National and International Issues

The Kulbhushan Jadhav Case

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its much anticipated judgment in the Jadhav case on July 17, 2019 over two years after India first instituted proceedings in May 2017. During the oral proceedings, Mr. Khawar Qureshi QC and the Attorney General of Pakistan, presented well-founded arguments with reference to PowerPoint slides and other visuals on behalf of Pakistan. Their Indian counterpart, on the other hand, was rather measured. The eventual judgment in the Jadhav case, however, has raised certain questions from a discussional standpoint, for which we must divide the case into two sections: what the court has decided; and what the subsequent impact of this case may be vis-à-vis security concerns and long-term foreign relations. 
India’s Prayer and the Judgment
Let us first look at what India requested from the Court.2 It asked that the ICJ declare that the sentence awarded to Jadhav was in violation of international law.3 It also wanted Pakistan to be restrained from giving effect to the sentence, directed to release Jadhav, and facilitate his safe passage to India.4 Their submissions also gave the court an alternative form of relief. This was perhaps an acknowledgment of how far a departure such a judgment would be from the ICJ’s previous case law. It stated that if the Court could not order Jadhav’s release, then it could annul the decision of the military court, and direct a trial before the civilian courts, after excluding the confession and granting full consular access.5
The ICJ’s decision may be summed up in the concluding paragraph of the judgment wherein the Court states: 
For these reasons,
THE COURT,



The Kulbhushan Jadhav judgment being read out at the ICJ on July 17. Photo: Twitter/@CIJ_ICJ



(From left) Attorney Anwar Mansoor Khan, Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson MohammadFaisal and Queen’s Counsel Khawar Qureshi are seen at the International Court of Justice duringthe final hearing of the Kulbhushan Jadhav case in The Hague. Photo: Reuters



