National and International Issues

Kashmir Dispute: Facts Speak

History remains exposed to cunning and shrewd twisters and manipulators. Kashmir Dispute is one such example where Indian political leadership, bureaucracy and scholars/academicians together have caused such a dust of history that it has become difficult to distinguish between truth and falsity. Below is an effort to throw some light with the help of historical facts so as to provide lead to students and researchers to further study and find the facts themselves.

Did Pakistan Refuse to Withdraw her Troops from Kashmir?

This one particular question has been so frequently twisted by India (and its sympathisers) in a manner that those who do not take pains to find out context/facts attached to it, accept it at face value and blame Pakistan for the failure to withdraw her forces first and facilitating the plebiscite.
The fact is that the first UNSC resolution asking for a plebiscite was passed on August 13, 1948 (details of clauses are given below) that asked Pakistan to withdraw forces. Pakistan, a party directly involved in the conflict with full grasp of the ground realities and likely exploitation by India, submitted a few proposals to the UN that were accepted/adjusted by the UN. However, from day one India had no intention to withdraw her forces and used one excuse or the other to refuse to do so.
The date of UNSC resolution i.e., August 13, 1948 is important to understand the context. By August 13 following was the ground situation in Kashmir: 
• Indian forces had resumed the ground offensive in Kashmir after clearing of the snow/cold weather in April 1948. In August 1948, Indian forces had been reinforced/strengthened to an extent that capture of whole Kashmir in case of unilateral withdrawal by Pakistan was an obvious fact. Therefore, Pakistan asked for simultaneous withdrawal of forces as well as information on the location and size of Indian forces in Kashmir. India refused.
• Local administration that existed in Kashmir in August 1948 was totally anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim Conference (the political party which supported accession with Pakistan). After connivance with Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Maharaja Hari Singh had appointed Sheikh Abdullah first as Chief Emergency Administrator on October 31, 1947 and then as full-fledged prime minister on March 5, 1948. Sheikh Abdullah who was called ‘Lion of Kashmir’ (owing to his few attributes that were extremely violent in nature as he particularly had been targeting his political opponents from the Muslim Conference using physical violence and predatory tactics), duly supported by Indian forces, was in full swing to crush his political opponents. Giving a free run to Indian forces and Sheikh Abdullah was against all ground realities.
• Pakistan was asked by the UN to withdraw the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, according to a UNSC resolution dated August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. However, India had also consistently demanded from Pakistan to disband Azad Kashmir Forces. India had known (but wanted to cunningly use Pakistan) that Azad Kashmir Forces were formed by the people of Kashmir (particularly from Poonch district) in response to the massacre of Kashmiri Muslims by Maharaja Hari Singh’s forces, duly supported by Maharaja Patiala’s troops since July/August 1947. How and why Pakistan could comply with this additional demand by India?
The fact is that India had no intention to demilitarize Kashmir and wanted to capture whole of it. This is 
evident by Indian action in the succeeding years as Pakistan always accepted UN proposals on withdrawal of forces in contrast to India which rejected them every time. Ijaz Hussain has thrown a detailed light on this question and a part of his research is reproduced below:

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Before examining the Indian refusal to comply with the Security Council resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 on the ground of Pakistan's non-fulfilment of her part of the stipulations envisaged in them which were conditions sine qua non for the Indian action, we propose to look at them briefly. The stipulations in question, as seen in the first chapter, were incorporated in Part II of the resolution of 13 August, 1948. They are as follows: i) since the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir constituted a material change in the situation, Pakistan would withdraw its troops from there; ii) Pakistan would do its best to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein; iii) pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops would be administered by the local authorities under the supervision of the Commission; iv) following the notification by the Commission to the Government of India of the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals and that the Pakistani troops were being withdrawn, the Government of India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces; v) pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, the Indian Government would maintain within the lines existing at the time of the cease-fire the minimum forces which would be necessary to assist local authorities in maintaining law and order.
When it came to the implementation of Part III of the resolution of 13 August, the Governments of India and Pakistan were asked by the Commission to present a plan of their own. As expected, the two parties could not come to an agreed plan of action on the demilitarization of Kashmir as their proposals substantially differed from each other. The Commission tried to move forward by submitting its own proposals and by dispatching its representative to the Indian and Pakistani capitals but to no avail. Pakistan rejected the Commission's proposal basically on the ground that the latter failed to live up to its undertaking for the synchronized withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries. More specifically, she based her rejection on the Indian refusal to reveal the strength, composition or location of the Indian forces allowed under paragraph B. 2 of Part II as well as the schedule of their withdrawal as compared to that of the Pakistani forces. As far as the Indian rejection of the Commission's proposal on demilitarization is concerned, it was based on irrelevant questions such as the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces. Joseph Korbel from Czechoslovakia who was India's nominee and chairman of the Commission made the following observation on this: 
Again it was evident that India was principally preoccupied with the control of the sparsely populated areas north and northwest of Kashmir proper, a control which clearly went beyond the stipulations of the accepted resolutions. She also continued to insist upon the disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces, an act never envisaged at that stage by the Commission.
The Commission tried to mediate between the parties in the matter but failed to achieve any positive result. In the face of the deadlock, the Commission proposed to the two Governments to submit their differences regarding the implementation of Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 to arbitration. It is noteworthy that the arbitration proposal was backed by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. Pakistan accepted the proposal, whereas India rejected it. The latter justified its rejection of the proposal on the ground that the scope of arbitration was not known in advance which rendered the procedure "novel and without precedent and could hardly be justified." Consequently, India refused to go along with the Commission proposal. As to India's counterproposal to the Commission to focus on disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces, it was viewed by the latter as being "far from a fulfilment of India's undertaking under the terms of the 13 August resolution." Commenting on this episode, Joseph Korbel made the following observation: 
The resolutions of the Commission of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, surely provided a solid basis for the final settlement. But their implementation had been defeated once more by the lack of mutual trust on the part of the two nations by their totally different evaluation of the causes of the Kashmir conflict, and especially... by a lack of good will on the part of India.
Following the failure of the Commission's mediation efforts and refusal of the Indian Government to accept arbitration, the Council decided to hand over the task at hand to one person rather than to a commission. Consequently, the Canadian statesman and president of the Security Council for the month General McNaughton was entrusted with the task of breaking the deadlock in the matter. Following consultations, he presented his demilitarization proposal according to which both sides were to reduce their armed forces simultaneously and progressively so "as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease-fire line." As to the northern areas of Baltistan and Gilgit, they were to be administered by local authorities under UN supervision and a UN representative with wide powers was to be appointed to oversee the implementation of this proposal.
Pakistan accepted the McNaughton proposal subject to some amendments of minor nature. India threw the spanners by again insisting on the complete disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces which, as we observed earlier, was irrelevant to Part III of the resolution. Additionally, she also sought the occupation of the northern areas by the Indian Army which was an equally extraneous matter.
The McNaughton proposal was adopted on 14 March, 1950, by the Security Council in the form of a resolution calling upon both India and Pakistan to carry out the demilitarization plan incorporated in it. It also decided to replace the Commission with a Representative entrusted with wide powers to oversee and help in the implementation of the demilitarization plan. Pakistan accepted the resolution without raising any objection whereas India was highly critical of it, though in the end she signalled her acceptance too. Commenting on the Indian attitude in the matter, Joseph Korbel wrote: 
One could read in India's reluctant acceptance of the Council's draft resolution that she recognized the authority of the United Nations, and that, faced with the pressure of the world organization and world opinion, she was willing to make what she considered to be concessions – a position which should have indicated to the Security Council its future method of procedure. 
The Security Council chose Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the Australian High Court who later became Chief Justice of Australia, as the United Nations Representative. The announcement of his nomination was received in India with criticism and hostility. He spent about three months in the Subcontinent in order to get the two parties to agree to demilitarize the State. India however persisted with the demand that Pakistan be declared an aggressor. In order to move things forward, he made a concession to India by making a declaration of sort on those lines. Having done so, he requested the two parties to reduce their forces to a level which would be consistent with the requirements of law and order in the State. Pakistan was quick to respond by agreeing to take the first step by withdrawing her army. India, on the other hand, refused to implement the demilitarization plan.

– Hussain, Ijaz. (1998). Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective. P. 92-95

Are the United Nations Kashmir Resolutions Invalidated by the Simla Agreement of 1972?

