to watch the growth of congenial behavior and healthy society. In an Islamic State, Iqbal and Jinnah believed, the judiciary and the government functionaries are required to frame laws in the interest of its citizens. If any law or act fails to meet the human or Islamic values the concerned law should be changed because Pakistan was going to be an ideological state. In order to promote the rule of law, the Federal and Provincial Governments were required to propose legislation for any new act they wanted to do through consultative process. The Rules and Laws were required to be passed by the Federal and Provincial Legislatures after full debate and discussion in the interest of society, culture and Islamic values.²⁴

When Jinnah returned from England and reached Bombay in early January 1935, he had already planned what to do in the best interest of the Muslims and pave the way for the road to Pakistan. Though he kept his real intentions secret, but his opponents could no longer delay to notice his visionary leadership leading the Muslims with rejuvenated gusto. When the session of new Indian Legislative Assembly started in New Delhi on January 21, 1935, Jinnah had to face three challenges. First was the election of Sir Abdul Rahim, his

²⁴ For Jinnah's ideas in this connection at the Round Table Conferences see Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Second Phase of His Freedom Struggle, 1924-1934*, pp. 124-158.

friend, as President of the Assembly, the second was to thwart the Congress move to boycott the session of the Assembly, and the third was also to thwart the Congress move not to allow the Assembly to consent for the Joint Parliamentary Committee Report.²⁵ Jinnah planned things in such a way that he foiled all the attempts of the Congress on all these three matters. The Congress candidate T. A. K. Sherwani was defeated and Sir Abdul Rahim was elected as Chairman of Indian Legislative Assembly. In this way the Congress move to wreck the holding of the Assembly session was also foiled. When Congress failed to block holding of the Assembly session, it resorted to a third negative step and that was rejection of Joint Parliamentary Committee Report and the Communal Award of 1932. A number of amendments in the Joint Parliamentary Committee Report were also tabled by some other members of the Assembly. On February 3, 1935 Jinnah tabled in the Assembly the following resolution:

1. That the Assembly accepts the Communal Award so far as it goes until substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned.
2. As regards the scheme of provincial governments, this House is of opinion that it is most unsatisfactory and disappointing in as much as it includes various objectionable features, particularly establishment of second chambers, extraordinary and special powers of the Governors, provisions relating to police rules, Secret and Intelligence Departments, which render real control and responsibility of the executive and legislature ineffective and therefore, unless these objectionable features are removed, it will not satisfy any section of Indian opinion.
3. With respect to the scheme of the Central Government called "All-India Federation", this House is clearly of the opinion that it is fundamentally bad and totally

²⁵ Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions, 1935-1948*, Islamabad, Alvi Publishers, 2017, pp. 4-5.

unacceptable to the people of British India and, therefore, recommends to the Government of India to advise His Majesty's Government not to proceed with any legislation based on this scheme and urges that immediate efforts should be made to consider how best to establish in British India alone real and complete responsible government and with that view take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion without delay.²⁶

The purpose of Jinnah was that federal portion of the report should be rejected, but the provincial portion by which he could allow elections for the formation of provincial assemblies should be adopted. In this way, Jinnah planned, the way for the Muslim majority provinces to opt for Pakistan was to be made clear. Very few could understand this strategy of Jinnah because he was such a leader who was thinking ahead of his times. However, his opponents knew about this and they did everything to block his way. Therefore, Jinnah moved in such a way that the Congress' move to reject the Joint Parliamentary Committee failed and his amendment was passed by the Assembly by a majority vote of 74 to 58 on February 7 after a debate of three days.²⁷ On February 13, 1935, an anonymous letter appeared in the *Times of India*, Bombay in which it was admitted that majority of the Assembly "by its approval of Mr. Jinnah's 'judgment' discarded all immediate thought of an Indian 'nation' embracing all India's peoples. What he wants apparently is the creation of a 'Hindu India' and a 'Muslim India' in the North, composed of a solid block of Muslim "States extending from the Afghan Frontier as far as and including Bengal. This will exist as a perpetual menace overhanging 'Hindu India' of

²⁶ *Times of India*, 4 February 1935.

²⁷ *Times of India*, 8 February 1935. Also see *The Legislative Assembly Debates (Official Report)*, 21 January to 18 February, 1935, Government of India, New Delhi, 1935, pp. 575-576. For details of this also see Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions, 1935-1948*, pp. 7-9.

the South”.²⁸ Thus another ‘blank cheque’ has been given to the Muslims led by Mr. Jinnah in the Assembly. It is a sad story.”²⁹ This was made possible because majority of the members of the Assembly were trapped by Jinnah “who always boasts of being a ‘nationalist’ but secretly believed in division of India. Thus, the majority members “walked into the spider’s parlour”.³⁰

Jinnah’s Move Appreciated by his Opponent Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy

Jinnah’s victory was further substantiated by the Viceroy. On February 9, 1935 the Viceroy Lord Willingdon sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, informing him that the Congress’ move of rejecting the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) Report as a whole for the last two months had lost in the Indian Assembly. It also had been accepted by the Assembly. The Congress finally “surrendered” and “swallowed the bitter pill and agreed to have both parts put together, though it involved accepting provincial autonomy which their own resolution wanted to reject”. Having secured the Congress’ surrender, Jinnah was very happy that he was able to get Congress’ consent at least on the provincial autonomy. He rightly understood the minds of the Congress leadership as well as those of Hindu Mahasabha. On April 22, 1935 Jinnah addressed a function arranged by the Bombay Muslim Students’ Union in which he gave his assessment that the Hindu Mahasabha had made the situation difficult. In this respect Jinnah said:

The position of the Hindu Mahasabha made not only the position of the Muslims difficult but also made the position of the Congress difficult. So far as the Hindu Mahasabha was concerned, every pronouncement it made, or any course of action it adopted, was calculated

²⁸ *Times of India*, 13 February 1935.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

to show to the Muslims that the Mahasabha was dominated by the one consideration – the main consideration – that in India there should be complete supremacy and ascendancy of Hindus.

When the Muslims realized the attitude and mentality of the Hindu Mahasabha, their position became difficult. The Muslims naturally asked: ‘What is going to be our position in the future Government of India? When this great country gets self-government, are we to be under the rule of the Hindus?’

How could they, therefore, expect the Muslims to join hands whole-heartedly with the Hindus and share in the struggle for freedom? Unless that mentality underwent a complete change, it would be very difficult indeed for the Hindus and Muslims to work whole-heartedly together.³¹

Jinnah’s View of Congress as Representative of Hindu India Authenticated by 1937 Elections

There are some adverse comments on Jinnah and the Muslim League by certain writers with reference to their performance in the elections of 1937. The reality is least understood by most of the Indian and Pakistani writers. The reality is that by 1937 Jinnah’s message and Iqbal’s idea of Muslim State advanced at Allahabad in December 1930 at the Muslim League’s session had become popular amongst the Muslim masses. The only difficulty was that the provincial Muslim leadership was not united behind the Muslim League and Jinnah. But Jinnah’s message was well understood by the Muslims of the whole of British India. The greatest example was in the elections of 1937 where although the Muslim League could not win more than 25% seats in the Provincial Assemblies, yet at the same time the Indian Muslims as a whole showed their distrust in the Congress by not voting for Hindu leadership. Out of 482 seats

³¹ *Times of India*, 23 April 1935.

allocated for Muslims in all the eleven provinces, it was only against 58 seats that Congress put up its own candidates and, of these, only 26 won,³² of which 15 belonged to the NWFP. In ten other provinces, Congress had, therefore, won only 7 seats, i.e., about 5% of the total seats reserved for the Muslims.³³ The Muslim leadership became united after the elections of 1937 when Jawaharlal Nehru announced in April 1937 that Hindu Raj had come and all the other minorities should line up behind the Congress.³⁴ At Lucknow Sessions of the All India Muslim League held on October 15-18, 1937 not only the Muslim League leaders became united but Chief Ministers like that of the majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal belonging to other parties also came to assure Jinnah that they were all united against the threat of Hindu Raj posed by the Congress or the Hindu Mahasabha to the Muslims. In this connection, the assurances to Jinnah by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Chief Minister of Punjab, Maulvi A. K. Fazlul Haq, Chief Minister of Bengal, and Sir Saadullah Khan, the Premier of Assam that for the cause of Muslim freedom at the national level they were with him, were of great surprise to the world. The Congress leadership including those of Gandhi, Nehru and others felt threatened. Jinnah accepted their hand of cooperation, though some Muslim League leaders also could not understand Jinnah's larger strategy.

Jinnah Unites Muslim Leaders of Majority Muslim Provinces in Lucknow, October 1937

In his presidential address at Lucknow Sessions of the AIML held on October 15-18, 1937 Jinnah gave full charter for the freedom of the Muslims of South Asia. Jinnah termed this session as one held under the "most critical" circumstances in more than thirty years' of the League's existence. The issues which he touched in his long

³² *Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 168-a-168b.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 168b.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

speech related to the history of the AIML and its failed efforts to build up cooperation with the Congress despite the successful conclusion of Lucknow Pact of 1916, dangers to the very existence of AIML from the Congress leadership, dichotomy in the words and deeds of the Congress leadership – including those of M. K. Gandhi, the Congress challenge not only to the AIML but to the very existence of the Muslims in British India, and disunity amongst the Muslims themselves, etc. In this scenario Jinnah gave a Charter for the Muslim freedom by suggesting various steps such as organization of the Muslims around the AIML, smaller Muslim parties to rally round the AIML, to awaken the Muslims to the reality that they were a separate nation whose existence was not tolerated by the Congress and Mahasabha leadership.³⁵

Gandhi, Nehru, and Bose Alarmed by Jinnah’s Speech at Lucknow, October 1937

As a matter of fact, Gandhi had felt antagonized by Jinnah’s address at the Lucknow session of AIML of October 1937 which he, in his letter of October 19, 1937, described as “a declaration of war” to which Jinnah, in his reply to Gandhi on November 5, 1937, tactfully explained that what he said was “purely self defence”.³⁶ Nehru also tried to befool Jinnah by writing a letter to Jinnah on January 18, 1938 in which he showed his ignorance to understand the Muslim issue and showed his desire to discuss the matters in a meeting. Jinnah fully understood this willful ignorance of Nehru. In reply, Jinnah showed his readiness to meet Nehru, but he explained that he would talk to him with reference to the Fourteen Points starting with the Lucknow Pact of 1916.³⁷ Despite receiving this letter of Jinnah, Nehru forgot to meet him, but replied on April 6, 1938. Jinnah replied on April 12, 1938 in which he said that

³⁵ Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. II, pp. 239-246.

³⁶ *Times of India*, 16 June 1938.

³⁷ *Indian Annual Register January-June 1938*, Vol. I, pp. 369-370.

“it has been to me a most painful reading” because “you twisted” the matter. Towards the end of his letter, Jinnah made it clear that “in my opinion unless the Congress recognizes the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will determine the measures of importance and distinction it possesses”.³⁸ After the failure of Gandhi and Nehru to befool Jinnah, came Subhas Chandra Bose, President of Indian National Congress, to confuse Jinnah with regard to what Jinnah said at Lucknow Muslim League session in October 1937. Initially, Bose had a meeting with Jinnah on May 14, 1938 followed by a number of letters. Jinnah also conveyed to him the Muslim League Council’s resolution that “it is not possible for the All India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the *Mussalmans of India*”.³⁹

Jinnah Terms Congress Rule as Hindu Raj in 6 Hindu Majority Provinces during 1937-1939

The next challenge which Jinnah faced was the Congress Rule in six provinces. The Congress rule was installed in six Hindu majority provinces of UP, Central Provinces (CP), Bihar, Orissa, Madras and Bombay in July 1937 after getting certain assurances from the Governors. The Congress’ reign was also established in NWFP in September 1937 after bribing certain members of NWFP against the Ministry of Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum. Since this was a Muslim majority area, the Congress did not provoke the Muslims in this province. The Congress ministries in these provinces continued to rule until November/December 1939.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 374-375.

³⁹ Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions 1935-1948*, pp. 95-96.

The Congress-led ministries in six Hindu majority provinces acted against the interests of the Muslims. The Muslim culture, interests, institutions and Urdu language were suppressed in these Hindu majority provinces. As a matter of fact, Jinnah had been urging the British Central Government to appoint a Royal Commission to probe into the cruel actions of the Congress ministries in the six provinces, but this demand was not given any weight in the official circles because of the risk that the Congress high command might dislike it. When this was not accomplished, the Muslim League appointed its own committees to report on the Congress' high-handedness in their treatment of the Muslims and to prove whether it was merely an allegation or based on facts. As a result of this, two reports were completed – Pirpur Report which probed the allegations in the UP, and the Sharif Report which probed the allegations in Bihar. According to Khalid bin Sayeed, the Muslim allegations were proved and a number of steps taken by the Congress government against the Muslims were particularly pointed out.⁴⁰ The same was substantiated in Bihar by the Sharif Report.⁴¹ Even A. K. Fazlul Haq prepared a pamphlet titled “Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule” which also substantiated the Congress' cruelties upon the Muslims in a number of provinces.⁴² These reports produced a far-reaching effect on the Muslims.

Jinnah's other strategy was to hold Provincial Conferences in a number of provinces just to highlight the Muslim grievances as he did in Bengal, Bihar, UP, Bombay, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, and Sindh. These Conferences were successfully held and the Muslims of these provinces were made aware of the Congress policies of the Hindu Raj. During this period of the Hindu Raj (1937-1939) three

⁴⁰ Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 97-98.

⁴¹ I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, University of Karachi, 1997, p.87.