(1) Unanimously,
Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the Application filed by the Republic of India on 8 May 2017;
(2) By fifteen votes to one,
Rejects the objections by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the admissibility of the Application of the Republic of India and finds that the Application of the Republic of India is admissible; …
(3) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that, by not informing Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav without delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that provision; …
(4) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that, by not notifying the appropriate consular post of the Republic of India in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan without delay of the detention of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav and thereby depriving the Republic of India of the right to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to the individual concerned, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; …
(5) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan deprived the Republic of India of the right to communicate with and have access to Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, to visit him in detention and to arrange for his legal representation, and thereby breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; … 
(6) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is under an obligation to inform Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav without further delay of his rights and to provide Indian consular officers access to him in accordance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; …
(7) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to provide, by the means of its own choosing, effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, so as to ensure that full weight is given to the effect of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention, taking account of paragraphs 139, 145 and 146 of this Judgment; …
(8) By fifteen votes to one,
Declares that a continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav.6
Pakistan’s ad hoc Judge Jillani also appended his dissenting opinion to the Court’s judgment.7 He contended that India’s reliance on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 (VCCR)8 subverts the object and purpose of the treaty and that it does not apply to espionage agents. The opinion also alluded to the issue of interference with the investigation which the ICJ had not addressed at all and which required discussion. He further disagreed with the Court’s dismissal of the 2008 bilateral agreement between the two countries. The opinion concludes with an objection to the relief granted by the Court as inappropriate given Pakistan’s courts already allow for effective review and reconsideration. 
Judge Trindade also appended a strong separate opinion to the ICJ’s ruling in which he focuses on the obligation to inform an individual of their right to consular assistance and its interrelationship with the human rights of due process and fair trial.9 He considers the reasoning of the Court in its jurisprudence on consular access to be lacking in that it does not consider the fact that the right of the individual to be informed without delay under Article 36(1) of the VCCR has today assumed the character of a human right. He believes this insufficiency has again been furthered in the Jadhav case. He also discusses in detail the wrongfulness of the death penalty as a breach of human rights. Judge Trindade considers ‘review and reconsideration’ to be a manifestly inadequate remedy and believes it should have been made clear that a reiteration of the death penalty after Pakistan reviews and reconsiders was to be discarded. Judge Trindade was former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and it remains to be seen whether the ICJ will favour his human rights-centric approach in future cases.
Matters the ICJ Ought to have Considered
Interestingly, the ICJ had called on all other 177 state parties to the VCCR that so wished to make submissions to the court regarding their own views as to whether Article 36 provides for a customary international law exception with regards to espionage.10 This was requested on the basis of Article 63(1) of the Statute of the ICJ under which states are to be notified if the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case is in question.11 This was significant as it signalled to states that the ICJ was open to their views of whether national security matters offered an acceptable exception. It was an indication as well that the Court considered this case to be different to previous precedents on consular access. This was due to the particular factual matrix applicable and the fact that Pakistan was arguing that a customary exception existed. 
The Jadhav case can be distinguished from the Court’s previous jurisprudence as the circumstances and facts of the case were unique. Jadhav faced charges of planning and executing terrorist attacks and waging war against Pakistan, as well as of involving himself in a criminal conspiracy against the state and people, and espionage activities.12 These charges include those under Section 121 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, entitled, “Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against Pakistan” and Section 122 of the PPC entitled “Collecting arms… with intention of waging war against Pakistan”13 as well as acts of terrorism under Article 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.14 These are very serious and grave charges and must be treated as such. While the Court mentions the FIR in which these charges are recorded, the only ones discussed in the judgment are ‘involvement in espionage and terrorism activities’.15 This not only oversimplifies the charges but also glosses over the abovementioned sections which are significant. Due to the nature of the charges levelled against him, Jadhav is classified as an enemy alien under Pakistan’s domestic law. Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which provides individuals with safeguards in the event of their arrest or detention, does not apply to enemy aliens. Article 10(9) clearly states that “Nothing in this Article shall apply to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien”. They are thereby disentitled to this protection and access to remedies for violations of their fundamental rights under this provision which are normally available to any other prisoner whether foreign or local. 