This issue/question has also been exploited and twisted by India that it is taken per se. The fact is that after the 1971 War and in the spirit of truce, Pakistan and India did agree to resolve the issues bilaterally, however, this was to be done according to the UN Charter, that becomes more essential in case of a conflict that the concerned fail to resolve bilaterally. Ijaz Hussain also addresses this question in his book Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, and relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

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To begin with, the protagonists of the foregoing viewpoint contend that "the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided… through a free and impartial plebiscite" under the UN auspices as stipulated in the Security Council resolutions has been replaced by the provision of the Simla Agreement of 1972 which lays down that the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them." This has been termed as "bilateral approach" to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute as against the international or multilateral approach of the said UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. In other words, in this view the Simla Agreement, which is the latest treaty on Kashmir, excludes third party involvement including that of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by any of its organs in the matter unless the two countries mutually decide otherwise. In short, in this view, the Kashmir question is no more than a purely bilateral matter to be resolved through peaceful means by India and Pakistan to the exclusion of all other approaches.
On the basis of the foregoing contention India seems to enjoy a good prima facie case in the matter. However, a close scrutiny of the Agreement demonstrates that the Indian contention is quite untenable. To begin with, paragraph 1 (i) of the Simla Agreement specifically provides "[t}hat the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries." Article 2 of the Charter which spells out the principles of the Organization in its paragraph 2 provides that “[a}” Members… shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." More precisely, article 103 of the Charter says in unambiguous terms: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." Article 103 by laying down the principle lex prior derogat posteriori (the later treaty shall be invalid if incompatible with the earlier treaty) goes against the general international law principle of ex posterior derogate priori (the later treaty invalidates the earlier treaty). In other words, article 103 attempts to regulate the question of compatibility between the Charter and other international agreements. As is clear from the language of this article, between the two categories of norms (namely those obligations undertaken by the members by virtue of the present Charter and those undertaken by any other international agreement) the former category prevails when the two are in conflict with each other. This is so because of the "constitutional" or "grundnorm" character of the Charter which its founding fathers intended as borne out by the travaux préparatoires of the San Francisco conference.
As to legal consequences of the conflict between the two norms, the international agreement in question becomes inapplicable but is not vitiated with invalidity. In other words, in case of conflict with obligations under the Charter, the treaty in question is neither abrogated nor rendered invalid. Only the obligations under it which are contrary to those under the Charter become inoperative… Given the fact that in international law an obligation to negotiate does not mean an obligation to reach an agreement, in all probability, India is not likely to agree any time with Pakistan to the grant of the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir in terms of the pertinent UN resolutions. This is testified by the history of negotiations on Kashmir between the two countries since the advent of the Simla Agreement whereby India has been and remains extremely reluctant to enter into negotiations on the issue, let alone agreeing to the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Kashmir. Given this ground reality and even without taking it into account, what is the status of the Simla Agreement in international law, in view of the fact that the Agreement virtually denies the Kashmiri people a right which they enjoy under the UN Charter and which has a status of jus cogens?....
Taking up the question of compatibility of the Simla Agreement with the provisions of the UN Charter, one notices that article 2 of the Agreement by virtually denying this right to Kashmiris comes into conflict, for example, with article I, paragraph 2 of the Charter which spells out the purposes of the Organization in these terms: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." It is also at variance with articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. By virtue of the former article, the UN members commit themselves to take a number of steps in order to create conditions of stability and well-being which are essential for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. And by virtue of the latter article, they pledge to take joint and separate action for the purposes set forth in article 55.
Similarly, as seen above, article 103 of the United Nations Charter unambiguously states that the obligations of the members have precedence over their obligations under any other international agreement. The Simla Agreement in its article I states "[t]hat the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries." In view of the fact that article 2 of the Simla Agreement by effectively denying the right of self-determination to 
Kashmiris is violative of the United Nations Charter as well as its own article 1, it is therefore null and void.
Lastly, the right of self-determination which the people of Kashmir obtained by virtue of the pertinent United Nations resolutions has not been affected through the conclusion of the Simla Agreement for the reason that they were not a party to it and India and Pakistan are not entitled in international law to speak on their behalf. This argument has been accepted by the International Commission of Jurists in these words:
However, the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir were not parties to the Agreement and neither India nor Pakistan, both of which had conflicts of interest with the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir can be regarded as having authority to bind them. The members of the ICJ mission do not see, therefore, how the Simla Agreement can be regarded as having deprived the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir of any rights of self-determination to which they were entitled at the time of the Agreement.