⁴² *Ibid.*

sessions of the AIML – October 1937 at Lucknow, Calcutta Session of April 17-18 in 1938, and the Patna Session of December 26-29 in 1938 – were arranged to make aware the Muslims as well as the British Government of the Congress’ atrocities against the Muslims. This bore fruit, not only did the Muslims galvanize around AIML, but the British Government was also convinced that what Jinnah was saying was right. In his statement before the British Parliament, Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, explained that the Congress has functioned as it was a “Hindu organization”, a statement disliked by Gandhi.⁴³

Resignation of Congress Ministries and Celebration of December 22, 1939 as the Day of Deliverance

Gandhi and the Congress disliked such statements against the Congress rule in the six Hindu majority provinces. When World War I started, there were a number of meetings of the British Viceroy of India with Gandhi, Jinnah and other leaders. When Gandhi and other Congress leadership decided to give a hard time to the British Government to not support them in the war efforts, Jinnah took the opportunity to support the British in the war matters. Jinnah’s assurances were given weight because 50% of the armed personnel who were fighting in different corners of the world for the British were the Muslims who came to have love for the Quaid. Annoyed by this assurance of Jinnah, the Congress leadership thought to put pressure on the Government by resigning from the Ministries in November 1939. When this happened, Jinnah advanced the concept of celebration of December 22, 1939 as the Day of Deliverance from the Congress Raj, a celebration in which not only the Muslims but all the minorities including those of the lower classes of the Hindus of British India participated. Thus

⁴³ *Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vo. II, pp. 38-39.

the Congress rule ended and Jinnah was able to step on towards the concept of Pakistan in March 1940.

The Government was deeply influenced by this Day of Deliverance and issued a statement that the Federal Scheme of the Government of India Act 1935 was “suspended.” Jinnah expressed his satisfaction in his statement of December 25, 1939 and hoped for the moment when the scheme “is definitely buried”.⁴⁴ S. P. Rath, Editor of the *New Orissa*, declared the Day of Deliverance as a Red Letter Day in the annals of political history of India because on this day thousands of Muslims and Hindus came together to pay their gratitude to God for delivering them from a nightmare of intolerance and authoritarianism. M. C. Rajah, President of All India Association of Depressed Classes, welcomed Quaid’s declaration and strongly supported the demand for setting up of a Royal Commission to look into the misdeeds of the Congress ministries.⁴⁵

Jinnah’s Demand for Pakistan, 23rd March 1940

Now Jinnah was ready to speak openly for Pakistan at the time when he cashed in the moment in favor of his new course of history, i.e., the road to establish Pakistan. That was also done tactfully and with so much care that his opponents both within and without could not dodge him or stab him from the back. He could approach the British Government directly, but for the Congress, being the greatest enemy, he had gained strength on how to tackle them in terms of arguments in the public field because he had mobilized the Muslim masses of both the majority Muslim provinces and the minority provinces in favor of the goal of Pakistan. A goal that already had its introduction at the Muslim League’s Allahabad session in December 1930. In 1933, Chaudhry Rehmat Ali had

⁴⁴ *Times of India*, 27 December 1939.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

coined the word 'Pakistan' for the concept of a Muslim State in Indo-Pak subcontinent in this connection.

When the ground had been prepared, Jinnah announced the holding of next 27th session of All India Muslim League in Lahore on March 22-24, 1940. Thus the scheme of Pakistan prepared by Quaid-i-Azam was presented in the form of a resolution. As the language of the resolution runs, it was put: "Resolved that it is the considered view of the session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."⁴⁶ In his Presidential Address, the Quaid also said: "We find that even according to the British map of India, we occupy large parts of this country where the *Mussalmans* are in a majority — such as Bengal, Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan."⁴⁷ He also declared: "*Mussalmans* are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State."⁴⁸

As Jinnah planned, the resolution was moved by A. K. Fazlul Haq, Premier of Bengal. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, a leader from UP seconded it. Others who spoke in favor of this resolution were Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, the editor of the popular Urdu daily *Zamindar*, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, the Leader of Opposition in the NWFP Assembly, Sir Abdullah Haroon — a veteran leader from

⁴⁶ Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. II, p. 312.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

Sindh, Khan Bahadur Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, the President of the U.P. Muslim League, Mohammad Isa Khan, the President of Balochistan Muslim League, Abdul Hamid Khan, the Leader of the Muslim Party in the Madras Assembly, I. I. Chundrigar, the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League party in the Bombay Assembly, Syed Abdur Rauf Shah, the President of the C.P. Muslim League, Dr. Mohammad Alam from the Punjab, Syed Zakir Ali, Begum Mohammad Ali who was the widow of late Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, and Maulana Abdul Hamid.⁴⁹ The resolution was passed on 24th March “unanimously amid great enthusiasm.”⁵⁰ This reflected the unity of the Muslims of the subcontinent belonging to both the majority and minority Muslim provinces of British India who fully supported the Quaid in his scheme of Pakistan.

This was not entirely a new idea. Various ideas for the division of South Asian subcontinent into Hindu zones and Muslim zones had already been put forward. John Bright in the late 19th century was the first to suggest in this direction. There were other British, Muslim and Hindu visionaries who put forth the ideas of partition of the subcontinent. All these ideas were nothing but merely talking into thin air and had nothing to do with the favorable public opinion. It goes to the credit of Quaid-i-Azam and his followers that first they mobilized Muslim public’s opinion, both in the historical and political sense, and then presented the idea. The idea coming in this background duly enjoyed the backing of the whole of Muslim India. The leaders of the majority Muslim provinces expressed their willingness to accept this. At the same, it was supported by the leaders of the minority Muslim provinces. The common factor which bounded the Muslims of both these areas was the fear of Hindu Raj and what it meant, duly exhibited in a number of Hindu writings and speeches by certain Hindu leaders. Thus, the State of

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 311-315.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 315.

Pakistan was designed to serve the purpose of both the majority Muslim areas as well as those of the minority Muslim areas.

Quaid-i-Azam was the leader who had a strong sense of history. He not only rightly interpreted the historical development in the contemporary realities but he was also a person who thought in the line of giving new direction to history. He also understood the main forces that shaped history. At the international and national level, it was the British Government which formed the greatest force of history. In the internal political developments, it was the Indian National Congress leaders who were another big factor in history representing the Hindu majority's will. Jinnah, in his long political career of working with the Congress leaders since his entry into politics in 1897, had visualized that the Congress leaders were not allowing the Muslims any respectable position in the body politics of South Asia. In making the Muslims a third majority power factor of South Asia, Jinnah got the chance when World War II started in September 1939. On this issue he challenged the British masters and made them realize that the Muslims are a third major factor without whose approval the future of South Asia could not be determined. Through his wise policies Quaid-i-Azam brought unity amongst the rank and file of the Muslims of the subcontinent. After having achieved this unity during 1935-1939, he presented the goal of Pakistan for their approval in March 1940. Now with the complete support of united Muslims, he was ready to deal with the Congress leaders.

The Lahore session of the AIML was closely watched by the Governor of the Punjab, Sir Henry Duffield Craik. He sent his secret report to the Viceroy on March 25, 1940 in which he wrote: "The session of the Muslim League finished last night and I am glad to be able to report that my Ministers have emerged comparatively unscathed from a situation that at one time seemed extremely

critical.”⁵¹ He also wrote: “As regards the result of the Muslim League session, I imagine you are in as good a position to appreciate these as I am. My own impression is that the influence and that the unanimity and enthusiasm shown at the session have given the League a position of far greater authority than it previously enjoyed.”⁵²

At that time Lord Zetland was the functioning Secretary of State for India. When he heard of the popularity of the Muslim demand, his first reaction was the realization that he could not avoid expressing his hostility to the Pakistan demand, a stance least liked by the Home Government and Linlithgow. Writing to Lord Linlithgow in April 1940, Zetland observed:

I think that in the course of the forthcoming debates I shall be bound to express my dissent from the proposals which have recently been put forward by the All India Muslim League in the course of their recent conference at Lahore. I should very much doubt whether they have been properly thought out and in any case to create a number of Ulsters in India would not only mean the wrecking of all that we have been working for a number of years past, but would also imagine, give rise to the most violent opposition on the part of the Congress and possibly of others who are not actually attached to the Congress in India. There is, of course, great force in Jinnah’s arguments that the circumstances of India are unsuited to the form of democracy which we have evolved in this country. We have always recognized that and we have of course provided various restrictions on the free working of the democratic system.

⁵¹ Craike to Linlithgow, 25 March 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Eur. Mss. F. 125/89, British Library (OIOC), London.

⁵² *Ibid.*

Even so, it is clear that the working of parliamentary institutions in India is characterized by some strange practices.... The fundamental difference between the Muslims and the Hindus is certainly a much greater obstacle in the way of the smooth working of a democratic system. But nothing appears to have been said in the Resolution of the All India Muslim League in which they sketched their constitutional policy about the form of government in the units which are to be created in those parts of India which are inhabited mainly by Muslims or in the units which lie outside the Muslim sphere of influence.⁵³

British Government Decides not to Oppose the Demand for Pakistan Publicly because of Jinnah's Popularity

In a number of telegrams, the Viceroy had advised the Secretary of State for India and the Home Government not to publically express their opposition to the Pakistan demand. This was thought because of the fact that the idea had firmly gained ground in the Muslim minds. What was desired by the Viceroy was a policy of the British Government by which sympathy to the Pakistan demand was to be shown before the public as long as the World War II was continuing. And that after the war comes to an end, the British should resort to devise their policy in this connection. In another telegram in April 1940, the Viceroy advised the Secretary of State for India:

I am myself disposed to regard Jinnah's partition scheme as very largely in the nature of bargaining. I think he has put forward this scheme, the many objections to which I need not set here partly to dispose of the reproach that the Muslims had no constructive scheme of their own; partly to offset the extreme Congress claims to independence,

⁵³ Zetland to Linlithgow, 5 April 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Eurr. Mss., F. 125/9.

etc.; and the Congress contention that the Congress is the mouthpiece of India; and that a Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult suffrage is the only machinery for deciding future progress, as put forward in the Ramgarh Resolution. That many Muslims are unhappy about the partition scheme, I have no doubt, more particularly Muslims in the minority provinces.⁵⁴

Explaining it further in his telegram of April 8, Viceroy made it more clear to the Secretary of State that while he fully appreciates the impressions of the Secretary of State with which he entirely sympathized, as regards the Muslim partition plan, he would again emphasize the great importance of saying nothing which would antagonize the Muslims and of avoiding any direct attack on them. The British Government, the Viceroy continued, should be careful enough while handling this issue so long as the war was ongoing. At the end of the war, as promised by the Government, the British Government would consider the situation and decide the matter to the entire satisfaction of the all the parties and communities.⁵⁵

Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, was also giving serious thought to what the Viceroy *Linlithgow* had written to him on Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan. Zetland took into confidence the British Prime Minister and other policymakers of the Home Government. After thorough homework, Zetland wrote to *Linlithgow* on April 24, 1940:

I quite understand, of course, your anxiety lest I should say anything to upset Jinnah, but I really feel that I could not say less than I regarded the scheme put forward by the

⁵⁴ Viceroy to Secretary of State (telegram), 6 April 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Eur. Mss. F. 125/19.

⁵⁵ Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 April 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Eur. Mss. F. 125/19.

All India Muslim League at Lahore as being something little short of a council despair.⁵⁶

Linlithgow discussed the view of the Secretary of State with his Cabinet and some provincial governors. Other key advisers of the government were also consulted. After thorough homework, the Viceroy replied to the Secretary of State in June 1940 in which his assessment of Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan was as follows:

The Muslim League, challenged as it has been to produce any constructive programme to set against that advanced by Congress has in the last few months come out a definite position that India should be divided in Hindu and Muslim spheres of influence, a proposition commonly referred to as the theory of the two-nations; or the Pakistan claim, I have not myself ever believed that this proposal was put forward by Muslim leaders save for bargaining purposes and to offset Congress claims.

On Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan, the British Government, both in India and London, were disturbed. Some thought this idea of Pakistan by Jinnah, was a "bargaining counter" to deal with both Congress as well with the Government. Others thought differently as seen before. But Jinnah was very sincere in his demand for Pakistan. The British rulers were careful enough to express publicly on this issue for fear of reaction from the Muslim public whose majority had come to be commanded by Jinnah's political leadership. It was with fears and doubts that the Viceroy, his advisers and the British tackled the political situation in British India, particularly the Pakistan demand.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Zetland to Linlithgow, 24 April 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Eur. Mss. F. 125/19.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Thus the British Government as a whole came to accept that the Muslim public opinion is being “commanded by Jinnah’s political leadership”. The Government also came to develop a policy, in such a state of affairs as in World War II, that publically the Government would show sympathy with the idea of Pakistan but secretly work for its failure because the Congress leadership was committed to unity of India at all costs. Thus the new situation developed.

August 1940 Offer – British Promise to Consider the Muslim League Demand for Pakistan after the War

It was in this scenario that the British Government decided to negotiate with Jinnah and the Congress leadership of Gandhi and Nehru. As a result of these negotiations, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow announced on August 8, 1940 which is known as the “August Offer 1940” that “His Majesty’s Government authorize me to declare that they will most readily assent to the setting up after the conclusion of the war, with the least possible delay of a body representative of the principal elements in India’s national life in order to devise the framework of the new constitution and they will lend every aid in their power to hasten decisions on all relevant matters to the utmost degree”⁵⁸. It was also made clear in this statement that “His Majesty’s Government’s concern that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision has also been brought out. That remains the position of His Majesty’s Government”.⁵⁹ The Viceroy also wanted to form his War Cabinet in which he wanted representatives of the Muslim League and Congress should also participate.

⁵⁸ H. N. Mitra (ed.), *The Indian Annual Register 1940*, Vol. II, New Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1990, pp. 372-373.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Viceroy's Dialogue with Jinnah for the Inclusion of Muslim League Representatives in the War Cabinet

With regard to the War Council or War Cabinet, the Viceroy offered Jinnah on August 14, 1940 two seats in the expanded Executive Council intended to consist of 11 members for which a panel of four Muslim League representatives was required to be nominated by Jinnah. The strength and composition of the War Advisory Council was intended to be 20, of which 5 were to be Muslim League representatives.⁶⁰ At the same time, the Viceroy made it clear to Jinnah that “the theory of unity of national life” was essential. This condition was not acceptable to Jinnah and the Muslim League. The Working Committee of the AIML met in Bombay on August 31 - September 2, 1940 and observed that the Viceroy's theory was “historically inaccurate and self-contradictory”.⁶¹ Therefore, Jinnah conveyed to the Viceroy that the Muslim League was committed to “Pakistan Resolution” of 23rd March, 1940. The joining of the Muslim League representatives did not mean that they had sacrificed the Pakistan Scheme. This position was not acceptable to the Viceroy who wanted Jinnah to submit the names of Muslim League nominees and it was the Viceroy who was to select people according to his choice. The Viceroy did not agree to this. On the other hand, following Gandhi's “guidance”, the Congress' response was not positive to the August Offer. The Congress Working Committee, in its meeting held on August 18, 1940, noted the offer “with deep regret,” and expressed that “they cannot associate themselves in any way with these proposals.”⁶² Jinnah addressed the public meeting in Bombay on December 8, 1940 in which he declared: “If the Congress wants to achieve independence there is

⁶⁰ Linlithgow to Jinnah, 14 August 1940, in *Linlithgow Papers*, Eur. Mss. F. 125/122, British Library (OIOC), London.