This designation is well-expressed given Jadhav’s own confessional statements made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Some of these statements are already part of the official record of the Court. Therefore, as an alien engaged in hostilities against the state, the consequences of enemy alien status include a lack of protection from safeguards when under arrest and detention as well as a lack of redress. The charges of terrorism and waging a war against a state – incredibly grave in and of themselves – coupled with his alien enemy status mean he comes under a unique category to which the ICJ’s former precedents do not apply. However, his status under domestic law was, disappointingly, not discussed in the judgment which made no extra efforts to gauge his legal classification. Indeed, the discussion of the FIR actually ignores the charges levelled against him other than espionage and terrorism. A more detailed and accurate look at the charges framed against Jadhav would have allowed the Court to consider his legal designation under Pakistan’s law, shedding light on the circumstances under which he was arrested and detained. His arrest, detention, conviction and sentencing fell squarely within the rubric of national security, which is not the case with the ICJ’s former jurisprudence. Commenting later on the verdict, Pakistan’s DG ISPR also rightly took the position in media that the ICJ verdict has effectively validated the Pakistan judicial system, particularly the military courts, as the judges refrained from making adverse comments on it despite India’s elaborate insistence.
This factual matrix in Jadhav is in stark contrast to the Court’s previous precedents on the matter of consular access. In Avena,16 52 Mexican nationals had been convicted and sentenced to death in U.S. courts for murder.17 These individuals were in some cases also convicted for other crimes as well as murder, such as sexual assault, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and carjacking. Moreover, in the LaGrand case, the LaGrand brothers who were German nationals were arrested in the United States on suspicion of having been involved in an attempted armed bank robbery in which the bank manager was murdered and another bank employee seriously injured.18 Neither of these cases involved issues relating to national security. Therefore, the Jadhav case was based on a unique set of circumstances upon which the ICJ had not previously ruled and the nature of the charges against him were significantly different from those in Avena and LaGrand.
As a result, it seems the Court did not view it as a pre-determined, open and shut case based on its previous jurisprudence. For this reason, it welcomed the participation of state parties to the VCCR to address the second matter, whether a customary exception on the basis of national security existed to Article 36. However, no state came forward. State reluctance may in part be because of Article 63(2) of the ICJ’s Statute, under which intervening states are to then be bound by the construction in the judgment. This silence may be indicative though that states were unwilling to subscribe to any interpretation the Court may have given in this case. Therefore, the Court’s evaluation of whether a customary exception exists to the granting of consular access was deduced from its own review of state practice. 
This is an area which may see interesting developments if more states are willing to clearly place their practice before the Court or bring similar cases to the ICJ. An evolutionary interpretation may be forthcoming and this legal principle may be revisited in the future. 
Pakistan’s Obligations Following the Judgment
It is clear from the ICJ’s decision that Pakistan has been asked to grant consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav, and to review his sentence and conviction. When the case began, there was considerable apprehension that Pakistan may lose comprehensively, receiving some form of stricture on its judicial and military criminal justice system. The trepidation of annulment was also present, for the Court could have set aside the conviction against Jadhav, and ordered a trial in a civilian court.19 Instead, the Court disregarded and effectively denied the major consequential relief sought by India of release or annulment. An India demand was conceded to, in that consular access was to be granted to Jadhav and his execution is to remain stayed until Pakistan conducts a review, but at the same time, from Pakistan’s vantage point, Jadhav continues to remain with Pakistan, and the conviction stands upheld. 
On August 1, 2019 Pakistan fulfilled the first part of its obligations by formally offering Jadhav consular access.20 What Pakistan is required to do now is to undertake a detailed exercise of review of the process – this can be done through three means: a) a domestic court could conduct a judicial review of the military court trial to ascertain whether it was prejudiced by lack of consular access; or b) under Article 186 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 197321 an opinion can be sought from the Supreme Court by the President of Pakistan which could declare whether the trial was so prejudiced; or c) Jadhav could file a claim himself to a court in Pakistan which would then decide the same. 
Under the last option, Jadhav shall need to seek permission from the Federal Government as per Section 8322 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as Jadhav is an ‘enemy alien’ within Pakistan’s jurisdiction.23 Therefore, Jadhav is only entitled to file a case in a domestic court in Pakistan with permission. It must be noted that, given his status, where otherwise the Federal Government would retain the prerogative of granting or denying said permission, it now stands compelled to extend the said permission as a consequence of the Court’s direct instructions to this effect. He can also, as an alien enemy, file an appeal from a decision against him under Section 83.24 The availability of an appeal procedure may go some way to securing an ‘effective review as requested by the ICJ.  