– Hussain, Ijaz. (1998). Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective. P.186, 187, 191, 195, 196.

 


 

Even Lord Mountbatten Accepted the Kashmiris’ Right to Self-Determination before Deploying Indian Troops on October 27, 1947.

Lord Mountbatten – the last Viceroy of the British Crown, who also accepted the offer to be the first Governor-General of the Dominion of India, thus became a biased party to the partition in 1947 – remains a shadowy character in whole Kashmir tragedy till date. Even he accepted the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination.
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Letter of His Excellency the Governor-General of India addressed to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, 27 October 1947 
My dear Maharaja Sahib, 
Your Highness' letter dated 26 October has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State, where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. (underline and italics added)
Meanwhile in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.

My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister. 
With kind regards. 

 

                                                                                                                  I remain,
New Delhi,                                                                                                Yours sincerely,
27 October 1947                                                                                       MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
    

– Hussain, Ijaz. (1998). Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective. P.253, 254.

 

Tribal Freedom Fighters Wrongly Accused by India

In extreme cold days of Kashmir’s winters, freedom fighters from Tribal Areas (who had decided to join Pakistan in 1947 but still not under full control) volunteered to help the people of Kashmir who had been killed in millions since July 1947. These brave people, wrongly dubbed as ‘invaders’, actually mounted a response to the communal genocide that Maharaja Hari Singh’s forces, goons from RSS, and violent Hindus (including refugees) had been committing against defenseless Muslims, particularly against those from the Jammu province of Kashmir. These tribal fighters went to Kashmir in the spirit of revenge against murderous Hindus and Sikhs in Kashmir. Once they targeted such forces and their sympathizers (Kashmiri Hindu and Sikh population in Muzaffarabad and Uri districts), India propagated and portrayed them as ‘invaders and looters’. This is far from the truth and in fact blemished the fighting spirit of these warriors who went to help the Kashmiri Muslims. Their targeting of the Hindus and Sikhs of Kashmir, who had been actively supporting the Maharaja’s forces in killing of millions of Muslims, is portrayed as barbaric actions against Kashmiris. This paragraph below from Alastair Lamb’s book amply highlights this aspect.     

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The havoc wreaked upon the unfortunate population of the Vale of Kashmir by the Pathan "aggressors" has become part of the folk-lore of the Kashmir dispute; and it is constantly raised by the Indian side as justification for their own intervention. Quite what damage the Pathans in fact did has never been analysed objectively. Parties of tribesmen certainly looted the bazaar in Muzaffarabad, where there were many Hindu and Sikh shopkeepers at this period. They also attacked Christian premises, notably in Baramula, as might be expected from warriors engaged on what they saw as a jihad, a holy war. What else they did is far from clear; and any incidental savagery by these men would pale into insignificance when compared to what had taken place both in the Punjab and in Jammu at the time of Partition (with as many as 16,000,000 refugees and 500,000 killed through communal violence). There can be no doubt that for those in the way, Pathans on the warpath are bad news. There is no evidence, however, for the argument that what took place in the Vale of Kashmir immediately after 22 October 1947 marked one of the great atrocities of the modern history of the subcontinent. The significance of the Pathan atrocities is to be found less in their alleged magnitude than in the great publicity given to them at the time and ever since.

– Lamb, Alastair. (1991). Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990. P.143.

India had Militarily Intervened in Kashmir Even Before the Fraudulent Accession

Moreover, whatever might be argued in defence of the timing, actual or intended, of the Indian intervention on 27 October, it could not be said that the Patiala troops, who were certainly in theory subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, only arrived after accession. They were there before the tribal advance of 22 October. Indeed, a good case can be made that the presence of the tribesmen was a direct response to the arrival of the Patiala troops. So, once again, who was "aggressing" against whom?

 

– Lamb, Alastair. (1991). Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990. P.155.