⁶¹ H. N. Mitra, *Indian Annual Register 1940*, Vol. II, New Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1990, p. 243.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

no other way of doing it except by the two communities agreeing to live as separate entities. Pakistan is the only way to India's freedom."⁶³ Expressing in this connection at a meeting in Karachi on December 15, 1940, Jinnah declared: "The failure of the Viceroy's and Mr. Amery's efforts is due to the weak, vacillating and indecisive policy of the British Government."⁶⁴ In this scenario, speaking at the annual meeting of the Muslim Educational Service League in Bombay on January 10, 1941, Jinnah urged upon the British to grant the Muslims their homeland as it was their united demand.⁶⁵ This was said by Jinnah because Gandhi and Nehru were not ready to have any talk with Jinnah or any other Muslim League leader during 1940-1941. While the settlement with Jinnah could not be made, the Viceroy started nominating the War Cabinet members out of his own choice, to which Jinnah objected. While all these parleys were going on, the Japanese advanced towards India from the Eastern side by which the British Government felt further pressed to deal with the Indian leaders.

Jinnah's Stance on the Cripps Proposals 1942

On March 11, 1942, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared before the British Parliament (House of Commons) that "the crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life".⁶⁶ A Draft Declaration was prepared by the British Cabinet by which "immediately following the war "an elected body" shall be constituted for the purpose of "framing a new constitution for

⁶³ Ibid., p. 51.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁵ Indian Annual Register 1941, Vol. I, p. 28.

⁶⁶ "India (Lord Privy Seal's Mission): Statement and Draft Declaration by His Majesty's Government with Correspondence and Resolutions Connected Therewith, London: April 1942", British Library (OIOC), London L/PJ/10/2, and Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p.197.

India”.⁶⁷ Sir Stafford Cripps, Leader of the House of Commons, “friend” of the Prime Minister as well as of the Congress leaders was deputed to carry the draft declaration to India, discuss with Indian leaders and report back to the British War Cabinet as well as the Parliament. Cripps arrived at Karachi by air on March 22 and reached New Delhi on March 23, 1942 – the day celebrated by All India Muslim League as the Pakistan Day – there he came directly into contact with the Indian leaders by personally meeting with them or writing them letters. On March 30, 1942 the draft declaration was published in the newspapers. Though he gave undue importance to the Congress leaders, yet he could not ignore the Quaid as leader of the Muslim League. On March 25, 1942 he had a meeting with Jinnah in which five clauses of the draft declaration were discussed. Jinnah suggested some changes in the last clause which were accepted with slight modifications. This was conveyed to Jinnah on March 26, 1942. Text of the draft declaration finalized as a result of discussions with Jinnah and other Indian leaders was published in the Indian newspapers on March 30, 1942.

Stafford Cripps remained in British India during March 22-April 12, 1942. Apart from active dialogues with Cripps, Jinnah kept up building political pressure on the Government by taking a number of political steps. On 23rd March 1942 Pakistan Day was celebrated in a befitting manner, a public meeting in New Delhi was held under the auspices of AIML, which Jinnah termed as “the only representative body for the ten crores of Muslims”. He was bold enough to declare:

Sir Stafford Cripps is now here as representative of the British Government. We must wait and reserve our

⁶⁷ “Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders” in “India (Lord Privy Seal’s Mission)”, London, 1942, British Library (OIOC), London, L/PJ/10/2.

judgement on the proposals which he has brought with him.

We are prepared to face all the consequences if any scheme or solution, which is detrimental to the interests of the Muslims, is enforced and we, by all our might and resources at our disposal, shall oppose that. We shall resist any intrigue resorted to by Hindu leadership or British leadership until we are all dead.⁶⁸

In his Urdu address to the open session of AIML at “Jinnah Chaman”, Allahabad on April 3, 1942, the Quaid said that the Working Committee of AIML is considering the Cripps proposals:

What the Committee will decide no one knows but one thing I want to announce in clear words. Rest assured that our aim is Pakistan and whatever the proposals might be. If they are such that we cannot achieve Pakistan we will never accept them. There may be shortcomings in the Proposals — and there are many — but our firm determination and our only goal is one — Pakistan — Pakistan — Pakistan.⁶⁹

The Quaid also added with determination:

Now it is not a question of their giving it (Pakistan) but we will take it. This voice was being raised throughout India and in every language. In Bengal, in Bombay, in Madras whether it is a Tamil Telugu, Gujarati, Punjabi, Urdu or Pashto there is only one cry from every corner of India — ‘*Pakistan Zindabad*’. This is our decision and there can be no change in it.⁷⁰

The ‘veiled’ recognition of Pakistan by the Cripps offer could not satisfy Jinnah who was vigorous for the demand for Pakistan.

⁶⁸ *Star of India*, 24 March 1942.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 4 April 1942.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

However, as part of his strategy, Jinnah wanted to continue dialogue with Cripps in the hope of convincing him for the cause of Pakistan.

Cripps' three-week stay in British India was most crucial for Jinnah who read a number of newspaper reports that British government was coming to terms with the Congress by which Jawaharlal Nehru would become Defence Minister in charge of the whole of defence of India. Even the Commander-in-Chief of British India, it was reported, would be placed under Nehru's control. The reports were certainly alarming for Jinnah's demand for Pakistan, because if this had happened, it would have sealed the fate of Pakistan. By rejecting the Congress demand to transfer defence to Congress Defence Minister, the British did not favour the Pakistan demand. As a matter of fact, the British Government had its own agenda and policies by which they were not ready to put Indian forces under the Indian Defence Minister because it would have affected their overall world war activities. Jinnah closely watched all these stages of dialogues between Cripps and the Congress leaders. When difference of opinion emerged between these 'friends', it was easy for Jinnah to relax. Otherwise, Jinnah was preparing the nation for acting on either side of the settlement. Even if a settlement between Congress and British Government had been reached, Jinnah would have called upon the Muslim nation to revolt against the Government. In this, the Muslim component of the British Indian Army, which was equal to those of the Hindus, would have deserted and sided with their Muslim Indian nation. This position was fully realized by the British War Cabinet. Therefore, they preferred to reject Congress' demand to transfer defence to Indian minister. In this whole process, certainly the Quaid succeeded in further popularizing the Pakistan demand and preparing Muslim India for self-defense in the name of 'Civil Defense'.

Congress' Civil Disobedience Movement/Quit India Movement and Jinnah's Response, 1942-1944

The Cripps Mission failed to get support from the Congress in war efforts and on April 12, 1942 left British India for England. On Gandhi's guidance, the Congress Working Committee in its resolution of July 14, 1942, demanded that the British should leave India and hand over power to Congress representatives so that the Indian armed forces could be stationed in different parts of the world during the World War only with the approval of the Congress. Otherwise, the Resolution threatened, the Congress would start a non-violent movement "under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi" to achieve its goal of Indian freedom. Under this statement it was a clear message for All India Muslim League led by Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah that Congress did not give any kind of weightage to the Muslims as a separate entity or their concept of Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam and other leaders of the Muslim League equally well understood this behavior of the Congress leaders and were not going to surrender before Congress.

Opposing this demand of the Congress, Quaid-i-Azam issued a press statement to the foreign press on July 31, 1942 by which he said: "The latest decision of the Congress Working Committee on July 14, 1942, resolving to launch a mass movement if the British do not withdraw immediately from India is the culminating point in the policy and programme of Mr. Gandhi and his Hindu Congress of blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a system of Government and transfer power to that Government which would establish Hindu Raj immediately under the aegis of the British bayonet thereby throwing the Muslims and other minorities and interests at the mercy of the Congress Raj".⁷¹ This statement of the Quaid upset the entire Hindu Congress leadership particularly C. Rajagopalachari, who was very close to Jinnah. Consoling

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 368.

Rajagopalachari, Gandhi wrote to him that this statement of Jinnah “should not upset” him. When the British did not accept the Congress demand, the Congress launched its civil disobedience movement in August 1942 by passing “Quit India” Resolution. The British Government acted swiftly and arrested Gandhi and other top leaders of the Congress and sent them to jail. Gandhi was arrested and shifted to Aga Khan Palace in Poona. Responding to these arrests of the Congress leaders, Jinnah issued a press statement on the evening of August 8, 1942 in which he said: “I deeply regret that the Congress has finally declared war and has launched a most dangerous mass movement in spite of numerous warnings and advice from various individuals, parties and organizations in this country”.⁷² L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, termed the Congress mass civil disobedience “a deliberate campaign to sabotage” the British “war effort”.⁷³ In his statement of August 15, 1942, Rajagopalachari appealed to Jinnah for help at a time when the entire Congress leadership was in trouble. Jinnah called a meeting of the AIML Working Committee on August 16, 1942 at his Bombay residence and discussed the matter for two and a half hours, after which, Jinnah in a special interview said: “The Muslim League would join a provisional war-time Government if it had equal voice with Hindus and assurance of Pakistan after the war. It would also consider any suggestion for a solution from any authoritative source”.⁷⁴

The British Government wanted to get support of Jinnah and his All-India Muslim League which had emerged as the most popular party after the Congress. On this basis Jinnah agreed to allow the provincial Muslim League leaders in the Muslim majority provinces to form their own ministries, if they were asked to do by the British Government. In this scenario the ministries in the provinces of

⁷² *Indian Annual Register 1942*, Vol. II, p. 17.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Sindh, NWFP, Bengal and Assam were formed by the Muslim League leaders which did help promote the cause of Pakistan Movement during the war years.

Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, 1944

When the whole of Congress leadership including Gandhi and Nehru were in jail, Gandhi realized that the Pakistan Movement was advancing with much pace. He thought to have dialogue with Jinnah, which Gandhi himself had refused in 1942. Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah in 1943 from his confinement in jail, but it was delivered to Jinnah while the latter was in Kashmir. As a settlement, Gandhi became ready to meet Jinnah in September 1944 at Jinnah's residence in Bombay. The British Government's stance was that both the leaders should settle their differences regarding grant of freedom to India amongst themselves. A number of meetings between the two leaders took place at Jinnah's Bombay residence. They were also followed by lengthy correspondence requiring explanation of certain points of settlement. But by the end of September 1944 these talks failed to bring any settlement though Gandhi offered to settle the issue of Pakistan after the departure of the British, a ploy which Jinnah was not ready to believe.

Finally, having failed to satisfy Jinnah on the above points, in his letter of September 24, 1944, Gandhi tried to persuade Jinnah to accept the principle of not two nations, but of two brothers, a principle to be worked out by a Congress-Muslim League Commission after the departure of the British when "India will be free from foreign domination". Jinnah was not ready to accept such a ploy and in his letter of September 25 said: "As a result of your correspondence and discussions, I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and does not come from your heart. And now, suddenly, at the eleventh hour you put forward a new suggestion, consisting of two sentences, in your statements, 'I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be

partition between two brothers, if a division there must be'. I naturally asked you what this new suggestion meant, and wanted you to give me rough outlines of this new idea in terms of as to how and when the division is to take place and in what way it is to be different from the division envisaged in the Lahore resolution, and now you have been good enough to give me your amplification, in your letter of September 24, it is clear that your terms are in vital conflict with the Lahore resolution.”⁷⁵

After the failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks it was agreed that both leaders would part as “friends” and not as “enemies”. But Gandhi was soon to divulge his real opposition to the Lahore Resolution when in his press conference on September 30, 1944 he made it clear that the type of partition proposed by the Lahore Resolution was an “unnatural division” which he was not ready to accept. Jinnah termed such aspersions on the part of Gandhi against the very spirit of press communiqué issued towards the end of talks jointly by both the leaders.

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, was depressed in the sense that the political atmosphere of the country had become very tense after the breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks. Reporting the matter to Amery, Secretary of State for India on October 2, the Viceroy wrote:

Breakdown reveals complete absence of common ground between Gandhi and Jinnah even on broadest general principles. Gandhi wants transfer of full power to some nebulous national official [interim] government and later settlement of Hindu-Moslem differences. His belief in unity of India is sincere but he is also profoundly Hindu, and if his interim government materialized he would hope for Hindu domination subject to some degree of self-determination for Moslem provinces. Jinnah is

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 147-149.

determined to get division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan cut and dried before the British leave.⁷⁶

To this assessment of the Viceroy, the Secretary of State wrote back in the following words:

The breakdown of the Jinnah-Gandhi conversations does not give much encouragement to any hope of an early solution of the communal difficulty. It strikes me that on the issue of the definition of Pakistan both sides ask too much, even from their own point of view. If there are really to be two separate Nations with no relationship to each other than the ordinary international one, which is Jinnah's demand, then clearly Gandhi was entitled to ask for such a definition of the boundaries of these nations as would not include large numbers of unwilling subjects in Pakistan. On the other hand, if there is still to be something in the nature of a common Indian system of government, however limited, then it would not be unreasonable to concede Jinnah's claim that the existing Provinces should form the basis. All this, of course, makes it more difficult to foresee any useful outcome of any Indian gathering that you might advise calling together in the near future.⁷⁷

Amery was so disappointed that he further wrote to Wavell on October 19 that the failure of Gandhi-Jinnah discussions has "killed all interest in this country". This was multiplied by Beverley Nichols' book, *Verdict on India*, in which Jinnah's case of Pakistan was successfully pleaded as it considerably influenced the British public opinion and official circles in the United Kingdom. Despite these opinions at the top level of British hierarchy, M. G. Hallett,

⁷⁶ Wavell to Amery [telegram], 2 October 1944 in Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. V, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974, pp-62-63.