What Pakistan is required to do now is to undertake a detailed exercise of review of the process – this can be done through three means: a) a domestic court could conduct a judicial review of the military court trial to ascertain whether it was prejudiced by lack of consular access; or b) under Article 186 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 197321 an opinion can be sought from the Supreme Court by the President of Pakistan which could declare whether the trial was so prejudiced; or c) Jadhav could file a claim himself to a court in Pakistan which would then decide the same. 


It is now up to the policymakers in Pakistan to decide whether they would prefer to: a) explain to the Court, or to the international community, as to whether the formal filing of a claim in court (that Jadhav may take up) would satisfy this requirement for an ‘effective review’ emphasised by the Court in Paragraph 13825; or b) to set up a separate entity – a special bench of the Supreme Court (or the High Court for that matter) – to examine the documentation and evidence his conviction was predicated upon, to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the access granted to him (or a lack thereof) ought to have made a difference in his conviction; or c) have the Supreme Court opine as to whether Jadhav’s conviction and sentence was sound taking into account the ICJ’s judgment.
The Granting of Consular Access
Pakistan has formally offered Jadhav consular access. However, this raises further questions regarding the nature and extent of that access. There are certain complications and logistical issues involved in answering these. For instance, Jadhav has so far been kept in highly classified confinement. His whereabouts will need to be disclosed, which in turn will have security implications in its own right. Regarding access, furthermore, as has been directed in Paragraph 13426 of the judgment, certain technical aspects must be looked into. For instance, how frequent will the access be? Will said access be in-person? Should access be granted to an individual designated by the embassy? 
Pakistan must also look into its own laws and rules archives to assess whether there are legal processes already in place (such as standard operating protocols (SOPs) or guidelines that, though may not have been notified, may have been issued by the Home Department under Prisons Rules) which regulate such matters of access, and so on. If the Ministry of Interior (or the provincial government under the Home Department) has indeed issued such SOPs, guidelines, or instructions, they must be made note of and factored in while both granting access, and determining the procedure of access itself. 
It is in this context that another interesting query relating to said grant of access crops up. Should access be granted regardless of whether the investigation has been completed? In light of the ICJ’s judgment, access must clearly be granted, however, the question is when and how much? Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR merely states it must be provided ‘without delay’. From the standpoint of establishing precedent for future cases (in the event such a spy is arrested again), however, the legal question becomes whether access ought to be granted during the period of official remand. During said period, of howsoever many days granted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, a person may be retained in custody, without the permission to interact with anyone except his family, to provide reassurance of his well-being and safety. This is a question not addressed by the Court in this judgment, along with questions on the nature of the investigation and its implications.27
While the Court did address this question somewhat in the Avena judgment, it largely restricts its decision on the matter to a statement that the obligation to inform a person of their right to consular access ‘without delay’ does not necessarily mean that this should be immediately upon arrest or before any interrogation. However, the duty does fall upon the arresting authorities once there are grounds to think the person is a foreign national. When it comes to the question of when access should be granted, how much access should be granted and what this access can include, the Court has not yet addressed these matters. There is an argument to be made that the temporal element of ‘without delay’ would be broader in cases which relate to national security.  
Further Assistance from India
An investigation relating to the other FIRs also remains very crucial, as Jadhav faces charges, as per said FIRs, of waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against Pakistan and collecting arms… with intention of waging war against Pakistan.28 The status of Kulbhushan Jadhav, as we can thus understand, is not merely of an alien enemy or spy, but of almost a Spy Plus in terms of what he has confessed in his statements. Pakistan issued letters of assistance to the Government of India, seeking assistance and statements regarding certain individuals Jadhav had named in said statements, which are also part of the official record of the Court (India even referred to them as one of the grounds to argue that Pakistan has been delaying the grant of access). 
India in its pleadings also tied up matters of consular access and legal assistance. It took the position that it cannot provide or exchange any information unless consular access is granted.29 Consequently, as consular access has now been granted by Pakistan, it is expected, based on India’s prior statements, that it will provide assistance in order to verify the facts of the case. Therefore, Pakistan requires the statements which it has previously requested under Section 161 of Pakistan’s Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 of the following individuals:
i.    Director General, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) India, and his Officer in Charge of operations in Pakistan,
ii.   Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta, Joint Secretary RAW India,
iii.  Sub-Inspector Rakesh @ Rizwan, RAW India,
iv.   Mr. Alok Joshi, RAW India,
v.    Director, Naval Intelligence India,
vi.   Admiral Mehta, ex CNS,
vii.  Commander Yogesh Bali, Naval Intelligence India,
viii. Captain Pathak Chutarvedi, Naval Intelligence India,
ix.   S. K. Das, Counsel General of India, Zahedan, Iran,
x.  Wife of accused Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav (alias Mubarak Hussein Patel),
xi. Mr. Brijesh Tiwari, Indian trader with offices in Dubai, UAE (if in India),
xii. Mr. Seri Sahai, an Indian businessman settled in UAE (if in India).30
Pakistani investigating officers under FIR No. 6 should be allowed to travel to India and take formal statements from the abovementioned individuals to assess if they wish to contradict or support the stance taken by Jadhav in his confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of Pakistan’s Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. 
Pakistan and International Courts
Overall, Pakistan has done well at the international forum over the last few years, at least at the ICJ. In the case in question, it has the satisfaction of gaining a substantive victory as opposed to a technical one (which has gone in favour of India). Pakistan also recently won the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) case31 at the ICJ where RMI had challenged Pakistan and some other countries, seeking implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which would have meant gradually rolling back nuclear arsenal through disarmament negotiations). I held the honour of representing Pakistan in the said case, wherein the memorial filed by RMI was dismissed after the Court evaluated Pakistan’s counter-response to the same.
Cases such as the aforementioned RMI case, the recent Jadhav case, and such other matters, including the Indus Waters Treaty, which we refer to as strategic (security-related) cases, must be fought properly (unless negotiated on better terms). The same principle, however, should not be applied to the other set of cases, which are essentially economic in nature, and are based on claims made by investors. Cases which involve financial claims should preferably be negotiated, and not contested. The preference should be to negotiate with the aim of winning back the investor, who is, otherwise, aggrieved and hoping to have his concerns heard. For this, a suitable mechanism needs to be brought in place (perhaps the Alternate Dispute Resolution Act, 2016 may be referred to) whereby a panel of retired judges of the Supreme Court may be constituted, to entertain such requests for negotiations. This may well be helpful in the current circumstances, wherein civil servants have become reluctant to move summaries for a negotiated amount, in cases where financial matters are concerned.
From a long-term lens, the Jadhav case is significant because it has given Pakistan a unique opportunity to document intervention by India within its borders. Earlier, Pakistan was struggling to find venues and to win appointments from heads of state, and officials of the United Nations, to present its dossiers. This time, however, it has been able to submit a plethora of material on Jadhav – material which is now permanently part of the archive of the most authentic judicial forum of the world; material which can now be referred to and relied upon. I believe the diplomatic circles in Pakistan, for times to come, will learn to lean on these materials to build their arguments, should such issues of intervention arise again. In that sense, India managed to provide Pakistan with an opportunity to highlight before the world, through the presentation by its counsel, such matters of intervention. 
Naturally, Pakistan maintains the satisfaction of retaining Kulbhushan Jadhav, and, thereby, continues to investigate his footprints in numerous terrorism-related incidents in Karachi, Balochistan, and even Punjab (where his superior had acknowledged to have worked undercover for a good five years or so). Any disclosure from his side will be a disclosure of the Indian spy network present within Pakistan, making any investigation related to him highly significant. There might be more disclosures, or there may be material already on record which requires corroboration through legal assistance from India. 
The Need for Legal Diplomacy with India
A different approach to the same scenario is to recognise its potential for improving cooperation between India and Pakistan in the legal dimension. The tensions between India and Pakistan find themselves inextricably linked to specific legal matters. Incidents such as the Mumbai trials, the Pathankot incident, the fate of the Samjhauta Express, among others require a cooperative mechanism built around the spirit of Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA). No such mechanism currently exists. 
There is a need for legal diplomacy between the two countries as a channel for them to interact which may allow for the swift and consensual resolution of disputes as they arise in the spirit of comity. This is required all the more so in the field of international law, as legal advisers are able to consider long-term policy objectives without being weighed down by politicians’ shorter-term concerns. 
Pakistan and India may, thus, improve conditions between themselves, and serve each other’s cause better by setting up such a legal framework to improve bilateral cooperation, and engaging with each other in a constructive manner through legal diplomacy.