Kashmir – Fully Integral to Pakistan and Not India

India claims Kashmir as ‘integral part’, but geography, history, ideology, culture and demography show the contrary. It is not India but Pakistan that has deep-rooted links and ties with Kashmir. For these very reasons, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947.
A paragraph below by Christopher Snedden (an independent writer) amply highlights this:

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For Maharaja Hari Singh, accession to Pakistan was, in terms of J&K's geography, feasible, even desirable. This was because almost all of J&K's major geographical, communication and economic links were with areas of western Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province that were to become part of the new Muslim-majority state of Pakistan. Geographically speaking, the only railway line that entered J&K was a branch of the North Western Railway from Sialkot, some twenty-five miles away in Pakistan, to J&K's winter capital, Jammu City. As for motorable roads, J&K had few. Like the railway line, the main road to Jammu City was from Sialkot. Of the three roads to Srinagar, J&K's summer capital, two entered J&K from areas that were to become part of Pakistan. The first was the all-weather Jhelum Valley Road, which ran alongside the Jhelum River for 132 of its 196 miles.
This road began in Rawalpindi, where there was a railhead, and then went via Murree and Domel, near Muzaffarabad, to Srinagar. A second road went from the NWFP rail terminus of Havelian, seventy-one miles further north of Rawalpindi, via Abbottabad, to Muzaffarabad, and then to Srinagar. A third, 'more picturesque' road was an extension of the Sialkot-Jammu road. This route went for 203 miles from Jammu City to Srinagar via the Banihal Pass, which was often snowbound during winter from December to April and was 'notoriously liable to gullying and landslips'. In terms of communications, J&K's post and telegraphic links invariably followed the major road or rail links that entered the princely state. These also originated in, or traversed through, areas that were to become part of Pakistan.
Economically speaking, accession to Pakistan was feasible as J&K's links with areas that were to become part of this new dominion were highly important. Indeed, the J&K economy was heavily integrated with, and dependent on, these areas. Up to 98 per cent of the non-timber exports from the Kashmir Valley went via the Jhelum Valley Road to Rawalpindi, the city considered the 'warehouse' for goods transiting to and from the Kashmir Valley. J&K timber exports were floated down the Jhelum and Chenab rivers to points downstream in (Pakistani) Punjab. (Equally, these rivers' headwaters controlled vitally important water flows from J&K into the downstream (Pakistani) Punjab canal system.) Goods from J&K freighted by rail from Jammu City or Rawalpindi were carried on the western rail network to Karachi, the traditional port for the princely state. Owing to its proximity, Karachi enjoyed a 65 per cent freight advantage over goods sent to Bombay or Calcutta. Finally, even in the 1940s, Kashmir Province was a popular tourist destination, with tourism 'of vast economic importance'. In 1940, almost all of the province's 29,292 visitors, who comprised 8,367 Europeans and 20,925 Indians, would have entered J&K by roads coming from areas that were to become part of Pakistan, chiefly the Jhelum Valley Road.

– Snedden, Christopher. (2012). The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir.P.8,9.

  

 — Snedden, Christopher (2012). The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir. P.10.


How a Majority Population Was Controlled by a Minority in the Government

The question of all Muslims living in the Subcontinent in a United India has been frequently raised on the argument that the combined strength of Muslims would not have allowed the Hindu majority to subjugate/exploit a dominant minority. Kashmir under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh presents an interesting case study that proves contrary. Pre-1947 Kashmir had a Muslim majority (approx. 80%) that was ruled by a minority Hindu/Sikh population (approx. 17%) dominant in government/state apparatus. The way Maharaja’s government had been using state machinery, rules and procedures to control and subjugate a population that was four times larger should be an eye-opener for all Muslims living in independent Pakistan, Bangladesh and Azad Kashmir.