⁷⁷ Amery to Wavell, 3 October 1944, in *ibid.*, p.81.

Governor of the United Provinces, in his report of October 3, 1944, reported: "The Gandhi-Jinnah talks have made the position clearer; they have shown that neither of these leaders have abandoned any of their former ideas; Jinnah emphasizes the two-nation theory and Pakistan more strongly than before, and clearly wants this question finally decided before the British leave; Gandhi, though he camouflages his position as usual, aims at a Hindu Raj and adheres to the view that independence must come before a settlement".⁷⁸ He proposed the conference of the leaders to settle this issue under the auspices of the Viceroy.

Simla Conference, June-July 1945

The British Government started thinking on the issue of calling the conference of the Indian leaders from June 3, 1945. As planned by the British Government, the Simla Conference of Indian leaders started on June 25, 1945 at the Viceregal Lodge attended by twenty-two leaders. Political leaders, belonging to different parties, who participated in this conference were: M. A. Jinnah, M. K. Gandhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. P. N. Banerjee, Bhulabhai Desai, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Hussain Imam, Dr. Khan Sahib, B. G. Kher, Khizar Hyat Khan Tiwana, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, G. S. Motilal, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, Maharaja of Parlakimedi, C. Rajagopalachari, Sir Henry Richardson, Sir Saiyid Muhammad Saadullah, Shiva Raj, Pandit R. S. Shukla, Sri Krishna Sinha, and Master Tara Singh. While Gandhi remained in the Manor Villa in Simla where he was staying, all the others attended and participated in the conference. Lord Wavell presided over the proceedings, and Sir Ivon Jenkins, PS to Viceroy, and Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon acted as the Secretaries of the conference.

⁷⁸ Note by His Excellency the Governor of the United Provinces on the Present Political Situation, 3 October 1944, in Zetland Papers, Eur. Mss. British Library (OIOC), London.

There were four items of the agenda [popularly known as Wavell Plan] for discussion and settlement by the leaders in this conference:

1) Strength of the Executive Council of the Viceroy; 2) Composition of personnel of Viceroy's Executive Council; 3) Restoration of ministries in the provinces under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935, and 4) Timing of federal elections – central and provincial.

On the evening of June 27, Jinnah met the Viceroy and made clear to him that he was not prepared to agree to admission of Muslims to the Executive Council who were not members of the Muslim League. There was no meeting of the conference on June 28 and the conference met on June 29 at 11:00 a.m. in which soon it became clear that Congress and the Muslim League delegates had “failed to agree”. The Viceroy asked Jinnah and Azad to send him lists of the nominees of their respective parties ranging between 8-12 from each party. Opposing this idea, Jinnah said that he could not approach AIML's Working Committee in this connection unless the whole scheme of the composition of the Executive Council was not clear to him. The Viceroy said he would later finalize the proposal and promised to send Jinnah a written statement of the procedure in this connection. Then, the conference postponed to July 14, 1945.

When the leaders met again on July 14, the failure of the conference was already publicized because of refusal of Muslim League not to surrender its right of being the sole representative body of the Muslims of the subcontinent. According to official minutes of the Simla Conference on July 14, the Viceroy, who presided over the conference, “hoped that the conference would accept that he had done his best for the success of the conference”. It was also reported: “The Congress stood for a united India whereas the Muslim League stood for Pakistan and these two were entirely incompatible”. Thus, the conference ended with the thanks of the Viceroy for all the delegates who attended this conference. On this,

the Viceroy was very much disappointed to the extent that there was a rumour in the press that Lord Wavell was “contemplating resignation”.

In a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee held in Simla on July 15, 1945, it was demanded that fresh general elections both at the Centre and in the Provinces should be held at the earliest possible. On July 16, Jinnah explained his sentiments as well as his programme for the future: “I am leaving Simla within a few days and I do not wish to announce the exact date of my departure. I have already received telegrams and telephonic requests from the people on the way wishing to give me receptions. I am very grateful to them, but my health does not permit me to go through this ordeal, especially I have gone through very strenuous work during the last three weeks, which has been a very great strain on me. In these circumstances, while I am very thankful for the support, encouragement, regard, and affection in which *Mussalmans* hold me, I request them not to arrange receptions and demonstrations, en route. I take this opportunity of thanking the thousands who have sent me their telegrams and letters of encouragement and support. I advise them to concentrate all their might and main in organising our people and getting ready to face the elections which are bound to come sooner than many people think. Every province and every district must be thoroughly and systematically organized and the results of the elections would be the acid test and verdict given at the polling booths will be the main criterion by which the solidarity and unity of the *Mussalmans* will be judged both in India and abroad all over the world.”⁷⁹

Further analysing the Simla Conference in his speech in Bombay on August 6, 1945, Jinnah said: “The first question is why did Mr. Gandhi, as one of the leaders of the recognised parties go to Simla? Having gone there, why did he not attend the Conference?

⁷⁹ *Times of India*, 17 July 1945.

The reason is simple. It was to play the role of a wire-puller. He was not merely content with being an adviser to the Congress and its Working Committee but he constituted himself as an adviser to the Viceroy and through him, the British nation. Mornings and evenings, the Working Committee meetings took place and he was the guiding spirit behind. When it suits Mr. Gandhi, he represents nobody, he can talk only in his individual capacity, he is not even a four-anna member of the Congress; he undertakes a fast to decide the political issue; he reduces himself to zero and consults his inner voice. Yet, when it suits him again, he is the supreme dictator of the Congress. He thinks he represents the whole of India. Gandhi is an enigma. How can we come to a settlement with him?”⁸⁰

Wavell reported to Pethick-Lawrence in October 1945 that “violent tone of the Congress politicians” against the idea of Pakistan and the Muslim League has been noted.⁸¹ It was also noted that the attitude of the Muslim League was also of the same kind.⁸² Tense tone of the speeches was particularly in Punjab and NWFP. In Punjab the Muslim League leaders were giving the impression that the whole of the Punjab would also be included in Pakistan, a viewpoint much disliked by the Sikh leaders.⁸³ About Jinnah, it was specifically reported: “Jinnah claims, as you know, that the decision of a Muslim majority province to secede from the rest of India should be taken on a Muslim vote only, and I think that we can make it clear that this is unacceptable without appearing to modify the Draft Declaration of 1942”.⁸⁴ Master Tara Singh was particularly perturbed by the claims of Muslim League leaders. He wrote to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, on October 23, 1945: “The cry of

⁸⁰ *Indian Annual Register July-December 1945*, Vol. V, p. 158.

⁸¹ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 29 October 1945, in *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, p. 420.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 421-422.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

Pakistan is being raised more and more loudly by Muslim Leaguers who openly assert that, in accordance with the Cripps Offer, the whole of the Punjab as constituted today will be liable to separation from the Indian Union if there is a bare majority in favour of such separation”.⁸⁵ This was an alarming situation for him for which he asked the British Government to do something by “elucidating the Cripps Offer”. If Sikhs’ fears were not cleared, he informed Attlee, “widespread bloodshed” would follow.

Wavell reported to Pethick-Lawrence in early November 1945 that “communal bitterness is increasing” and advised the Secretary of State that the Cabinet may be informed of the “dangers ahead” so that it is well prepared to take steps in the light of election results. The Viceroy again informed the Secretary of State that Congress leaders are very “nervous” on the issue of Pakistan and Jinnah. In their nervousness “the speeches of the Congress leaders do not make very pleasant reading and that if the temperature continues to rise it may get higher than they themselves desire and they may feel bound to make an attempt to force our hand by another mass movement which may even be less non-violent than when Gandhi was in full control”. The Congress leaders desired the Government to bypass the Muslim League and form the new Executive Council before the elections which should be dominated by the Congressmen. Jenkins advised the Government not to do so because if the Muslim League was “bypassed”, it “might refuse to take part in the long-term discussion at all”.⁸⁶ Therefore, Jenkins advised the Viceroy to consider formation of the new Executive Council after the elections.

Jinnah’s activities were also continuously reported by the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India. In a report on November 13, he wrote: “Jinnah came out on 8th November with a definition of

⁸⁵ Tara Singh to Attlee, Amritsar, 23 October 1945, in *ibid.*, p. 424.

⁸⁶ Jenkins to Wavell, 10 November 1945, in *ibid.*, pp. 469-471.

Pakistan which adds nothing to what we already knew of his ideas. Pakistan is to consist of the Muslim majority Provinces as they stand, and the problem of the non-Muslim minorities is dealt with very superficially. Jinnah's definition does not seem to have been taken very seriously by the Congress, though in a speech in Bombay Nehru condemned it".⁸⁷

Elections of 1945-1946

In this scenario there was no choice for the Government except going for elections. The elections for the Central Assembly were held in November-December 1945 and for the provincial assemblies during January-March 1946.

Central Legislative Assembly Elections

According to the programme of Central Legislative Assembly elections, the candidates were to file their nominations, though dates differed in various provinces, between October 25-November 10, 1945 and the polling was to be held during November 23-December 5, 1945, depending upon convenience of each province.

There were 142 seats of the Central Legislative Assembly. Of these 102 seats were to be filled by election and 40 by nomination. Of the 102 elective seats 48 were allotted to the non-Muhammadans and 30 to Muhammadans. The remaining seats were distributed amongst Sikhs, European and special interests, according to the results announced on December 5, 1945.

This election was a great challenge for the Muslim League. From the start of election campaign, the Indian National Congress was showing their stiff opposition to the Muslim League and Pakistan. Addressing the first election meeting of the Congress at Lucknow on October 5, 1945, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Pandit Govind

⁸⁷ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 November 1945, in *ibid.*, pp. 476-477.

Ballabh Pant and Purushottam Das Tandon, “fired their first shots of the election campaign” when they addressed a public meeting at Amiruddaula Fort. Pandit Nehru believed that the Muslim League did not represent the whole of Muslim opinion in India as there were other Muslim organizations different from the League. He was sure that in the coming elections the Muslim League would be miserably defeated and its “Cry of Pakistan” would prove only “an imaginary slogan”.⁸⁸ In his speech Pandit Pant said that in the coming elections the Congress would win with overwhelming majority and it would result in the defeat of Muslim League because “the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind – the premier religious institution of the Muslims – was with the Congress”. Babu Tandon also was confident of the Congress’ victory. Therefore, he pleaded that there was no need for pleading settlement with the League. All these expressions were termed by the *Dawn*, in its editorial as “hysterics”.

Despite all these challenges, the Muslim League won all the 30 Muslim seats reserved for the Muslims in the Central Assembly. Thus, the Muslim League secured hundred percent victory in these elections. After the declaration of results, Jinnah in a statement, called upon the new Labour Government in London to know more about the ground realities in British India because “establishment of Pakistan” was the core issue of the freedom of India. But, instead of solving the problem of Pakistan, certain parliamentarians in the British Parliament suggested to the British Government as to how to tackle the victory of Muslim League in the coming provincial legislative elections.

In a statement, Jinnah termed the Muslim League victory in the Central Assembly elections signaled a great warning in the annals of British circles. This matter was even discussed in the British Parliament. In the debate held in the House of Commons on December 6, 1945 great concerns were voiced in this regard.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Major Wyatt, British M. P., speaking in the House of Commons on December 6, 1945 expressed his deep concern. According to him, “It is in the Punjab that the issue of whether or not the Muslim League can press their claim to Pakistan is to be decided. If the Muslim League can obtain the greater majority of the Muslim seats, they have got a clear case to go forward in India for saying, ‘we have the support of the majority of Muslims. If they do not it will be another matter. Their case for Pakistan will not be so strong’.”⁸⁹ He called upon the Government of India to be very careful in holding elections in the Punjab. The officials were required to be instructed in this matter. After Muslim League’s overwhelming victory in the Central Assembly elections, the Muslim League President M. A. Jinnah was even more forceful in pressing the demand for Pakistan. In his interview to the special correspondent of the *Associated Press of India* on December 10, 1945 Jinnah said: “We could settle the Indian problem in ten minutes if Mr. Gandhi would say: ‘I agree that there should be Pakistan. I agree that one-fourth of India, composed of six provinces, Sindh, Balochistan, the Punjab, NWFP, Bengal and Assam, with their present boundaries, should constitute Pakistan State. After that it would be a simple matter to sit down as friends and work out the details of a friendly and neighbourly life between the two great nations of the subcontinent... The deadlock in this country is not so much between India and the British. It is between the Hindu Congress and the Muslim League. I think more and more Congress members are beginning to realize that this is the crux of the matter and that, furthermore, nothing can or will be solved, until Pakistan is granted.”⁹⁰ He also expressed that “Lord Wavell knows that the Congress and the Muslim League are the two main political organisations which represent the overwhelming majority of the Hindus and the *Musalman*s, respectively, in this

⁸⁹ Ibid. Also see *Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons)*, 6 December 1945.

⁹⁰ *Times of India*, 11 December 1945.

subcontinent.”⁹¹ Speaking at the reception given by the Memon Merchants Associations in Bombay on December 27, 1945 Jinnah said that the Muslims were struggling for the freedom of both the communities and if they could not forge a united front, the Muslims would march alone and establish Pakistan.⁹² In order to celebrate the overwhelming victory of the Muslim League, Jinnah declared that January 11, 1946 should be celebrated as “our glorious victory in the first round”.⁹³ This victory of the Muslim League was termed by Jinnah as the victory for Pakistan cause.

Celebration of January 11, 1946 as Victory Day

Addressing the Victory Day in Delhi on January 11, 1946 to a gathering of about 50,000 people Jinnah said, “Muslims were a powerful well organized and determined nation and were prepared even to shed their blood for Pakistan”.⁹⁴ Then Jinnah directed his campaign to various provinces so that Muslim League candidates could win with overwhelming majority and the case of Pakistan is better explained to the voters.