The author is Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan, President Research Society of International Law and a former Federal Law Minister.
E-mail: [email protected]


1. With assistance from Abeer Mustafa and Ayesha Malik 
2. The Court refers to the International Court of Justice, alternatively referred to as the ICJ.
3. ICJ, ‘Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), Memorial of the Republic of India, 13 September 2017, [214] accessed on 30 July 2019.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. ICJ, ‘Jadhav (India v. Pakistan) (Judgment)’ [149] accessed on 27 July 2019.
7. See dissenting opinion of Judge Jillani available at: Last accessed on July 30, 2019
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, United Nations Treaty Series, vo1. 596, p. 261.
9. See separate opinion of Judge Trinidade available at: Last accessed on July 30, 2019
10. See Verbatim record, Oral Proceedings, Tuesday 19 February, 2019, p.15 available at: Last accessed on July 30, 2019
11. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Article 63.
12. FIR No.6, 8 April 2016, Pakistan’s Counter-Memorial in the Jadhav case, Volume 2: Annex 17, available at p.45 accessed on July 31, 2019.
13. Pakistan Penal Code, s. 121.and s.122
14. The Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII OF 1997)
15. ICJ, ‘Jadhav (India v. Pakistan) (Judgment)’ [24] accessed on 27 July 2019
16. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ, 31 March 2004.
17. See Application instituting proceedings, 9 January 2003, Avena, pp.13-40, available at: accessed on July 31, 2019.
18. LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 2001 [14]
19. Although the jurisprudence of the Court did not particularly warrant such an extreme measure, the discussions, both at home and abroad, around the occasional politicization of the court, resolved that it could not be ruled out.
20. See Dawn News, Pakistan formally offers consular access to spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, August 1, 2019, available at:
21. Under Article 186 of the Constitution, the President would have to refer the question to the Supreme Court for consideration and the Supreme Court would then report its opinion on the question to the President 
22. Section 83 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads, “(1) Alien enemies residing [in Pakistan] with the permission of the [Federal Government], and alien friends, may sue in the Courts [in the Provinces], as if they were [citizens of Pakistan]. (2) No alien enemy residing [in Pakistan] without such permission, or residing in a foreign country, shall sue in any of such Courts.”
23. As per Article 10(9) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, such alien enemies are not entitled, in principle, to the fundamental rights in question.
24. See Haji Muhammad v. K.B.M. Sirajul Alam Chowdhury (PLD 1967 Dacca 515) and Suleman Haji v. The State (PLD 1983 Quetta 84)
25. Paragraph 138 of the Jadhav judgment reads, “… The Court considers the appropriate remedy in this case to be effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav … In the Court’s view, India ultimately requests effective remedies for the breaches of the Convention by Pakistan. The Court notes that Pakistan acknowledges that the appropriate remedy in the present case would be effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence.”
26. Paragraph 134 of the Jadhav judgment reads, “… Accordingly, the Court is of the view that Pakistan is under an obligation … to comply fully with its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Consequently, Pakistan must inform Mr. Jadhav without further delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and allow Indian consular officers to have access to him and to arrange for his legal representation, as provided by Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c).”
27. The Court lightly alludes to this in Paragraphs 77 to 85, but provides no clear resolution.
28. Pakistan Penal Code, s. 121.and s.122
29. See for instance India’s communication on 31 March 2017 in response to Pakistan’s request for access which states that ‘consular access would be an essential prerequisite to verify the facts and understand the circumstances of Mr. Jadhav’s presence in Pakistan’ as referred to in the Verbatim Record of the Public Sitting on Monday 18 February 2019, [49] available at: accessed on July 30, 2019
30. Letter seeking assistance sent by Pakistan to India on January 23, 2017, Pakistan’s Counter-Memorial in the Jadhav case, Volume 2: Annexures 11-44, Annex 17, available at p.40 accessed on July 30, 2019.
31. See ICJ, ‘Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v Pakistan) (Press Release)’ accessed on 27 July, 2019.

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