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In 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh controlled all of his regime's organs of violence, power or influence, either directly or by making senior appointments to them, or by passing laws that ensured the superior position of him and his religious community. He usually appointed Hindus to his administration, police, and army, certainly at the senior levels. Frequently, these Hindus were from the same geographical area of eastern Jammu as the ruling Dogra clan, or they regarded themselves as part of the ruler's 'royal clan', or they were indebted to the ruler for their wealth and wellbeing. Muslims were under-represented in these bodies, particularly at senior levels. By April 1945, they comprised 40 per cent of J&K's civil service. In 1932, they comprised 45 per cent of the 1,500-strong Department of Police, only outnumbering non-Muslims at the constable level (460 to 430). Of the other 600 men with any rank, only 200 were Muslims (35 per cent); of the thirty-seven men holding the rank of inspector and above, only two were Muslims. The 'Jammu army', which comprised 9,100 men in 1939 was even more heavily dominated by non-Muslims: a maximum of 25 per cent of its soldiers were Muslims; much of the remainder (63 per cent) were Hindus from the Maharaja's Dogra community. Kashmiris, almost all of whom were Muslims, were debarred from military service as they were 'considered a non-martial race'. Equally discriminatory, the J&K Arms Act 1940 allowed only (Jammu-based) Rajput Dogras to own and use firearms. To discourage further conversions to Islam, particularly among Kashmiris, Hari Singh passed laws that compelled converts to forfeit all ancestral property. This was a further sign of the Hindu Maharaja's overwhelming power.

– Snedden, Christopher (2012). The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir. P.14.

Junagadh and Kashmir – Two Parallel Cases Exposing Indian Duplicity

The voluntary accession of Junagadh to Pakistan on August 15, 1947 (as compared to fraudulent and under duress accession sought from Maharaja of Kashmir by India on October 26, 1947), and, retaliatory initial response by Indian government to this legal act by Nawab of Junagadh and ultimate capture by India is a clear example of India’s duplicity, hypocrisy and aggressive policy towards weak neighbours. Few of the facts related to both states are:
• Junagadh willingly acceded to Pakistan on August 15, 1947.
• Indian government led by Nehru strongly reacted to it, raising the argument that the majority of Junagadh’s population comprised Hindus. On August 25, 1947 Nehru wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan that, “in case Junagadh became a part of federation of Pakistan, Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce to such an arrangement (Bangash, Yaqoob Khan. A Princely Affair. Oxford. P.110)
• Pakistan officially accepted the accession on September 15, 1947 according to provisions of India Independence Act 1947 – a month before India intervened and sent her forces to Kashmir on October 27, 1947 using the Instrument of Accession as a legal pretext. In case of Junagadh, India rejected the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and on September 17, 1947 the Indian cabinet decided and sent troops called the Kathiawar Defence Force to surround Junagadh.
• India laid an economic blockade of Junagadh by the end of September/October 1947, and also created a provisional government (Arzi Hukumat) under Gandhi’s nephew.
• Finally, India entered her forces in Junagadh on November 9, 1947 and captured the state that had legally become part of Pakistan, thus totally ignoring the validity of the Instrument of Accession.
• In case of Kashmir, a reverse formula was applied and India entered her forces in Kashmir on October 27, 1947 and captured two-third area of the state – this time using a fraudulent Instrument of Accession from the wrong end.
• Lord Mountbatten remained an accomplice to both these conspiracies against Pakistan.

Jammu and Kashmir: Extracts from Telegrams Sent by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

(i)    For Prime Minister, Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India, dated 27 October 1947: 
       ‘I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view.’
(ii)   From Prime Minister, India, to Prime Minister, Pakistan, dated 31 October 1947:
      ‘Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world.'
(iii)  For Liaquat Ali Khan, from Jawaharlal, Nehru, dated 4 November 1947:
       ‘I wish to draw your attention to broadcast on Kashmir which I made last evening. I have stated our Government's policy and made it clear that we have no desire to impose our will on Kashmir. I further stated that we have agreed on impartial international agency like United Nations supervising any referendum.’
(iv)  From Jawaharlal Nehru, for Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, dated 4 October 1948:
       ‘We have never resiled from our position that there should as soon as normal conditions return to Jammu and Kashmir be a fair and free Plebiscite.’
(v)   From Jawaharlal Nehru, for Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, dated 4 October 1948:
       ‘I can only say that I share your desire to allow the will of people to prevail in finding a solution of Kashmir question, and that I shall always be ready to co-operate in finding a peaceful and honourable solution of this problem.’

 

– Ayub Khan, Mohammad. Friends Not Masters. P.242, 243.

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