Provincial Assemblies Elections

By February 1946 it became very clear that Muslim League candidates were winning in almost all the provinces against the Muslim seats. This democratic victory further strengthened Jinnah in forcefully putting forward the demand for Pakistan. On February 13, 1946 *The New York Times* published Jinnah’s statement as “Mr. Jinnah’s threat of civil war” in which Jinnah called upon the British to establish Pakistan without any further delay. He also called for determining of the boundaries of Pakistan and Hindustan. He also called upon the Congress leaders to accept

⁹¹ *Times of India*, 12 December 1945.

⁹² *Times of India*, 28 December 1945.

⁹³ *Times of India*, 31 December 1945.

⁹⁴ *Times of India*, 12 January 1946.

Pakistan from the core of their hearts.⁹⁵ If they are not going to accept Pakistan “Jinnah threatened civil war”.⁹⁶ He also spoke against the idea of appointing a single constitution-making body.

Nominations for seats in eleven provincial assembly elections were to be filed during December 12, 1945 to March 4, 1946, as each province was given a different date. The polls were to be held between January 9-April 12, 1946. There were 482 seats reserved in eleven provincial assemblies for the Muslims. When the elections were held 429 seats were won by the Muslim League candidates. Thus, the Muslim League victory in the provincial assembly election was about 89%.

With the exception of NWFP (now KP) and Assam, the Muslim League’s victory in the provincial elections was overwhelming. Even in NWFP the position was complicated. Of the 38 seats reserved for the Muslims 19 were won by the Congress nominated Muslims. The Muslim League received 17 seats. Two seats were won by the candidates of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. As far as the percentage of Muslim votes cast for the Muslim seats is concerned, the Congress candidates secured the support of 130,975 or 39.24 per cent of the votes whereas the Muslim League candidates got the support of 147,380 or 44.7 per cent of the votes, and Jamiat-ul-Ulema secured the support of 5.3 per cent of the seats. Although the Ahrars, Khaksars and Independents contested elections in the NWFP but they got no seats.

Nawab Mamdot, Leader of the Punjab Muslim League, in his interview with the Punjab Governor in March 1946 made it clear that he was in possession of 88 (73+5 independent +10 others) members of the Punjab Assembly. Despite that, the Muslim League

⁹⁵ *Times of India*, 14 February 1946.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

was ignored by Glancy, the Punjab Governor who invited Khizr Hayat Tiwana to form his Ministry in the Punjab.

The Congress put up a stiff fight to the Muslim League candidates by putting proxy candidates against them. Jinnah told the Viceroy on March 18, 1946 that Congress spent two crore rupees in putting up candidates against the Muslim League.

Cabinet Mission Plan and the Direct Action (March-August 1946)

Having strengthened in these elections, Jinnah demanded that Pakistan should be established because majority of all the six Muslim majority provinces went in favour of the Muslim League candidates. During his dialogues with the British officials, Jinnah argued that there have been examples when the Great Powers have created nations just on the basis of their wishes. Citing the example of 14 Points of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson at the end of First World War (1914-1918), Jinnah argued in one of his dialogues, that 11 countries including Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine were created in East Europe in 1919 as a result of Treaty of Versailles without holding the elections. When six Muslim majority provinces voted for Muslim League which meant that they voted for Pakistan, the Muslim demand was all the more justified for the creation of Pakistan.

But here the case was different because the British Government was not ready to ignore the Congress leadership dominated by Gandhi and Nehru. It was with their consent that Cabinet Mission was appointed just for the purpose of delaying the cause of Pakistan and indulging in the prolonged dialogues and discussion so that the issue of Pakistan is confused. However, Jinnah was strongly backed by his party Muslim League, provincial leadership and Muslim National Guards. Without losing his temper, Jinnah was ready for the dialogue to whatever extent they may go.

The Cabinet Mission consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty, reached Delhi on March 24, 1946. They started their dialogues with Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru and other Hindu and Muslim leaders from different provinces during March-May 1947. Thus, marathon dialogues were held but without any result. The talks were held both in Delhi and Simla.

When all these efforts of the Cabinet Ministers and the Viceroy failed to bring about an agreement between “the two main parties”, they at their own, but with “full approval of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom”, announced in a press statement issued from New Delhi on May 16, 1946 that “an Interim government may be set up at once” to carry on the administration of the British India, and a Constituent Assembly be formed to frame the future Constitution of India on the basis of the following principles:⁹⁷

- a. Government of the Union of India embracing both British India and the States shall deal with the subjects of foreign affairs, defence and communications;
- b. All subjects other than the Union subjects shall be under the purview of the provinces;
- c. Any group or province shall have the authority to opt out of the Union after the lapse of 10 years with the consent of the majority of its legislature;
- d. A federal legislature, which will also act as Constituent Assembly, shall be composed of 385 members (292 from British India and 93 from Indian States). 292 members from British India will be elected from three sections – A, B, and C. Section A will consist of 187 members coming from the provinces of Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Central

⁹⁷ Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, pp.582-91.

Provinces and Orissa, Section B will consist of 35 members from the Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh (with a representative from the British Balochistan), while Section C will consist of 70 members from Bengal and Assam.

- e. First job of the Constituent Assembly would be to frame the future Constitution of India. Thereafter, the provincial representatives will divide into three sections — A, B, and C, and proceed to settle the provincial constitutions. Provinces were authorized to opt out of the groups in accordance with sub-clause VIII which is as follows: “As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation, it shall be open to any Province to come out of any group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the new legislature of the province after the first general elections under the new Constitution.”
- f. If the Union Constituent Assembly decided for the Transfer of Power, a Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Union Constituent Assembly will be negotiated.

No agreement between the British Government on one hand, and the Congress and the Muslim League leaders on the other hand could be reached, though some writers have tried to confuse the personality of Jinnah with reference to the Cabinet Mission Plan. All these are fallacies. The fact was that another Congress attempt in connivance with the British Cabinet Mission target Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan and pave the way for united India’s freedom commanded and controlled by the Congress leadership. All these failed before the strong and farsighted leadership of Jinnah who realized that he was not a short-sighted leader who could refuse to have more dialogues. Rather, Jinnah exhausted them with the lengthy dialogues of a group of British and Congress leaders and all of them humbled before him.

On July 6-7, 1946 meeting of the All India Congress Committee was held at Bombay under the chairmanship of Pandit Jawaharlal

Nehru, who assumed his responsibility as President of the Congress as he had been elected to this position two months earlier. Azad, the outgoing President of the Congress, and Gandhi also attended this meeting. In his speech to this Working Committee meeting Gandhi pointed out that in not accepting the Cabinet Mission proposals the Congress had committed a grave error. He maintained that the better counsels would have demanded a better decision. But no one cared for Gandhi's advice as Nehru was against it. Addressing a mass meeting of over one lakh people who had gathered at the flag salutation ceremony of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, Pandit Nehru declared that the Congress adhered to the policy of "Quit India" adopted in August 1942 and whatever decision the Congress took would be based on that policy. Thus with the assumption of charge of Presidentship of the Congress by Nehru, the Congress' attitude again hardened which created an alarming situation both for Jinnah and the Muslim League. On July 9 Nehru announced the names of members of the new Congress Working Committee at the Bombay House of the Congress. This was done in the light of Congress' decision a day earlier by Nehru for the formation of the Congress Volunteer Corps under Major General Shah Nawaz Khan of the Indian National Army to counter the Muslim League National Guards.

Direct Action Day

These developments were reviewed by the Council of AIML in its meeting in Bombay held on July 27-29, 1945 along with the Muslim League's stand on the Cabinet Mission Plan. The session was largely attended by 460 members. Jinnah presided. In his opening address, he said that what had happened during the three-and-a-half months of constitutional negotiations had subsequently convinced him that the Muslim League had no other course left open to it but to depend on its own strength and to chalk out such a course which should make the establishment of Pakistan at the earliest possible time. On the question of British Cabinet Mission's long term plan

for India and the Constituent Assembly envisaged by it, the Quaid said that Congress' acceptance of the plan and the Constituent Assembly had been conditional and not actually a full acceptance. It was the attitude of the Congress which had created the necessity of rescinding the decision of the League Council accepting the proposals. Regarding the Interim Government arrangement, Jinnah reiterated that the British Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy had gone back on their word and had abandoned what was announced as their final proposals in their statement of June 16, in their eagerness to "please the Congress". Explaining the importance of this Council meeting, the Quaid emphasised on two points. One was to decide what new course the Muslim League should adopt with regard to the Cabinet Mission's long term proposals, while the second purpose was to decide the League's attitude to the proposals about the Interim Government. He referred to Nehru's recent press conference in Bombay in which the latter was quoted as having said that the Congress was not bound either by paragraph 19 of the Cabinet Mission's statement with regard to the final grouping of the province, or by paragraph 15. Jinnah considered these paragraphs as the main basis of the scheme on the basis of which the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan.⁹⁸ It was precisely these paragraphs that were unequivocally repudiated by the Congress. Under paragraph 15, the provinces had the right to opt out only after the will of the people had been ascertained under the new Constitutions in Groups "B" and "C". By repudiating these paragraphs, the Congress rejected not only the two basic provisions, but also the fundamentals of the scheme. Jinnah asked what was the remedy if the Congress and the Constituent Assembly went beyond their scope of the plan because the Congress had a majority in the Constituent Assembly as a whole. The Congress was hoping to take any decision it liked, ignoring, nullifying and repudiating the important parts of the scheme

⁹⁸ Ibid.

relevant to the Muslim interests, and thinking it could act in a manner which was *ultra vires* of the rights and functions of the Constituent Assembly.

Continuing, Jinnah charged the Cabinet Mission that like a drowning man ready to get hold of a straw, it treated this conditional acceptance by the Congress as genuine. They decided not only to propagate the view in this country but had created the same impression during the India debate in the British Parliament. Referring to Lord Pethick-Lawrence's statement in the House of Lords that the Indian parties could not go outside the terms of what had been laid down, as this would not be fair to other parties, Jinnah said that this statement was a "pious" one. Nothing could be done if the Congress decided to go outside the plans laid down, Jinnah maintained. Regarding Pandit Nehru's statement that the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body, the Quaid said: "It is no use imagining things. The Constituent Assembly is not a sovereign body. Either we accept this view or not. If we accept that it is not a sovereign body, the only honourable course open to us is to treat it for what it is. It is an assembly summoned by the Viceroy, who had been appointed by the British Government. It is not going to be a sovereign body by any statement or show of bravado".⁹⁹ With reference to the Interim Government plan, Jinnah said that the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy had gone back on their pledged word. Clause 3 of the statement of June 16 was based on the understanding that the Interim Government plan proposed by the Mission and the Viceroy was final and could not be changed. Jinnah emphasised that the Congress Working Committee had rejected both the long-term and short-term proposals of the Mission on the night of June 24. Early in the morning of June 25, Sir Stafford Cripps called on Gandhi and later in the day Lord Pethick-Lawrence had a talk with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. As a result of these meetings, Jinnah continued, the Congress had been persuaded to

⁹⁹ Ibid.

accept the long-term proposals with their own interpretations, on the assurance that the Interim Government proposals would be abandoned.

Jinnah's Grave Charges against Viceroy Lord Wavell

Jinnah asked the Viceroy to give him explanations on these “grave charges”. That was why he had not proposed to the Viceroy the names of the Muslim League nominees for the Interim Government. He made it clear to the Viceroy that he would not submit any list until an agreement had been reached with the Congress. If no agreement was reached the Viceroy was bound to set up the Interim Government with the one party willing to work it. As the Muslim League was the first to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Viceroy was duty bound to extend invitation to the Muslim League to form the government. If the Viceroy accepts this position, then he will submit the names of Muslim League nominees for the interim Government. He also warned the Congress that if it thought it could go into the Constituent Assembly by by-passing the League, it was welcome to do so. But the Muslim League would not be threatened by anything the Congress might do.

Jinnah's position was legally and morally very right against which the Viceroy did not want to go, though the Viceroy had erred by inviting the Congress for the Interim Government. Jinnah was playing a fair game in politics because the Viceroy had announced immediately after the announcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan on May 16, 1946 that the Party who would first accept the Cabinet Mission Plan would be invited to form the Interim Government. Jinnah was the first person to accept the Plan, but the Viceroy did not honour his commitment.

Therefore, Jinnah was right in his conclusion that the Cabinet Mission had gone back on their pledged work and had played into the hands of the Congress. Under these circumstances, the Muslim League could not have any confidence in the Cabinet Mission or the

British Government. The only course open to Jinnah was to demonstrate against the wrong decision of the Viceroy. Such a decision would have to be taken by the Council of the League so as to prevent the British Government allowing itself to be influenced by the Congress. Despite the creation of a difficult position, Jinnah called for patience and sober action on the part of Muslim League leaders: “Our motto should be discipline, unity and trust in the power of our own nation. If we do that, the Mission and the British Government would be rescued, released and free from being cowed down by the threats of the Congress that they would launch a struggle and start non-cooperation.”¹⁰⁰

After thorough deliberations for three days, the Council unanimously decided on July 29 to reject the Cabinet Mission Plan and resort to Direct Action. A comprehensive plan for the observance of Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946 was chalked out by the Muslim League Council.

Then Jinnah declared: “What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into this position. This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods”.¹⁰¹

Thus after the continuous struggle for ten years, the League reached a “new phase” in its life. According to Jinnah’s strategy, the League had been fully mobilized to shun the constitutional method and adopt the unconstitutional method of Direct Action to achieve its objective of Pakistan. Was this a new idea emerging in the mind of Jinnah? No. It was not new. Since the beginning of his political career this idea was already in his mind. He expressed this idea after when he had opposed Gandhi’s ill-prepared non-cooperation movement in December 1920 to which Jinnah was opposed. At the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 180.

dawn of the year 1921, Jinnah repeatedly expressed his idea of Direct Action which no one was ready to hear. Now the situation was ripe for the realization of Pakistan on the basis of Jinnah's strategy. Hitherto, the Muslim League had been law-abiding; henceforth it would break laws. Whether it should take the form of non-payment of taxes or confine itself to the breach of one or more specified laws, how, when and where the defiance of authority should be undertaken, what arrangements were necessary to meet the consequences of Direct Action – these were some of the questions that were to be tackled by the Committee of Action.¹⁰²

Seeing this threatening tone of Jinnah, the Viceroy approached the Congress circles to come and form the Interim Government without caring for the League to join it. The Viceroy informed of this intention to Jinnah on August 8, 1946. To ponder over the threatening situation caused by the League's call for Direct Action, the Viceroy arranged a Governors' Conference in Delhi on the same day. The consequences of Jinnah's Call for Direct action in the provinces of Bengal, Punjab, United Provinces, NWFP and Sindh were particularly discussed. Various preparatory methods were also discussed in order to tackle the situation caused by the Direct Action.¹⁰³

Before the Direct Action Day, Nehru had finalised the names of the members of Interim Government and submitted them to the Viceroy on August 15, 1946. By this the Congress was showing that they wanted to cooperate with the Government for crushing the League demonstrations in different cities of British India.¹⁰⁴ Surprisingly, the Sikhs who had earlier declared not to join the

¹⁰² *Times of India*, 31 July 1946.

¹⁰³ "Proceedings of the Conference of the Governors of Bengal, UP, Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, dated 8 August 1946" in *Wavell Papers*, Eur. Mss. D.977/7, British Library (OIOC), London.

¹⁰⁴ *Times of India*, 16 August 1946.

Interim Government, were persuaded both by the Government and the Congress, expressed their intention to join the Interim Government. The Sikhs were seemingly convinced on the understanding that both the Government and the Congress had decided to tackle the Muslim League in their demand for Pakistan.

Despite all these developments, Jinnah and the Muslim League went to observe August 16, 1946 as the Direct Action Day throughout British India. The way it was observed, it amounted to showing of the Muslim strength for the cause of Pakistan for which they were ready to sacrifice everything including their life. At the start the British Government thought to tackle the situation as they had already tackled against the Congress leaders in 1942 when they announced their Non-Cooperation Movement in August 1942. The Government crushed the Movement by arresting majority of the Congress leaders and putting them in jail for two years including Gandhi. But here in case of Direct Action, the Government realized that the Muslim League agitation was so serious that it could not be tackled. Soon they had to come to dialogue with Jinnah. Some of the details of the Direct Action Day are mentioned here so as to give glimpse of the actual happenings.

Killings of Muslims in Bihar (October-December 1946)

The Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946 on the call of Jinnah, as President of the All India Muslim League, created far-reaching effects not only on the British Government but also on the leaders of Indian National Congress, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other topmost leaders of the party. They decided to give the Muslims a lesson in a camouflaged manner. For that matter they selected Bihar province as the ideal place to stage that drama, particularly in those areas of the province where the Muslim population was scattered both in urban and rural areas. Though the events occurred off and on but in the months of

October-December a mass scale killing of the Muslims happened.¹⁰⁵ Nazimuddin's Report came to the following conclusion:

The Bihar massacre was planned and directed by top-ranking Congress leaders with the co-operation of high-ranking Government officials. The emotions of the Hindu masses were deliberately incited and inflamed by a series of provocative articles in the Searchlight, distribution of vast quantity of handbills and posters to the Hindus in the rural areas, public meetings in villages, addressed by prominent Hindu leaders, chiding the Hindus for their lack of self-respect and courage which permitted the Muslims to plan for Pakistan in a land which was exclusively theirs to dominate and rule. Attempts have been made to connect the Bihar massacre with the desire to take revenge for the Noakhali happenings. It is undoubtedly true that grossly exaggerated reports of Noakhali provided a convenient argument to the inciters and had perhaps something to do with the timing and the severity of outbreak, but there is no doubt that the plans were well-laid and the powder all but ignited weeks before Noakhali, as is decisively proved by the savage butchery of Beniabad on the 29th of September and the killing of Andhana weeks before the August Calcutta riots.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ 'Report by Khwaja Nazimuddin & others', in Z. H. Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers – League-Congress Deadlock 1 August 1946-19 February 1947, Vol. XIV, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing, Culture Division, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2006, pp. 644-655. Other signatories of this report were Iftikhar Husain Khan Mamdot, President, Punjab Muslim League, Feroz Khan Noon, Member Working Committee of AIML, Mian Amiruddin, Mayor of Lahore, Daud Ghaznavi, and Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daulatana, Member, AIML Committee of Action. The Committee had been appointed on orders from Jinnah as President, All India Muslim League, so as to know facts about the Bihar Muslim killings.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 644.

The Congress' versions of the situation in Bihar are given here. First, communal riots broke out in Chapra town in Bihar on October 27, 1946 resulting in 13 persons being killed and 40 other injured. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, in his broadcast from Delhi on October 28 appealed to the people of India to end the communal strife and bring about a sense of peace and harmony which was essential for India's progress.¹⁰⁷ On October 28 the disturbances spread to other neighbouring villages. Troops were called out as a precautionary measure. The casualties increased to 23 and injured were 151. On October 29 the riot situation in Bihar was comparatively quiet, although a tense situation prevailed throughout the province. The same situation prevailed on October 30. The rioting situation developed on October 31 in Patna and Bhagalpur in which about 90 people were killed and 160 others were injured. The situation in Patna was tense on November 1, but the next day on November 2 minor disturbances were reported from the villages and rural areas of Patna. On November 3 mass scale disturbances were reported in Bhagalpur which continued for a couple of days. On November 5, Mahatma Gandhi announced to undertake a fast unto death if the communal riots did not stop in Bihar within the next 24 hours. As a result of these severe riots in Bihar against the Muslims, there were widespread riots in other parts of the country. It affected the whole of British India. On November 4, 1946 Arthur Henderson, Under-Secretary of State for India announced in the House of Commons that the total number of persons killed and injured in communal riots between July 1 and October 30 was estimated at 5018 killed and about 13320 injured and most of these disturbances were in East Bengal and Bihar. On November 6, people were killed on a mass scale in the whole of the Patna district in which more than hundred people were killed and many more were injured. The situation had become so severe that Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, came to Patna with Sardar Abdur Rab

¹⁰⁷ *Indian Annual Register 1946*, vol. II, p. 40.

Nishtar. Later, the Viceroy had discussions with Pandit Nehru and Dr. Rajendra Prasad. On November 9 Anugraha Narain Singh, Finance Minister of Bihar, said at Patna “what happened in Bihar was a continuation of the Calcutta killings and none cannot be considered separately from the other.”¹⁰⁸

On November 3, 1946 Lord Wavell along with four members of the Interim Government visited Patna and had their meetings with the Chief Minister of Bihar, Anugraha Narain Singh and toured different affected areas. The *Times of India* even reported that 300 to 400 persons were killed in the recent disturbances in Patna.¹⁰⁹ Dr. Rajendra Prasad along with the Congress President Acharya Kripalani visited Patna and some other areas of Bihar on November 5. By using the name of Gandhi, Dr. Prasad announced in Patna that if the communal riots did not stop in Bihar within 24 hours Mahatma Gandhi would “fast to death”. There were a number of reports that killing of Muslims was specially condemned in different parts of the country particularly by the Muslim leaders.¹¹⁰ On November 14, the Bihar Day was celebrated in Karachi by bringing out a big procession in the city.¹¹¹

Jinnah was alive to all these developments and was closely watching them. As President of the All India Muslim League, he had actually sent the high-powered Muslim League delegation along with the Viceroy to visit the affected areas. But the assessment of the situation was his own. He was neither influenced by the Congress propaganda nor by the exaggerated reports by the Muslims. Whatever he said was deduced from his own information based on newspaper reports, letters from Muslims from different corners of Bihar province, and by reports by the Muslim League leaders who

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 43-44.

¹¹⁰ *Times of India*, 4 November 1946.

¹¹¹ *Times of India*, 1-14 November 1946.

visited Bihar. He even patiently read the reports of the Congress leaders appearing in different newspapers and some of them even met him privately to apprise him of the situation. He also met the Viceroy a number of times in which the Bihar killing issue was discussed along with its repercussions. In a statement issued from New Delhi on November 3, Jinnah stated: "I have been receiving reports of a very grave and serious character of killing and destruction of property from the Muslim minority provinces, such as Bihar, the U.P., the C.P., Madras and Bombay, and I assure the Muslims of the minority provinces that it was not due to indifference or neglect that I have been quiet. The matter is receiving my most careful attention and consideration."¹¹² In another statement of 11 November issued from Delhi, he said: "I know that the Muslims have suffered heavily and are suffering. But the tragedy of Bihar has eclipsed what is mere speech elsewhere. I condemn brutality in any shape or form, but the Bihar tragedy has no parallel or precedent in this record of cold-blooded butchery of the Muslim minority in the various parts of the country committed by the majority Hindu community." He also expressed: "If you really want to achieve Pakistan, I pray to God that Muslim honour should not be sullied by inhuman, degrading and brutal happenings of the kind that have taken place in Bihar. We should not sink low in the scale of civilization, morality and humanity. While our hearts may bleed for the suffering we cannot sanction cowardly inhuman massacre of the innocent in other places where Muslims happened to be in majority."¹¹³ For the purpose of assuring the non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim majority areas, Jinnah emphasized in the same statement: "We must prove politically that we are brave, generous and trustworthy, that in the Pakistan areas, the minorities will enjoy the fullest security of the property and honour, just as the *Mussalmans* themselves may, even greater. If the Muslims lose

¹¹² *Times of India*, 15 November 1946.

¹¹³ *Times of India*, 4 November 1946.

their balance and give vent to the spirit of vengeance and retaliation, and prove false to the highest codes of morality and preaching of our great religion, Islam, you will not only lose your title to the claim of Pakistan, but also it will start a most vicious circle of bloodshed and cruelty, which will at once put off the day of our freedom, and we shall only be helping to prolong the period of our slavery and bondage.” Thus Jinnah was not in favour of retaliation in the Muslim majority areas just as what happened in the Hindu majority areas of Bihar. He called for patience and forbearance for the purpose of “the achievement of Pakistan”.¹¹⁴ On November 17 Jinnah wrote to Lord Wavell in which he called upon the Viceroy to have a fair assessment of the situation of the Bihar killing of the Muslims. He was of the view that these killings of the Muslims were planned by the Congress government of Bihar deliberately. Therefore, he called upon the Viceroy: “I most earnestly urge upon you to concentrate upon the measures to be adopted and carried out first to protect life and property without delay. The entire machinery of the administration of the Government must immediately be concentrated upon establishing peace and tranquility and providing succor and help to those who are homeless, foodless, clothless, in need of medical help and wandering about in Bihar in thousands – the latest reliable estimates so far available are about 30,000 killed and 150,000 refugees – and further to see by every means how to avoid and prevent a recurrence of human slaughter in the future. This is your sacred duty and trust and I hope you will immediately impress upon His Majesty’s Government to take up this immediate task. In my opinion, therefore, you should announce immediately the postponement of the Constituent Assembly *sine die* and let us all forthwith concentrate every ounce of our energy upon restoring peace and order first.”

¹¹⁴ *Indian Annual Register 1946*, Vol. II, p. 209.

Jinnah Ignored and Congress Joins the Interim Government (August 1946)

By ignoring Jinnah and the Muslim League, on August 24, 1946 Lord Wavell announced at the Delhi Viceroy House the formation of Interim Government consisting of 14 members, names of 12 members announced and remaining 2 to be announced later. This included five Hindus, three Muslims, one representative each of the scheduled castes, Christians, Sikhs and Parsis.

On August 25, 1946 Jinnah issued a statement to the press regarding Viceroy's broadcast in which he charged the Viceroy of violation of his agreement with him. Jinnah also asked the Viceroy, "Will the Viceroy explain why should there be any departure from those proposals and the assurances, that were given to us and for whose advantage is this new move being made by him?"¹¹⁵ Further commenting on Viceroy on August 26, 1946 Jinnah said: "The step the Viceroy has taken is more unwise and un-statesmanlike and is fraught with dangerous and serious consequences, and he has only added insult to injury by nominating three Muslims, who, he knows, do not command either the respect or confidence of Muslim India and two more Muslim names still remain to be announced".¹¹⁶ He also termed this action of the Viceroy as a "blow to Muslim India".¹¹⁷

British Government Forced to Induct Jinnah's Persons in Interim Government (October 1946)

Jinnah's statement "puzzled official quarters" in Delhi.¹¹⁸ The Viceroy sent copies of Jinnah's statement appearing in the *Statesman*, and *Hindustan Times*, to Lord Pethick-Lawrence on

¹¹⁵ Times of India, 28 August 1946.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 210.

¹¹⁷ *Times of India*, 26 August 1946.

¹¹⁸ *Times of India*, 27 August 1946.

August 28, 1946 so that the Secretary of State can make the British Cabinet aware of Jinnah's tone and tenor. These statements of Jinnah were reported in *The Times* (London). The Congress leaders were also worried by Jinnah's charges against the Viceroy. In order to deliberate on the issue Gandhi and Nehru met the Viceroy on August 27, 1946. For this purpose the Congress Working Committee meeting was held in New Delhi on August 28, 1946 in which various ways and means to tackle the League threat were discussed. Various Congress leaders also issued statements against Jinnah and the Muslim League. In his counter message of August 28, 1946 Jinnah promised "grim struggle ahead" for the Muslims. Muslim League was required to show its strength in the public.¹¹⁹ However, he appealed to the Muslims to remain united at that critical hour.

The British Government in London headed by Prime Minister Attlee felt perturbed by Jinnah's aforesaid statement. They impressed upon the Viceroy to contact Jinnah. But before meeting Jinnah, the Viceroy discussed his strategy with Rajagopalachari and Jawaharlal Nehru on September 13, 1946, which was reported to the Secretary of State for India who in turn briefed the Prime Minister Attlee about all this. Thus Viceroy invited Jinnah on September 16, 1946. Both had an hour and a quarter meeting at the Viceroy House Delhi after which Jinnah was presented certain proposals which he promised to discuss in the Council of the Muslim League. It was with great tact and care that Viceroy tackled Jinnah as the following note suggested "Jinnah was quite friendly throughout, was polite, and much less discursive than he often is. In fact, he was at his best as I have known him on one or two occasions before. We have got a great deal of rough going in front of us, but this interview might certainly have been much worse."¹²⁰ By going through this report Lord Pethick-Lawrence wrote gladly to Wavell on September 21: "I am very glad your interview with Jinnah

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ *Times of India*, 28 August 1946.

went so well and congratulate you on handling him so skillfully.”¹²¹ Jinnah discussed these proposals with the League leaders. On September 23 it was reported in the newspapers that Jinnah was “re-examining the political situation and considering the possibility of participation in the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly, the League Committee of Action is going ahead with its plans for Direct Action.” However, the Government was anxiously “waiting” for Jinnah’s next “move”. After consulting the League’s Committee of Action, Jinnah met the Viceroy in Delhi on September 25. Then Jinnah, again, had his consultation with the League Committee of Action. On the other hand, the League’s Committee of Action which had been considering various pros and cons of the Direct Action since September 8 had by October 3, 1946 “completed” its plans for the Direct Action. In his letter to Viceroy on October 3, 1946 Jinnah sent his 9-point formula before the Muslim League Component Committee to join the Interim Government. After telegraphically consulting the Secretary of State for India, the Viceroy replied to Jinnah on October 4. Congress leadership was worried about these developments. They continued their efforts to persuade Jinnah for the purpose of joining the Interim Government.

It was in this background that Jinnah in his letter of October 14, 1946 proposed the following as five nominees in the Interim Government on behalf of the Muslim League which also included a Hindu scheduled caste member from the Muslim League quota:

1. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Hon. Secretary, AIML, MLA (Central)
2. I. I. Chundrigar, M.L.A. (Bombay)
Leader, Muslim League Party in the Bombay Legislative
Assembly and President Bombay Provincial Muslim League.

¹²¹ *Times of India*, 28 August 1946.

3. Abdur Rab Nishtar, Advocate (NWFP)
Member, Working Committee, AIML, Committee of Action and Council.
4. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Punjab),
Member, Council of AIML, of Punjab Muslim League.
5. Jogendra Nath Mandal, Advocate (Bengal), at present
Minister of Bengal Government.¹²²

Thus, in October 1946, the Muslim League component joined the Interim Government. By making the Muslim League join the Interim Government, an effort was made by the Congress leadership and the British to make the Muslim League members join the Constituent Assembly of India. But Jinnah was thinking otherwise because if the Muslim League members had joined the Constituent Assembly, the cause of Pakistan would have been shelved. A lot of pressure on Jinnah was put by the Congress and the British Viceroy and other British officials. But Jinnah was determined not to allow his members join the Constituent Assembly. The issue became so serious that the British Government had to invite Jinnah, Nehru and others to London to discuss the matter further.

Jinnah's Demand for Separate Constituent Assembly for Pakistan and Prime Minister Attlee's Announcement (February 20, 1947)

As a result of Muslim League's refusal to participate in the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly a major crisis brewed up in the capital Delhi, which perturbed not only the Congress leadership but the government circles equally. The Viceroy was therefore compelled to seek advice from the Home Government in London who advised holding a Round Table Conference between the Congress, League and other Indian leaders in London. Lord

¹²² *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. III, p.527.

Wavell conveyed this decision to Jawaharlal Nehru on November 26, 1946. Initially, Nehru was not ready to go to London but when he was assured by the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that arrangements will be made for his return to India in order to attend the meeting of the Constituent Assembly on December 9, he agreed.¹²³

Accordingly, a delegation consisting of Lord Wavell, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan, M. A. Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh proceeded to London on the same plane from Karachi on the morning of December 1, 1946. An interesting situation developed when Jinnah was late in arriving at the Karachi airport which upset the Viceroy. However, on arrival of Jinnah the anxiety decreased.¹²⁴ Nehru was optimistic to make Jinnah agree to participate in the Constituent Assembly meeting with the British help to return home within five or six days so that they could participate in the meeting of the Constituent Assembly on the scheduled date of December 9, 1946.

On December 13, 1946 Jinnah was interviewed by D. Maller of the BBC. During this interview Jinnah expressed the strong need for the establishment of Pakistan in these words:

We want the division of India into Hindustan and Pakistan because that is the only practical solution, which will secure freedom for both Hindus and Muslims and the achievement of stable and enduring governments of Hindustan and Pakistan, which I am confident, will settle down as friends and neighbours like Canada and the

¹²³ Ibid., p.556.

¹²⁴ Jinnah to Wavell, 14 October 1946, Nicholas Mansergh and Pendra Moon, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VIII, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979, p.726.

United States and other sovereign States both in the North and South America.¹²⁵

Jinnah added that he wants division of the subcontinent into “Hindu India and Muslim India” because “we differ in our history, culture, language, architecture, music, law, jurisprudence, calendar and our entire social fabric and code of life.”¹²⁶ Jinnah also added that this would give Pakistan the “opportunity to develop in accordance with their own culture and ideology so as to contribute to the advancement of the world as a whole.”¹²⁷

On December 14 Jinnah addressed a press conference in London in which he thus expressed his viewpoint: “The goal of complete independence is Pakistan — certainly”.¹²⁸ Defending his position not to participate in the Constituent Assembly or reference of the case to Federal Court, Jinnah pleaded that there should be a “separate Constituent Assembly for Pakistan” and separate Constituent Assembly for Hindustan.¹²⁹ Regarding the Federal Court, Jinnah maintained that main parties to the partition issue of British India were the Congress and the Muslim League. The case of partition or of the two Constituent Assemblies, Jinnah continued, therefore, could not be sent to the Federal Court without the prior approval of the Congress and the Muslim League.¹³⁰

Despite boycott of the Muslim League the Constituent Assembly continued to function which, according to the Muslim League, was illegal and unconstitutional. The Working Committee of AIML in its meeting at Karachi on January 31, 1947 passed a lengthy resolution

¹²⁵ Z. H. Zaidi (ed.), *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. XIV, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing, Culture Division, Govt. of Pakistan, 2006, pp.706-710.

¹²⁶ *Times of India*, 2 December 1946.

¹²⁷ Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. XIV, p. 737.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 738.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.315

by which it declared. “... The summoning of the Constituent Assembly, in spite of strong protests and most emphatic objections on the part of the Muslim League, was *ab initio void*, invalid and illegal as not only the major parties had not accepted the statement but even the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes had also not done so; and that the continuation of the Constituent Assembly and its proceedings and decisions are *ultra vires*, invalid and illegal, and it should be forthwith dissolved”.¹³¹ In his telegram of February 25, 1947 the Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State for India for immediate consideration of a number of matters regarding the Muslims but the following issue was marked very important:

Jinnah has declared that “the Muslim League will not yield an inch in their demand for Pakistan” and is reported to have said privately that the Constituent Assembly was dead, and other Muslim League leaders are insisting that the new approach must be on the basis of two sovereign states. Some Muslim perturbation has been expressed that if the British align themselves openly with the Congress till they withdraw, civil war will become a distinct possibility.¹³²

The British Government felt too much alarmed by the rising tension between the Hindus and Muslims particularly in Punjab, Bengal and Bihar. The worsening law and order situation in Punjab against Khizar Hayat Khan’s Ministry had reduced the government to a helpless position. The same agitation started in NWFP against Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry which paralyzed the administration in the province. This gave weight to Jinnah’s threat of civil war. Moreover, the Interim Government was “a house divided against itself”.¹³³ Forced by these circumstances, Prime Minister Attlee announced in the British Parliament on February 20, 1947 that the British would

¹³¹ Ibid., p.316.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., p.592.

be leaving India by June 1948 by handing over power to the Indians.¹³⁴

Mountbatten Joins as New Viceroy (23rd March 1947)

It was in this background that Wavell was replaced by Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy on March 23, 1947. By joining of Mountbatten the situation changed. Jinnah had to confront new challenges.

Mountbatten's Negotiations with Jinnah, Gandhi and Others and Partition Plan of 3rd June 1947

Lord Mountbatten joined on March 23, 1947 as the last Viceroy and Governor-General of British India. Immediately after joining, his first effort was to give British India freedom by keeping it united but when he failed to do so he went for partitioning the Sub-continent. For this purpose, he met more than 50 British Indian leaders and persons of different thought during March-April in order to prepare himself for the purpose of meeting Jinnah and tackle him as the main exponent of partition. A number of governmental institutions and politicians including M. K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were asked to advise the Viceroy so that the latter could well equip himself before meeting Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah. Despite his well-preparedness the Viceroy was knocked down by Jinnah when the latter met him on April 5-6, 1947. By April 21, 1947 Jinnah forced the Viceroy to work for Pakistan. Thus all his schemes to keep British India united were dashed to the ground. Thereafter, he started preparing himself for tackling the partition issue, though in a different manner. Extensive meetings for this purpose were held in the Viceroy's House during April-May culminating in 3rd June Plan by which modalities were finalized by settlement or compromise to partition British India into Pakistan and Hindustan.

¹³⁴ Viceroy to Secretary of State (Telegram) 25 February 1947, in Ibid. Also see *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. IX, p.813.

The first proposal which was discussed with Jinnah related as to how to keep British India united after the departure of the British. Mountbatten was working for this first because “he had received instructions to work for Unitary Government for India on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan”.¹³⁵

For this it was suggested by Gandhi that Jinnah should be asked by the British Government to form Union Government himself becoming the Prime Minister. Jinnah was also given the choice of forming “a government of his choice at the Centre.”¹³⁶ But Jinnah was wise enough to consider it a trick on the part of Congress and Gandhi in order to sidetrack him from the goal of Pakistan, he rejected this offer.¹³⁷ In the event of non-acceptance of this proposal, the second option proposed by the Congress to the British was that the latter should try to convince Jinnah to keep India united within the framework of the grouping clause of the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16, 1946. On this also the British and Congress officials failed to convince Jinnah who was determined to get the whole of six Muslim provinces – Bengal, Assam, Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and NWFP – included into Pakistan. For a number of days this option was discussed. In order to shift focus, the Viceroy mainly tried to concentrate on Bengal so that difference of opinions could emerge amongst the Muslim League leaders. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy when contacted by the British showed his readiness to go for independent Bengal for which the British initially encouraged him with the intention that difference of opinion particularly between Jinnah and Suhrawardy might emerge. No one knew that Suhrawardy had agreed by keeping Jinnah secretly in confidence. The finality of this scheme would

¹³⁵ V. P. Menon, *Integration of the Indian States*, Hyderabad, Orient Longman Ltd., 1985 (first published in 1956), p. 73.

¹³⁶ Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight - the Last Year of the British Empire in India*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2006, p.131.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

have changed the whole scenario. When on the issue no difference of view could emerge, the Congress, which initially gave a go ahead signal to the British, finally refused to accept this. Dragged into this complex situation, the British had to resort to something else so that Congress agreement could be carried with them. It was in this background that the British, in secret consultation and cooperation of the Congress players, agreed to float to Jinnah the idea of “truncated” Pakistan by dividing Bengal, Assam and Punjab and by attaching a number of pre-conditionalities on their terms so that some kind of hurdle from some other quarters would spring up on the basis of which Jinnah might refuse to accept the “truncated” Pakistan.

Towards the end of May 1947, Mountbatten finalized the discussions and dialogues with the Muslim League, Congress and parties representing various shades of opinion. Then he went to London to finalize the scheme. Mountbatten returned to Delhi on May 31, 1947 with a final plan.¹³⁸ This plan was shown to the leaders of both the big parties and Sikh leaders and finally on June 3, Nehru, Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh had their meeting with Mountbatten who announced the British Government’s approval of this Plan, which is also known as the Mountbatten Plan. It was followed by Radio India broadcast from Delhi on the same day by these leaders.¹³⁹

The Mountbatten Plan was announced on June 3, 1947 by the British Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons published at the same time in British India. According to this Plan, India was to be divided into two parts, one representing in the Hindustan Constituent Assembly and the other in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Bengal and Punjab were each to be divided into two

¹³⁸ *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. LXXXVII, p. 180. For text of Gandhi’s plan in this connection see *ibid*, pp. 199-200.

¹³⁹ *Times of India*, 22 April 1947.

parts – one representing Muslim majority districts and the other Hindu or non-Muslim majority districts shown in the appendix to this Plan.¹⁴⁰ For this purpose the members of each of these two Provincial Legislative Assemblies were to meet in two parts and to decide whether the province should be partitioned or not.¹⁴¹ The areas opting out of the Indian Union would join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. However, for the purpose of demarcation of boundary between two states, in terms of this decision, the Boundary Commission would be appointed to decide about the boundary dividing the Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority areas of the province of Bengal and Punjab.

Settlement of Partition Issues and Founding of Pakistan (June-August 1947)

After the conclusion of the Partition Plan as envisaged under the Mountbatten's 3rd June 1947 Plan the two dominions – Pakistan and Hindustan – were to be established by August 15, 1947 by dividing the Subcontinent under the terms of this plan. What the Indian National Congress wanted was that Lord Mountbatten should function as the common Governor-General of both Hindustan and Pakistan for the initial period of at least one year during which they could develop a plea that as the new state of Pakistan is not functional as an independent country, Mountbatten could order re-union of both the dominions. The All India Muslim League and its leadership came to know of this secret plan of the Congress and they floated Quaid's name as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, a decision which was most astonishing and disliked by both the British and Congress circles. This view was later substantiated after the emergence of Pakistan of which reference

¹⁴⁰ *Times of India*, 31 May 1947.

¹⁴¹ *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, London, 1982, pp. 89-101. Also see *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS. F. 200/112, British Library (OIIOC) Collection, and London.

was made by Quaid-i-Azam himself as Governor-General of Pakistan in his communication to Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister in October 1947. However, things were settled and Quaid came to be recognized as the designated Governor-General of Pakistan in the second week of July 1947 which bound the British government of India to seek his advice on all the issues of the partition and assets going to Pakistan or India or which were of common interest. Thus Quaid's involvement became of utmost importance for making decisions relating to partition. On most of the matters, the Quaid's advice was sought and even followed. Had the Quaid's position as the designated Governor-General of Pakistan not been recognized, all the partition matters would have been decided arbitrarily by the British and the Congress without consulting Jinnah or the Muslim League.

Partition Council

In order to chalk out the administrative consequences of the partition a meeting was held on June 5, 1947 presided over by Lord Mountbatten and attended by Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Vallabhbhai Patel in which various legal aspects of the partition were discussed. Jinnah said that there were "many things to do." Therefore, he wanted "to understand which was the first" because "they could not all be done at once." He suggested that first of all there should be Partition Tribunal which "should be the supreme and final authority and it should not be responsible to the present Interim Government" which was working only as a caretaker government.¹⁴² Jinnah's proposition was first opposed by Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel, but Jinnah finally convinced all of them about his justified stand. Consequently, it was agreed that a Partition Council should be set up consisting of two of the top ranking leaders of the Congress and two of the Muslim League and His Excellency the Viceroy as Chairman of the Council. A

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 94.

Committee and Arbitral Tribunal shall assist the Partition Council. The present Cabinet Secretariat in New Delhi would function as Secretariat of the Partition Council. Meetings of the Partition Council were to be held thrice in a week.

Completion of Formalities as Required Under the Partition Plan

Division of Bengal

On June 20, 1947 the Bengal Assembly members met in two groups – one representing the non-Muslim majority areas of Bengal under the presidency of Maharaja of Burdwan, deciding by a vote of 58 to 21 that non-Muslim majority areas of Bengal should join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, and the other representing the Muslim majority areas of Bengal meeting under the presidency of Nurul Amin decided by a vote of 107 to 34 that the province should not be divided and that Bengal should join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.¹⁴³ The Muslim majority section also decided by 105 votes to 34 that the new province of East Bengal should agree to the amalgamation of Sylhet district with it if the referendum to be held there resulted in favor of Pakistan.¹⁴⁴ The point to be noted in this connection was that while this voting was being cast, the Communist members remained “neutral” and the Indian Christian member was “absent”, but the five Scheduled Hindu members voted in favor of “amalgamation”.¹⁴⁵ Dacca (now Dhaka) was selected as the capital of East Bengal.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p.90.

¹⁴⁴ *Times of India*, 8 August 1947.

¹⁴⁵ “Setting up of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly”, R/3/1/168, British Library (OIOC), London.

Division of Punjab

On June 23, 1947 two sections of the Punjab Assembly – Western and Eastern Punjab – held their joint session in Lahore presided over by Dewan Bahadur S. P. Singha, the Speaker. In this session 91 members voted for the new [Pakistan] Constituent Assembly, while 77 members for the existing [Hindustan] Constituent Assembly.¹⁴⁶

Sindh Joins Pakistan

On June 26, 1947 members of the Sindh Legislative Assembly met in Karachi in a special meeting and decided for Sindh's joining the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.¹⁴⁷ Pirzada Abdul Sattar, the Revenue Minister, in a statement to the press said that with the passage of this resolution, the State of Pakistan had therefore "taken its birth today".¹⁴⁸

Balochistan Joins Pakistan

On June 29, 1947 a joint session of the Shahi Jirga members and the elected members of the Quetta Municipality was held under the presidency of Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogezai in which all unanimously voted for Pakistan.¹⁴⁹ Fifty-four members unanimously decided to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Eight non-Muslim members were absent.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. II, p. 539.

¹⁴⁷ Liaquat to Mountbatten, 10 June 1947, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, pp. 539-340.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 531.

¹⁴⁹ *Indian Annual Register, 1947*, Vol. I, p.77.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

Division of Armed Forces

As Jinnah was very keen on the partition of the Armed Forces, a meeting of the Partition Council was held in Viceroy's office on June 27 in which detailed discussion took place. A lengthy draft was prepared for the establishment of Headquarter of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi and Army Headquarter of India in New Delhi. But Commander-in-Chief of India was to function as Supreme Commander of armed forces of both the countries until such time that the process of partition was completed. In his meeting with the Viceroy on 23rd June Jinnah had already made it clear that it was his wish to "have a Pakistan Army ready by August 15th and that there must be an operational Commander-in-Chief in Pakistan by that date who would take orders from the Pakistan Government."¹⁵¹ The Viceroy agreed with him in principle, but added that administrative matters of both armies should continue to be under Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. On this the Quaid explained that "the Muslims no longer had faith in Field Marshal Auchinleck and they would much prefer to see someone else in his place".¹⁵² The Viceroy disagreed.

In a meeting of the Partition Council held on July 11, 1947 it was finally decided that the reconstitution of the armed forces will proceed in two stages in accordance with the terms decided by the Council which were also released to the press on the same day.¹⁵³ The first stage will be that "a rough and ready division on communal basis" will be done at the earliest. It was also declared that this decision would in no way prejudice the second stage, namely "coming out of the units on a basis of voluntary transfer of individuals." These decisions were based on the recommendations

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.78.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p. 79.

of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Sub-Committees and of the Armed Forces Reconstruction Committee.

Formation of Pakistan Flag

Regarding the formation of the flag of the Dominion of Pakistan detailed discussions were held between Jinnah and Mountbatten on July 12. Jinnah insisted that Muslim League flag would be the flag of Pakistan, but Mountbatten wanted an amendment in the shape that a small Union Jack should be shown in the upper canton of the Muslim League flag. The Quaid, in his interview with Mountbatten on July 12, explained that this “would be repugnant to the religious feelings of the Muslims to have a flag with Christian cross alongside the crescent.” Again on July 15 there was a meeting in the Viceroy House for settling the issue of flag, but Jinnah’s opinion was accepted.¹⁵⁴

Referendum in NWFP (July 1947)

Referendum was held in piecemeal. It started on July 7 in districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, and Bannu which went “peacefully.”¹⁵⁵ On July 9 the referendum was held in D. I. Khan and Hazara districts. Then it was followed in other districts. In a report to the Secretary of State on July 18, Mountbatten reported that the referendum in the Frontier Province was proceeding “in almost peaceful conditions.”¹⁵⁶ Seeing the possible outcome of the referendum, Dr. Khan Sahib chose to boycott the referendum.

In a telegram dated July 20, 1947, the Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State for India the results of the referendum by which

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, pp.269-270.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 270.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

289, 244 voters voted for Pakistan while only 2874 votes for united India. Thus 99% of the total cast votes went for Pakistan.¹⁵⁷

Referendum in Sylhet (July 1947)

In a press statement issued from Delhi on June 26, Jinnah also appealed to Sylhet Muslims to cast their votes for amalgamation with Eastern Bengal.¹⁵⁸ For this purpose the referendum was held on July 9, 1947.¹⁵⁹ The results of Sylhet Referendum were announced in a press note issued from the Viceroy's House on July 13, 1947. According to the Referendum results 239,619 voters voted for joining Eastern Bengal, while 184,041 voters voted for remaining in Assam. Thus there was a majority of 55,578 voters in favor of Pakistan.¹⁶⁰

Karachi to be the Capital of Pakistan

Jinnah had declared that Karachi would be the capital of Pakistan where the secretariat for the Government of Pakistan would be built. A number of arrangements in this regard were made. On June 19 K. J. Thoules, Chief Engineer of the Posts and Telegraphs Department and Mahomed Hussain, Director of Telegraph in New Delhi, came to Karachi and discussed with the Sindh ministers and local officials.¹⁶¹ The Muslim League high command also constituted a Housing Committee headed by N. A. Faruqui, District Magistrate of Karachi, as its chairman, and Ali Mohamed Baloch, Rent Controller of Sindh, as its secretary. The other two members of this committee were Executive Engineer and the Military

¹⁵⁷ "Fortnightly Report for the Second Half of June 1947", Ziarat, 6 July 1947 in the British Library (OIOC), L/P&J/5/280.

¹⁵⁸ Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, Robert Hale, 1972, p. 65.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ *Times of India*, 27 June 1947.

Administrative Officer. This committee was authorised to make all office and lodging arrangements for the staff of the Pakistan Central Secretariat before August 15, 1947.¹⁶²

Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary of All India Muslim League, in following the guidelines from Jinnah stated in a press statement from Delhi on June 26, 1947 by which he requested Dr. I. H. Qureshi, Professor of History, University of Delhi to suggest the officers, scientists, technicians, specialists and other men of distinction who would like to serve in Pakistan so that they could be approached for service to build Pakistan on constructive lines.¹⁶³

On July 8 it was decided that Sindh Government will move into the Napier Barracks, while the Pakistan Secretariat will be accommodated in the present Sindh Secretariat and Assembly Building, Karachi. Karachi will thus be the capital of both Sindh and Pakistan.¹⁶⁴ I. P. M. Cargill, Finance Secretary to the Sindh Government, revealed to the pressmen in Karachi that about 12,000 personnel, including families of members of the Pakistan Government, would move into Karachi from the beginning of August. He also stated that necessary lodging and office arrangements for the staff and their families are being made.¹⁶⁵

Thus the Muslim League High Command was engaged in New Delhi in assembling the Pakistan Central Secretariat in Karachi. According to a communication from the Auditor-General of India, to the local Comptroller, some 270 gazetted officers and 4,000 non-gazetted officers were to be transferred from the Government of India, Delhi to the proposed Pakistan Central Government with

¹⁶² *Times of India*, 14 July 1947.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Star of India*, 26 June 1947.

¹⁶⁵ *Star of India*, 30 June 1947.

headquarters at Karachi. They will be drawing their salaries at Karachi from September 1, 1947.¹⁶⁶

Transfer of Power and Founding of Pakistan

According to the Act of Independence the process of transfer of power to Pakistan and Hindustan was to be completed by August 15, 1947. As Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan, was insisting on the British Government to transfer power before August 15, the meeting of Pakistan Constituent Assembly was held on August 10, 1947. Next day the Quaid was elected President of the Constituent Assembly and he delivered his first presidential address which is very famous in which he explained the aims and purposes of the creation of Pakistan. The most important aspect of his speech was that the Quaid declared that Pakistan belongs not only to the Muslims who form majority of its population but to all the minorities who will enjoy equal rights of citizenship along with the Muslims. That was how the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan started functioning in Karachi before August 15. This was done on the basis of the Quaid's urgings upon Lord Mountbatten through various letters.

The other important step was the ceremony of the transfer of power to Pakistan's First Constituent Assembly which had already started functioning. This ceremony was held on August 14. A day before Lord and Lady Mountbatten reached Karachi to preside over this ceremony. In the evening of August 13 Mountbatten presided over the last meeting of the Provisional Pakistan Cabinet at the Government House in which all the Ministers were present. On August 14, the ceremony was held duly attended by Lord and Lady Mountbatten, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Fatima Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and other members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Amidst unprecedented scenes of splendour

¹⁶⁶ *Times of India*, 14 July 1947.

and color in this festive capital city of the new Dominion, the Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten addressed this morning the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. With numerous jeweled war decorations and orders glittering under the flashlights, Lord Mountbatten, who was in his Admiral's uniform, delivered his historic speech which lasted for 15 minutes in a dignified and measured tone to the full House with galleries packed with high personages, diplomats, world pressmen and prominent citizens.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Constituent Assembly led the Viceroy on his arrival to the throne placed along with his Presidential Chair. His Excellency Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of British India, Hon. Pamela Mountbatten and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan occupied the back row in the distinguished gallery while Lady Mountbatten and Miss Fatima Jinnah sat together in the front row near the Viceregal Throne. When the Viceroy and Quaid-i-Azam entered the hall all rose to their feet. Speaking on this occasion Mountbatten said: "The birth of Pakistan is an event in history." He also paid tribute to the leaders of Pakistan Movement in these words: "I wish to pay tribute to the great men, your leaders, who helped to arrive at a peaceful solution for the transfer of power." Paying tribute to the Quaid, he said: "Here I would like to express my tribute to Mr. Jinnah. Our close personal contact, and the mutual trust and understanding that have grown out of it, are, I feel, the best of omens for future good relations. He has my sincere good wishes as your new Governor-General." The Viceroy in his address also quoted the example of Mughal Emperor Jalaluddin Akbar particularly his tolerance and goodwill shown to the non-Muslims in India. The Viceroy was loudly cheered when he resumed his seat at the conclusion of his address.

Standing erect and dignified, the Quaid dressed in a long silk close coat replied in a measured voice extempore with some notes in his hand. He said: "Your Excellency, I thank His Majesty the King on

behalf of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and myself for his gracious message. I know great responsibility lies ahead and I naturally reciprocate his sentiments and we greatly appreciate his assurance of sympathy and support and I hope that you will please communicate to His Majesty our assurance of goodwill and friendship for the British nation and him as the Crown of the British Government.” Replying to Mountbatten as to his reference to the tolerance of Akbar, the Quaid emphasized that tolerance and goodwill shown to the non-Muslims was not of recent origin, but it dates back thirteen centuries ago when our Holy Prophet (PBUH) not only by words but by deeds treated the Jews and Christians with utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their faith and beliefs even after they were conquered.

Since dawn of the day on August 14 Karachi was in high spirits. Perennial streams of people lined the streets leading to the Constituent Assembly buildings to watch the historic drive-in-state of Their Excellencies Lord and Lady Mountbatten and Quaid-i-Azam and Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah. Police pickets regulated the traffic and the souring crowds which stood gazing in spite of the unusually warm weather. The premises of the Assembly were veritable sea of humanity, predominantly Muslim. The Viceroy and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah arrived from the Government House at 9:00 am at the Assembly premises and inspected a guard of honour provided by the pick of the Pakistan Army, in which the barest-caped men of the Second Airborne Division were prominent.




Thus, Pakistan emerged on the world map as the largest Muslim state in the world. Another feature of this freedom was that for the Muslims living in Pakistan the freedom was not a new phenomenon, but return of their age-old freedom as Muslim rule in the subcontinent. The Quaid at another place had said that for the Muslims this freedom was not a new thing because the Muslims had been ruling the subcontinent for centuries. In the shape of

Pakistan, the old historic rule has come back though in shorter areas than before.

Thus the man, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam, achieved the dream of a free homeland for his nation through his visionary leadership, astute statesmanship, and highest quality traits of courage, honesty and sacrifice. Long Live Pakistan.



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Published by
Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)
Hilal Road, Rawalpindi, Pakistan
+92 51 9271605 | www.ispr.gov.pk

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